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Abstract 
Corporate governance (CG) has been introduced to China as central to establishing the 
modern company system. The current Chinese CG principles and legal framework are 
the results of China having absorbed lessons and copied advanced and matured CG 
models from other countries. This thesis evaluates the process of CG practice by 
Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and concludes that the main issue for Chinese 
SOEs is not to adopt a fixed model of CG to copy, but to develop a complete and 
continuous set of institutions that lead to effective CG in the context of China’s 
economic and social environment.  
 
At this transitional stage, what are the significance and the functions of CG in China? 
And how do these functions applied in reality? During the last decade of practice, what 
are the achievements and problems of CG in the reform of SOEs in China? What are the 
future perspectives of Chinese SOEs’ reform? The series of questions above describe 
the dynamic of this thesis. In discussing the phenomenon of CG in the reform of SOEs, 
this thesis reviews the debates about the role of CG in China’s SOEs reform. 
Furthermore, this thesis will analyze the tensions concerning CG in the process of 
SOEs reform, in relation to ownership, boards of directors, shareholders and boards of 
supervisors. Moreover, explorations taking a legal approach are made in this thesis in 
order to find and fill the gap between theory and practice about CG of SOEs in China. 
 
The research into the CG of Chinese SOEs is a challenging and stimulating field. The 
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aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the CG of Chinese SOEs and offer some 
suggestions for improvement to make the development of CG of Chinese SOEs more 
attractive to experts and scholars, so as to better guide the practice.  
 
 
 5 
Contents 
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................... 1 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 3 
Chinese Terms ................................................................................................................ 7 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 8 
List of Legislation and International Agreements .......................................................... 9 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................ 18 
1.1 Definition ....................................................................................................... 20 
1.1.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance .............................................. 20 
1.1.2 The Concept of SOEs .......................................................................... 30 
1.1.3 Corporate Governance of SOEs .......................................................... 32 
1.2 Research Questions ........................................................................................ 34 
1.3 Methodology .................................................................................................. 36 
1.3.1 Documentation Analysis ..................................................................... 36 
1.3.2 Fieldwork and Case Studies Methods ................................................. 38 
1.3.3 Qualitative Research Strategy ............................................................. 41 
1.4 Theoretical Approaches and Literature Review ............................................. 43 
1.4.1 Reform of SOEs in China ................................................................... 47 
1.4.2 CG of SOEs......................................................................................... 55 
1.5 Outline and Overview of Chapters ................................................................ 62 
1.6 Contributions made by this Thesis ................................................................. 65 
Chapter 2:  The Development of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 
in China ........................................................................................................................ 67 
2.1 The Background of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprise in 
China .................................................................................................................... 69 
2.1.1 Economic Reform and its Impacts on State-owned Enterprises Reform
...................................................................................................................... 70 
2.1.2 Different Targets of SOEs Reform ...................................................... 78 
2.2 CG at the Transition Stage ............................................................................. 96 
Chapter 3: Transformation of the Owner and Control of SOEs in the State-Owned 
Enterprise Reform ........................................................................................................ 99 
3.1 Expanding the SOEs’ Autonomy (Kuoda Qiye Zizhuquan) ........................ 100 
3.2 State Enterprises Pay Taxes Instead of Turning over their Profit to the State 
(Ligaishui) .......................................................................................................... 104 
3.3 The Reform of Shareholding System (Gufenzhi Gaige) in Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises Reform....................................................................... 106 
3.4 'Grasp the Large and Free the Small' (Zhuada Fangxiao) ........................... 116 
3.5 Debt-into-Equity Reform (Zhai Zhuan Gu) ................................................. 119 
3.6 The Owner (shareholder) and Control of the SOEs under the Supervision and 
Administration of SASAC ................................................................................. 123 
Chapter 4:  Internal Governance of Chinese State-owned Listed Companies (I) ..... 128 
4.1 The Shareholder Meetings and the Rights of Shareholders ......................... 137 
4.2 The Board of Directors ................................................................................ 148 
 6 
4.3 The Supervisory Board ................................................................................ 153 
4.4 The Manager ................................................................................................ 161 
4.5 Information Disclosure ................................................................................ 162 
4.6 The stakeholders .......................................................................................... 166 
Chapter 5: Internal Governance of Chinese State-Owned Listed Companies (II): the 
Tension Issues for Internal Governance ..................................................................... 173 
5.1 The Problems about the Ownership Structure and the Controlling Shareholder 
Behaviour ........................................................................................................... 174 
5.1.1 The Problems about the Ownership Structure: Equity Concentration 
have not been Fundamentally Solved ........................................................ 174 
5.1.2 The Problems about the Controlling Shareholder’s Behaviour ........ 182 
5.2 The Problem about the Related Party Transactions and Information Disclosure
............................................................................................................................ 185 
5.2.1 The Main Methods of Related Transactions ..................................... 186 
5.2.2 Difficulties of Determining the Reasonable Price of the Related 
Transactions ............................................................................................... 188 
5.2.3 Inadequate Disclosure of Information on Related Transactions ....... 188 
5.3 The Problems for San Hui (General Meeting of Shareholders, Board of 
Directors, and Board of Supervisors)................................................................. 191 
5.3.1 A formalized San Hui ........................................................................ 191 
5.3.2 Problems of the Board of Directors .................................................. 191 
5.3.3 Problems of the Board of Supervisors .............................................. 197 
5.4 Problems about Stakeholders ....................................................................... 201 
Chapter 6: The Characteristics and the Suggestions of the Corporate Governance of 
Chinese State-Owned Listed Companies ................................................................... 208 
6.1 Characteristics .............................................................................................. 208 
6.1.1 Strong Government Intervention and the Government-led Driving 
Force .......................................................................................................... 208 
6.1.2 Transplantation of Chinese Corporate Governance .......................... 210 
6.2 Suggestions .................................................................................................. 213 
6.2.1 Fundamentally Solve the Problem of Related Party Transactions .... 214 
6.2.2 Perfect the Management System of the State-Owned Equity, 
Standardize the Scope and Procedure of Government Intervention .......... 217 
6.2.3 Improve the Efficiency of Corporate Governance of State-owned 
Holding Listed Companies ........................................................................ 219 
6.2.4 Strengthen the Supervision of Insider Information Sources ............. 226 
6.2.5 Improve the State-owned Equity Transfer System ........................... 227 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 231 
Appendix I ................................................................................................................. 234 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 243 
 
 
 
 7 
Chinese Terms 
 
baozhuang shangshi (包装上市) going public through the packaging less rotten assets  
 
chengbao jingying zerenzhi (承包经营责任制) responsibility contract system 
 
faren gu (法人股) legal-person shares 
 
geren gu (个人股) individual shares  
 
guanxi (关系) social connections, social relations 
 
gugai (股改) shareholding structure reform 
 
guojia gu (国家股) state shares 
 
guojiutiao (国九条) nine-point policy guideline released by the State Council on 
Developing China’s capital markets  
 
jianjinshi minyinghua (渐进式民营化) gradual, step-by-step privatization 
 
minyinghua (民营化) privatization  
 
minying qiye (民营企业) private enterprise 
 
shuanggui zhi (双轨制) dual-track system; dual-track approach 
 
wei guoqi jiekun (为国企解困) save state-owned enterprises from financial difficulties 
 
yigu duda (一股独大) dictatorship of one shareholder 
 
zhuada fangxiao (抓大放小) grasp the large, release the small  
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Abbreviations 
 
BOC               Bank of China 
CCT               China Cheng Tong  
CG                Corporate governance  
CIRC              China Insurance Regulatory Commission  
CNPC              China National Petroleum Corporation 
CPC               Communist Party of China 
CPPCC             Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference  
CSRC              China Securities Regulatory Commission  
ESOP              Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
FDI                Foreign Direct Investment  
FSA               Financial Services Authority 
GNP               Gross National Product  
ICLCG             Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance 
ICRA              Information and Credit Rating Agency 
LP                 Legal Person  
LR                 Listing Rules 
M&A               Merger and Acquisition 
MES                Modern Enterprises System 
MoC               Ministry of Commerce 
NDRC              National Development and Reform Commission  
NPC                National People’s Congress  
OECD              Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PRC                People’s Republic of China  
SASAC             State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission  
SCRES              State Commission on the Reform of the Economic System 
SCSC               State Council Securities Commission 
SDIC               State Development& Investment Corporate  
SEC                Securities and Exchange Commission 
SHSE               Shanghai Stock Exchange  
SMLR              Stock Market Listing Rules 
SOE                State-owned Enterprises  
TVE                Township and Village Enterprises 
WTO               World Trade Organization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
List of Legislation and International Agreements 
 
People’s Republic of China  
 
The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee  
 
1982 中华人民共和国宪法 Constitution Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and came into 
force on 4 December 1982, then amended in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004; amendment 
came into force on 14 March 2004)  
 
1985 中华人民共和国会计法 Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National 
People’s Congress on 21 January 1985, and amended in 1993 and 1999 respectively; 
amendment came into force on 1 July 2000) 
 
1988 中华人民共和国全民所有制工业企业法 Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned 
by the Whole People of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the First Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 13 April 
1988 and came into force on 1 August 1998, then amended by the Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending Some Laws on 
27 August 2009; amendment came into force on 27 August 2009) 
 
1989 中华人民共和国行政诉讼法 Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 
(adopted by the Second Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 4 April 
1989 and came into force on 1 October 1990) 
 
1991 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China 
(adopted by the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 9 April 
1991 and came into force on 28 October 2007) 
 
1993 中华人民共和国公司法 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress on 29 December 1993, amended 25 December 1999 and further 
amended on 28 August 2004; amendment came into force on 1 January 2006 ) 
 
1993 中华人民共和国宪法修正案 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted at the First Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress and promulgated 
for implementation by the Announcement of the National People’s Congress on March 
29, 1993) 
 
 10 
1994 中华人民共和国仲裁法 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress on 31 August 1994, and came into force on 1 September 1995, 
amended and amendment came into force on 27 August 2009) 
 
1997 中华人民共和国刑法 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Fifth National People’s Congress on 1 July 1979, then was amended on 
14 March 1997 ; amendment came into force on 1 October 1997) 
 
1998 中华人民共和国证券法 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress on 29 December 1998, amended 27 October 2005; amendment came 
into force on 1 January 2006) 
 
1999 中华人民共和国会计法 Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Ninth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National 
People’s Congress on 21 January 1985, amended in 1993, 1999; amendment came into 
force on 1 July 2000) 
 
2003 中华人民共和国证券投资基金法 Securities Investment Fund Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress on 28 October 2003, and came into force on 1 June 2004, replacing 1997 
Tentative Rules of Securities Investment Fund) 
 
2005 中华人民共和国公务员法 Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 27 April 
2005) 
 
The State Council and its Ministries and Commissions 
 
1979 关于扩大国营工业企业经营管理自主权的若干规定 several Provisions on the 
Expanding the Autonomy in Operation of the State-owned Industrial Enterprises 
(issued by the State Council on 13 July 1979) 
 
1983 关于国有企业利改税试行办法 (Tentative) Procedures for State enterprises pay 
taxes instead of turning over their profit to the state (ligaishui)  
(issued by Ministry of Finance was forwarded by the State Council) 
 
1986 关于深化企业改革增强企业活力的若干规定the Provision on the Deepening 
Enterprises Reform and Enhancing the Vitality of Enterprises 
(issued by the State Council on 5th December 1986） 
 
1992 全民所有制工业企业转换经营机制条例 Regulation on the Transformation of 
Operational Mechanism of the Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 
 11 
(adopted at the 106th executive meeting of the State Council on June 30, 1992, and 
promulgated by Order No.103 of the State Council on July 23,1992） 
 
1992 股份制企业试点办法 the Pilot Measures for Joint-Stock Enterprises 
(No. 30 [1992] Order of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System 
(SCRES) 1992) 
 
1992股份有限公司规范意见Opinion Standards for the Companies Limited by Shares 
(promulgated by No. 31 [1992] Order of the State Commission for Restructuring the 
Economic System (SCRES) on May 15,1992) 
 
1992 有限责任公司规范意见 Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability Companies 
(promulgated by the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System 
(SCRES) on May 15,1992 ） 
 
1992 国家科学技术委员会，国家经济体制改革委员会关于在国家高新技术产业
开发区创办高新技术股份有限公司若干问题的暂行规定 Interim Provisions of the 
State Commission of Science and Technology and the State Economic Restructuring 
Commission on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of High and New 
Technology Incorporated Companies within National High and New Technology 
Industry Development Zones （Expired） 
(issued by State Science and Technology Commission (repealed) on 19th,  Nov, 1992) 
 
1992 股份制试点企业国有资产管理暂行规定Interim Provisions on the Ownership 
of State-owned Shares of the Pilot Enterprises of the Stock Ownership  
(adopted by State-owned Assets Administration Bureau on July 27 1992) 
 
1992 海南经济特区股份有限公司条例 Provisions on Hainan Special Economic 
Zone Concerning Joint Stock Limited Companies 
(adopted by Twenty-third Meeting of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress 
of Hainan Province on July 11 1992) 
 
1993 股票发行与交易管理暂行条例 Interim Provisions on the Management of the 
Issuing and Trading of Stocks 
(promulgated by the State Council and came into force on 22 April 1993) 
 
1993 中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定 Decisions of the 
Communist Party Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of 
a Socialist Market Economy System 
(adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Fourteenth National Congress on 14 
Nov. 1993) 
 
1994 国务院对《外经贸股份有限公司内部职工持股试点暂行办法》的批复Reply 
of the State Council on the Provisional Measures for Experiments of Employee Stock 
 12 
Option Plans in Joint-Stock Limited Companies of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation 
[Letter No. 54(1994) of the State Council] 
 
1994 关于股份有限公司境外募集股份及上市的特别规定 Special Provisions on 
Joint Stock Limited Companies Issuing Shares and Listing Overseas 
(promulgated by the State Council and came into force on 4 August 1994) 
 
1994 到境外上市公司章程必备条款 Mandatory Provisions for the Articles of 
Association of Companies Listed Overseas 
(promulgated by the State Council and the State Commission for Restructuring the 
Economic System and came into force on 27 August 1994) 
 
1994 财政部，国家体改委，国家经贸委，国家税务总局，国务院法制局关于停
止执行企业以留利再投资退 40%所得税规定的通知 Notice of the Ministry of 
Finance, the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission, the State Administration of Taxation and the Bureau 
of the Legislative Affairs under the State Council on Stopping the Implementation of 
the Provisions that 40% of Income Tax will be Refunded if an Enterprise Makes 
Reinvestment by Using the Retained Profits 
 
1995 国务院关于深化企业职工养老保险制度改革的通知 Circular of the State 
Council on Deepening the Reform of the Pension System for Staff and Workers of 
Enterprises 
 
1995 国务院关于原有有限责任公司和股份有限公司依照《中华人民共和国公司
法》进行规范的通知 Notice of the State Council to Standardize Original Limited 
Liability Companies and Joint Stock Limited Companies in Accordance with the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(issued by the State Council on 3rd July 1995) 
 
1995中央关于指导国民经济和社会发展“九五计划”和 2012年远景目标的建议
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Zhiding Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Jiuwu Jihua 
he Er ling yi er Nian Yuanjing Mubiao de Jianyi 
(promulgated officially at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP’s 14th Central Committee on 28 
September 1995) 
 
1997 国务院关于在若干城市试行国有企业兼并破产和职工再就业有关问题的补
充通知 Supplementary Notice of the State Council on the Relevant Issues about the 
Pilot Implementation of the Merger and Bankruptcy of State-owned Enterprises in 
Some Cities and the Reemployment of Workers 
 
1997 国务院转批国家计委，国家经贸委，国家体改委关于深化大型企业集团试
点工作意见的通知 Circular of the State Council on the Approval and Transmission of 
the Suggestions of the State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade 
 13 
Commission and the State Restructuring Commission on the Work of Deepening the 
Expe 
(issued by the State Council on 29th April, 1997) 
 
1997国务院关于进一步加强在境外发行股票和上市管理的通知 Circular of the 
State Council on Further Strengthening the Administration of Overseas Stock Offering 
and Listing 
(promulgated by the State Council 8 December 1998 and came into force on 20 June 
1997) 
 
1997 财政部关于外商投资企业依据何种标准编制会计报表问题的复函 Letter of 
the Ministry of Finance Concerning the Issue on the Standard with which the 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment Work out the Accountant Report Forms 
 
1998 对外贸易经济合作部，国家发展计划委员会, 国家经济贸易委员会关于赋
予试点企业集团进出口经营权和对外承包劳务经济权有关事项的通知 Circular 
on the Related Issues of Granting Import and Export Operation Right and Foreign 
Contracted Project and Labour Service Cooperation Right to the Trying out Enterprises 
Group 
 
1999 关于加强技术创新，发展高科技，实现产业化的决定  Decision of 
Strengthening Technological Innovation, Developing Advanced Science and 
Technology and Realizing Industrialization    
(promulgated by the State Council and came into force on 20 August 1999) 
 
1999 关于境外上市公司进一步做好信息披露工作的若干意见 Several Opinions on 
Further Enhancing the information Disclosure by Overseas Listed Companies 
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 26 March 1999) 
 
2000 国有企业监事会暂行条例 Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors in 
State-owned Enterprises 
((promulgated by the State Council on 15 March 2000) 
 
2000 证券公司会计制度 Accounting System for Securities Companies 
((promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on 26 November 1999 and came into force on 
1 January 2000) 
 
2001 国务院办公厅关于外经贸企业内部职工持股会法律地位问题的复函 Letter 
Reply by the General Office of the State Council on the Legal Status of the Meeting of 
Employee Stock Ownership in Enterprises of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations 
(issued by General Office of the State Council on 28th April, 2001) 
 
2002 企业会计制度 Accounting System for Business Enterprises  
(applicable to Joint Stock Limited Enterprises effective 1 January 2001 and applicable 
 14 
to Foreign Investment Enterprises effective 1 January 2002). 
 
2003 中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定 Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues concerning the 
Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy 
(adopted by the Communist Party of China through the Third Plenary Sessions of the 
Sixteenth Central Committee on October 14, 2003) 
 
2004 关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干意见 Several Opinions on 
Promoting the Reform and Opening-up and the Stable Development of the Capital 
Market  
(promulgated by the State Council and came into force on 31 January 2004) 
 
2006 关于国外投资者并购境内企业的规定 Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
(promulgated jointly by the Ministry of Commerce, the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission, the CSRC, the State Admission of Taxation, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange on 8August 2006, amended and amendment came into force on 22 June 
2009) 
 
2006 外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法 Measures for the Administrative of 
Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors 
(promulgated jointly by the Ministry of Commerce and the CSRC on 31 December on 
2005, effective 30 January 2006) 
 
2009 国务院国有资产监督管理委员会关于印发《董事会试点中央企业董事会规
范运作暂行办法》的通知 The Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council on Issuing the Interim Measures for 
the Standard Operation of the Board of Directors of a Central Enterprises in the Pilot 
Program on Board of Directors 
(promulgated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council on 20 March 2009 ) 
 
Supreme People’s Court Interpretation 
 
2006 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题的规定（1）
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application 
of the PRC Company Law (1) 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court on 28 April 2006 and came into force on 9 
May 2006) 
 
2006 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题的规定（2）
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application 
 15 
of the PRC Company Law (2) 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court on 12 May 2008 and came into force on 
19 May 2008) 
 
Securities Regulatory Authorities 
1999 关于企业申请境外上市有关问题的通知 Circular on the Issue Concerning the 
Companies Applying for Overseas Listings 
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 14 July 1999) 
 
1999 中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定 The Decision of the 
Central Committee of The Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning The 
Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises 
(promulgated by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and came into 
force on 22 September 1999) 
 
2001 关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见  Guiding Opinion about 
Establishing Independent Director System in Listed Companies 
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 26 August 2001) 
 
2002 上市公司治理准则 Corporate Governance Code for Listed Companies  
(issued and promulgated by the CSRC and State Economic and Trade Commission in 
2001 and came into force on 20 January 2002) 
 
2004 关于高新技术中央企业开展股权激励试点工作的通知  A document on 
High-tech Central Enterprises to carry out the Work of Stock Option Incentive Pilot 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Science and Technology and came into force 2004) 
 
2005 上市公司股份分置改革管理办法 Measures on Administration of Split Share 
Structure Reform of Listed Companies  
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 4 September 2005) 
 
2005 上市公司回购社会公众股份管理办法 (试行) Administration of Repurchase of 
Public Shares by Listed Companies Procedures (Trial Implementation) 
 
2006 首次公开发行股票并上市管理办法 Measures on Administration of the Initial 
Public Offering and Listing of Shares 
(promulgated by the CSRC on 17 May 2006 and came into force on 18 May 2006) 
 
2006 上市公司收购管理办法  Measures on Administration of the Takeover of  
Listing of Shares 
(promulgated by the CSRC on 31 July 2006 and came into force on 1 September 2006; 
amended and amendments came into force on 27 August 2008) 
 
2006 上市公司章程指引 Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed 
 16 
Companies 
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 16 March 2006, replacing the 1997 
Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies) 
 
2006 上市公司证券发行管理办法 Measures on Administration of the Offering of 
Securities by Listed Companies 
(promulgated by the CSRC on 6 May 2006 and came into force on 8 May 2006) 
 
2006 中国证券监督管理委员会发行审核委员会办法 Measures on the Public 
Offering Review Committee (POR Measures) 
(promulgated by the CSRC on 9 May 2006, amended on 13 May 2009; and amendment 
came into force on 14 June 2009) 
 
2006 公开发行证券的公司资讯披露内容与格式准则第1号-招股说明书 Criteria 
No.1 on the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies Conducting 
Public Offer of Securities—Prospectus 
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 18 May 2006) 
 
2007 上市公司信息披露管理办法 Measures on Administration of the Information on 
Disclosure of Listed Companies 
(promulgated by the CSRC and came into force on 30 January 2007) 
 
2007 财政部关于印发《金融企业财务规则—实施指南》的通知 Notice of the 
Ministry of Finance on Issuing the Financial Rules for Financial 
Enterprises-Implementation Guide  
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and came into force on 30 March 2007) 
 
2008 关于上市公司以集中竞价方式回购股份的补充说明 Supplementary 
Provisions on the Share Repurchase by Listed Companies by Means of Centralised 
Bidding.  
 
2009 首次公开发行股票并在创业板上市管理暂行办法 Tentative Measures for the 
Administration of the Initial Public Offering of Shares and the Listing thereof on the 
Growth Enterprises Board 
(promulgated by the CSRC on 31 March 2009 and came into force on 1 May 2009) 
 
 
 
Local Authorities 
 
2001 上海证券交易所股票上市规则 Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
(promulgated by the SHSE on 8 June 2001, amended on 25 February 2002; and further 
amended on 29 November 2004, amendment came into force on 10 December 2004) 
 
 17 
2001 深圳证券交易所股票上市规则 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
(promulgated by the SZSE on 7 June 2001, amended on 24 February 2002; and further 
amended on 29 November 2004, amendment came into force on 10 December 2004) 
 
2009 上海市推进国际金融中心建设条例 Regulations of Shanghai Municipality on 
Promoting the Building of International Financial Centre 
(adopted by the 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th Shanghai People’s 
Congress on 25 June 2009 and came into force on 1 August 2009) 
 
Documents about OECD 
 
OECD 2004, Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
OECD 2004, The State-Owned Enterprises’ Corporate Governance Guidelines  
 
OECD 2005, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises, 
OECD Publishing  
 
OECD 2005, Governance in China 
 
OECD 2006, Corporate Governance of Non-listed Companies in Emerging Markets 
 
OECD (2009) Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of state 
Owned Assets, State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence, 26 January 
2009 
 
OECD 2010, Accountability and Transparency: A Guide for State Ownership  
Shao,N, 2012, The Report from SASAC Boao Forum for Asia in Apr. 2012. 
http://news.chengdu.cn/content/2012-04/03/content_926063.htm?node=1880 Last 
accessed, 17/06/12 
 18 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The reforms of SOEs reforms in China are extensive and profound. 1After over thirty 
five years of SOEs reform,2 having experienced different periods of reform including 
the early period of reform and opening-up policy, the establishment of modern 
enterprises system,3 and the reform of small and medium SOEs,4 the composition of 
Chinese SOEs has hugely changed. Now, most Chinese SOEs are large-sized. Some 
SOEs continue to be wholly owned by the state; by contrast, the state has reduced its 
stake in others to a majority or become a non-controlling shareholder. 5  The 
transformation of the SOEs’ system and their structures has reached a crucial stage,6 
with some deep-rooted contradictions and problems having emerged.7 
Corporate governance (CG) has become the core of the reform of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) among various contradictions or problems summarized above in 
                                                 
1 The terms “extensive” and “profound” will be illustrated form two aspects: span of time and social influence about 
Chinese SOEs reform. On the one hand, SOEs reform in China started 1978 and lasted over 35 years. It experienced 
different periods with different targets. The reform is the core and challenge for Chinese SOEs which they must face 
up to and solve from the beginning till now. On the other hand, the success or failure of SOE reform has a vital 
bearing on the success or failure of the overall economic restructuring. The transformation of the SOEs’ system and 
their structural readjustments has reached a crucial stage, with some deep-rooted contradictions and problems having 
emerged.  
2 In this thesis, the starting point of Chinese SOEs reform is the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 
1978.More details can be seen in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major 
Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of SOEs, which issued by Central Committee of the Committee of 
the Communist Party of China on 09-22-1999. 
3 Establishment of modern enterprises system (MES) of SOEs, as a new strategy, started to play a key role because 
SOEs were one of new targets for this stage of economic reform. For more details and analysis see Chapter 2, 2.1.2 
Different phases with different targets of SOEs reform.   
4 This essay divided the whole SOEs reform process into four periods, the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs 
is the third phase, and the concept, target, process, methods and influence of the reform small and medium-sized 
SOEs can be seen in Chapter 2, 2.1.2 Small-medium SOEs reform.   
5 Wang Z, 2014: 487-502.  
6 See footnotes 1 about social influence, and see footnotes 7, the list of tensions for SOEs reform, the SOEs reform 
shall take practical and effective measures to solve problems above. It is long way and protracted work. 
7 A considerable number of SOEs have not yet adapted to the demands of a market economy due to the long-term 
influence of the traditional system, with many problems left over from history, the redundant construction over the 
past years and the drastic changes of market environment. For example, some SOEs can not be flexible in terms of 
operations, weak in technical innovation, heavily in debt and social burdens, and have too many surplus workers and 
difficulties in production and business operations. Their economic returns are dropping and some employees lose 
their work. 
 19 
China, particularly since 2003.8 The CG of those companies which transferred from 
traditional SOEs is totally different in development methods and characteristics from 
the CG of a capitalist system’s company, because under the capitalist system they are 
based on private ownership. However, in China, especially at this transition stage, the 
governmental agencies are extensively involved in the CG of the SOEs as controlling 
shareholders.9  
This thesis provides an overview of the background and development of the CG of 
SOEs in China. It discusses the ownership and control of SOEs in this transformational 
period, analyses the problems of internal governance for Chinese state-owned listed 
companies, and suggests the ways in which the problems can be solved. A central 
argument is that although the CG of Chinese SOEs has come a long way since it was 
transplanted from the west and introduced into China, the CG of SOEs cannot be 
acclimatized. The CG of SOEs formed its own features with Chinese characteristics in 
the process of development following a large-scale SOEs’ restructuring, and with 
inheriting features from the original and chaotic legal system. Therefore, this thesis 
suggests methods from a legal perspective to further develop CG in Chinese SOEs. 
                                                 
8
 The way CG become the core of the reform: Experienced the Reform and Opening up Policy, establishment of 
MES established the position of CG of SOEs, the main method of MES is ownership restructuring.  The form of 
MES for SOEs had been completed when the traditional SOEs restructured followed Company Law. Then, CG as the 
key target regarding internal reform became to the core for SOEs, because the development of CG is restructuring 
SOEs in essence. This is also the reason why CG is so important for SOEs, especially for the SOEs to develop into 
international enterprises under WTO. The significance of the year 2003 is that SASAC had been established, and 
SASAC pushed CG to a higher level and offered a clearer standard.  
9 CG of capitalist system’s company developed from continuous evolution of company or corporate; the legal 
system and market environment had already matured. However, the CG of Chinese companies which transferred 
from traditional SOEs is from transplantation, which included the relevant codes, laws, modes and market rules, with 
inconsistent background, corporate culture and legal system and its own experience. Therefore, the CG of Chinese 
SOEs developed in China with strong Chinese characteristics. The nature of the characteristics of CG will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.   
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This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces basic concepts and 
definitions, research questions, methodology, theoretical approaches and literature 
review. It provides an outline and overview of chapters and contributions of this 
research. Chapter 2 examines the history of different development periods and the 
current situation of CG of SOEs in China. The examination shows a combination of 
political elements from the past together with the modern enterprise system China has 
been pursuing. Chapter 3 discusses the transformation of the ownership and control of 
SOEs. Chapter 4 focuses on internal governance of Chinese state-owned listed 
companies. Chapter 5 analyses the tension arising in the internal governance of Chinese 
state-owned listed companies. Chapter 6 proposes the ways and measures that can 
improve the CG of Chinese state-owned listed companies.   
 
1.1 Definition  
 
1.1.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
The term ‘corporate governance’ first appeared in the 1970s in the United States.10 
With a rise in takeover activities in 1980s, this concept had been applied more broadly 
in the field of corporation law and practice.11 Then, gradually, the term as a subject 
gained more attention from economists, social scientists, corporate managers, investors, 
policy-makers and lawyers. Since the 1990’s, corporate governance as a policy issue in 
the developed countries, had attracted greater attention from scholars, managers, and 
                                                 
10 Zhao Yuan, 2009. “Dongshihui Zhongxinshuo Yu Gudong Zhongxinshuo: Xiandai Meiguo Gongsi Zhili Xueshuo 
zhi Bian”, Journal of Comparative Law. 04 2009. Pp. 93-99. 
11 Veasey E 1993. the Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline the Business Lawyer. P 1267. 
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directors. CG became an important factor for a nation’s companies to make use of the 
capital market to attract foreign capital investment. A good CG structure can obtain the 
trust and recognition of other countries’ investors. Although there are differences 
among different countries in political systems, company culture, company organization 
and business culture leading to a diversification of CG modes, the universal principles 
of CG still get maximum recognition. At least, across a certain geographic range, 
uniform principles of CG can be recognized.12  
What, then, is corporate governance? The concept of CG is defined differently in 
various fields, as the following selection of definitions demonstrates:  
·For business management, CG refers to those procedures established within a 
company's organization that allow directors to oversee the decisions of key officers, 
provide disclosure of material facts to investors and other stakeholders, and allow for 
efficient and accurate decision making within the organization.13  
·From the finance perspective, CG deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations can assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.14 The 
                                                 
12 It can be proven by the legislative and regulatory philosophy, and the importance of regulation in some countries 
and regions, such as Principle of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, published by American 
Law Institute in 1994; and according to the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (the 
London Stock Exchange intends to require all listed companies registered in the United Kingdom, as a continuing 
obligationfor listing, to state whether they are complying with the code and to give reasons for any areas of 
non-compliance. See the part of the setting for the report on page 10) where CG refers to the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled: ‘The board of directors is responsible for the governance of their companies. 
The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic 
aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting are 
subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.’ This can be seen as a summary of the general 
principles for modern corporate governance.  It can also be seen that the particular geographic range is the element 
which can influence the form of CG.  
13 Vanderloo J 2004-2005. “Encouraging Corporate Governance for the Closely Held”, Business Mississippi College 
Law Review, Vol 24, p. 39. 
14 Shleifer， Andrei，and Robert W. Vishny 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance, Jourmal of Finance. 52 
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purpose of corporate governance is to minimize the total cost in aligning managers’ and 
shareholders’ incentives, and in unavoidable self-interested managerial behaviours.15  
After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, CG attracted more attention around the world. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) called the 
governments, relevant international organizations and non-governmental organizations 
to establish a set of CG standards and guidelines.16 The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance was the first international CG standard established by inter-governmental 
international organizations.17 In 2000, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
was adopted as a major criterion to measure whether a financial system is sound or not 
by the Financial Stability Forum.18 At present, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance have helped members and non-members to carry out the reform of CG in 
their own countries, to establish their own code of CG, and to develop their new 
legislative and regulatory measures.  
Revised in 2004, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance started focusing on 
other issues and changed key points to cover the tensions caused by separation of 
ownership and control. It made the following changes. Firstly, it focused on the 
                                                                                                                                            
1997. Pp. 737-783. 
15 Nabavi Chashmi S. A. , Matan M. , Nasrollahi M. 2012. “The Relation Between Institutional Shareholders and 
Earnings Management in Companies Accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange”, Pajouheshgar (Journal of Management) 
Spring 2012, Volume 9, Number 25; P. 65-74. 
16 Includes the following the OECD Steering Group Corporate Governance and includes regular observers from the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  
17 The Principles of Corporate Governance purposed by the OECD in 1999.Although there is no legal effect, this 
Principle has become the basis of legislation for the countries of the world, and also is the action guidance for various 
countries’ securities trading markets, investors and enterprises’ Corporate Governance. More discussion can see Si 
Yuan, 2004. “OECD Caoni Gongsi Zhili Xinfangan”, the Chinese Certified Public Accountant. 04 2004. The 
Principles mainly include: rights and equitable treatment of shareholders, interests of other stakeholders, role and 
responsibilities of the board, integrity and ethical behavior and disclosure and transparency.   
18 Tan Jingyu, 2011. “Ouyuan yu Guoji Huobi Jinrong Tixi de Wanshan”, Huoli, (11) 2011.  
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coordination of related interests of internal and external elements instead of internal 
managers about distribution and monitoring. Secondly, it paid more attention to 
employees and creditors who had been neglected before. Finally, it set out that a sound 
CG must meet the following six principles: I. Ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework, II. The rights of shareholders and key ownership 
functions, III. The equitable treatment of shareholders, IV. The role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance, V. Disclosure transparency, and VI. the responsibilities of the 
board.19  
‘corporate governance is the system or process by which companies are directed and 
controlled’.20 And on the basis of this approach, the OECD further developed the 
definition of CG: ‘…the CG structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures 
for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure 
through which the company objectives are set and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance’.21 
The definitions of CG from the views above suggest that CG is a system which can 
realize control and balance the relationship of a corporation’s structure between owner, 
directors and managers.  However, most views above define the CG from a financial or 
economic perspective, and establish the theory of the modern corporation on the issues 
                                                 
19 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 see part one, p17-24. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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of why and how to separate ownership and control. Some scholars have debated the 
concept of CG from a legal angle. There are several typical views as follow: 
Oliver Hart in his article named “Corporate Governance: Some Theory and 
Implications Provided a Theoretical Framework for Corporate Governance” discussed 
legal concerns about CG. In his opinion, corporate governance would become an issue 
in an organisation if the following two conditions are present. On the one hand, if there 
is an agency problem, or conflict of interest, involving all the members of the 
organisation including owners, managers, workers or consumers. On the other hand, if 
a contract cannot solve all the agency problems because the transaction costs are so 
big.22  
Concerning the first condition, Oliver believes that all individuals associated with an 
organisation can be instructed to maximise profit or net market value or minimise costs 
without agency problems. Oliver explained that because individuals do not care about 
the outcome for the organisation, they just follow their own instructions.23 The result of 
above situation is that all the costs of individuals can be reimbursed by the organisation. 
In another words, the organisation pays the costs for activities even the effort of 
individuals. If so, it is hard to find a position for corporate governance because there are 
no disagreements needing to be resolved through corporate governance. For the second 
condition, the optimal principal-agent contracts do not need any costs or take any risks, 
and the contracts should be comprehensive. However, the costs might be huge during 
                                                 
22 Hart O, 1995, “Corporate Governance: some Theory and Implications”, The Economic Journal. Pp.678-689. 
23 Ibid. 
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the transaction process, and the risks-bearing cannot be zero for clients. It is the reason 
why principal- agent contracts cannot be comprehensive. His opinion was popular for 
some years because the root of legal nature of CG was found, and the bridge between 
legal considerations and financial considerations was established through defining CG.  
His idea about CG was later absorbed into many researchers’ thinking, even in some 
important theories of organizations; the incompleteness of contracts was the 
fundamental theory.  
The definition of CG world-wide was gradually completed as the requirements of 
corporation affairs became more complex and across industries. There is a classic, 
complete definition on corporate governance, such as Blair’s belief that ‘the phrase CG 
is often applied narrowly to questions about the structure and function of boards of 
directors to the rights and prerogatives of shareholders in boardroom decision-making. 
Now this definition has been broadened to refer to the whole set of legal, cultural, and 
institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, 
who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from 
the activities they undertake are allocated’.24 In Blair’s opinion, CG was not only a 
system for decision-making to adjust and manage the position and relationship between 
directors and shareholders, but also involved the nature of relevant parties of the 
corporation: rights, prerogative of shareholders, and risks and returns. Although the 
description of CG in Blair’s article was vague, it should be noted that the legal factor 
was closely linked with management and financial factors. In addition, the combination 
                                                 
24 Yang Hua, 2011.  Reconstruction: New Path for Corporate Governance, Beijing: China CITIC Press. P4. 
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of these two factors is a breakthrough for the development of CG in Modern 
Corporation’s level.25 
 The Definition of CG in China  
On the basis of the views above, the concept of CG has been further developed through 
years of practice in China. In accordance with the basic principles of the Company Law, 
the Securities Law and other relevant laws and regulations, as well as the commonly 
accepted standards in international corporate governance, the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") is formulated 
to promote the establishment and improvement of the modern enterprise system by 
listed companies, to standardize the operation of listed companies and to bring forward 
the healthy development of the securities market of our country.26 The Code is the 
major measuring standard for evaluating whether a listed company has a good 
corporate governance structure. The Code states the basic principles for corporate 
governance of listed companies in our country, the means for the protection of 
investors'' interests and rights, the basic  rules of behaviour and moral standards for 
directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management members of listed 
companies.27There are different views about CG theory in China as follows.  
                                                 
25 In the framework of modern corporation, the combination of financial, management factors and legal factor was 
the basic theory for agency problem. Here the factors mean separation of ownership and control, and the 
incompleteness of contract. The agency problem is not the core issue in this study, so here this study just simple 
introduces but not further and detail; it means the agents of the shareholders of corporation may pursue private 
interests that conflict with some or all shareholders. Most research on modern corporation believe that a sound CG 
will offer a good check and balance between managers and shareholders to induce the conflict and make sure 
maximization of interests for all the parties in the corporation.  
26 Code of Corporate Governance For Listed Companies in Chin, issued by CSRC and State Economic and Trade 
Commission on January 7, 2001.  
27 Ibid. 
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The first opinion focuses on the internal governance in a company. According to Wu 
Jinglian, CG refers to an organization structure which includes owner, board of 
directors and senior executives. 28  Wu points out that a restricted and balanced 
relationship should be established among owner, board of directors and senior 
executives, ‘through which the owner entrusts its capital to the board of directors. The 
board of directors is the highest level of decision making of the company and has the 
power to appoint, reward and penalise, and dismiss senior managers.’29  
The definition of CG from Wu was published in 1990s.  It can be seen that Wu’s 
opinion emphasized the function and importance of the board of directors. In addition, 
it also can be inferred from his view that CG has been established in China since the 
1990s. A legal bailment has been created between the owner and the board of directors; 
secondly, the board of directors is the highest decision-making body in the corporation, 
with the power of hiring, reward, punishment and firing for senior executives; last but 
not least, senior executives are employed by the board of directors, and run enterprises 
within the scope authorized by board of directors.30 Although the concept of CG was 
officially introduced only in 2000, the practice had begun long before that.  
In contrast, the second view supports the idea that corporate governance is equivalent to 
corporate ownership arrangements; Zhang Weiying believes CG is a system about the 
function and structure of the board of directors and the power of shareholders.31 From a 
                                                 
28 Wu Jinglian, 2004. “the Functions of Chinese Government in Transition Stage”, Journal of Hebeip. Pp. 39-46. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. P. 39.   
31 Zhang Weiying, 2005. “Wealth Distribution of Corporate Governance”, China High Technology Enterprises, 
Pp.80-82. 
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wider perspective, CG refers to arrangements connected to law, culture and 
institution.32 Specifically, the arrangements can solve problems during the operation of 
enterprises, such as deciding corporate goals, who controls the enterprises and how, 
distribution of income, and risk assessment.33 Another scholar Li Wei’an holds a 
similar view. According to Li, the nature of CG is the check and balance between owner 
and operator.34 Internal governance refers to shareholders, the board of directors, the 
board of supervisors and managers.35 Another important point made by Li is that CG 
deals with the relationship between enterprises and all stakeholders, including 
government, shareholders, creditors, employees and suppliers.36  
The third opinion stresses external governance in a company. According to Lin Yifu; 
corporate governance is a complete set of institutional arrangements for the owner of 
supervision and performance. The most basic component of the CG is indirect control 
through the competitive market or external governance. However, although internal 
governance is necessary and important, compared with a market competition 
mechanism, the internal governance is just an institutional arrangement whose purpose 
is to use the system arrangement and organization form to achieve the goal of 
minimizing the possibility of asymmetric information in order to protect the interests of 
the owner.37 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. P. 80.  
34 Li Weian, 2001, ‘Summarization of Workshop on WTO, Corporation Development and Corporate Governance 
Principles’, Nankai Business Research Vol. 4. Issue 01. P. 40. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Lin Yifu, 1997. “Xiandai Qiye Zhidu de Neihan yu Guoyou Qiye Gaige Fangxiang”, Economic Research, 03 
1997. 
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Chinese researchers particularly emphasized the management and financial functions 
of CG in a corporation, and compared with foreign researchers, their opinion combined 
the Chinese actual situation seems to be more specific.  Compared with Wu and Zhang, 
Qian Yingyi’s opinion was similar to Oliver’s in that Qian agreed with Oliver that, as a 
system for the corporation, the core constituents of CG were investors, managers, 
workers and other important parties, and there should be checks and balances among 
them.38 To sum up, Qian’s opinion can be regarded in the light of several questions: 
firstly, how to separate ownership and control and how to exercise their power; 
secondly, how to supervise and evaluate the board of directors, managers and 
employees; finally, how to design and implement incentive mechanisms to promote the 
optimal use of resources.39  
Based on the analysis and comparison of different views above, the following 
consensus can be reached about CG: firstly, CG is playing a contractual role in a 
corporation, and this nature of CG is determined by an incomplete contract. The 
incomplete contract means a contract in a corporation that cannot anticipate every 
possible situation in advance, and a contract that cannot make all the rules clear for the 
interests of parties and loss to various situations.40 To reduce the transaction costs, the 
parties to contracts may focus on fixed objects including the target of the contract, the 
general rules, decision rules, share decision-making and solve possible dispute 
mechanisms in order to have an agreement. Therefore, the incomplete contract saves 
                                                 
38 Qian Yingyi, 2006. “Enterprsies Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control”, Economics of 
Transition, 4 (2) Pp. 422-447. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Yang Ruilong, Nie Huihua, 2006. “Bu Wanquan Qiyue Lilun: Yige Zongshu”, Economic Research Journal. 02 
2006. Pp. 104-115. 
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the costs of constantly negotiating.41 As we know, the incomplete contract should be 
based on company law and articles of association; the incomplete contract 
specifications offer a standard for all the parties and regulate the trading among them to 
realize the comparative advantage of transaction cost.  
 
Secondly, the core issue and main functions of CG is about an allocation of ownership, 
power, rights, responsibility and interests in a corporation. On the one hand, the 
different styles of ownership determine the style of CG, for example, debt and equity. 
The centralized or decentralized equity are all factors that can impact on CG. 42 
Generally speaking, the answer to ‘who control the corporation?’ is the foundation for 
CG; and ‘how to control the corporation’ and ‘how the risks and returns from activities 
the parties undertake are allocated’ are the main tasks for CG.  
1.1.2 The Concept of SOEs 
The term “SOEs” refers to “enterprises where the state has significant control, through 
full, majority, or significant minority ownership”43. As in the OECD Guidelines, the 
                                                 
41 Yu Huihui, Jia Jie, 2002. “Qiye de Buwanquan Qiyue Lilun Pingshu”, Zhejiang Social Sciences. 06 2002. 
Pp.184-188. 
42Ownership structure is the foundation of the corporate governance mechanism. Different ownership structure 
determines the shareholders’ equity concentration, composition of the shareholders, and the identity of majority 
shareholders, which leads to differences in the methods shareholders use to exercise their rights. From another 
perspective, different ownership structure determines different enterprise organization structurse, so as to determine 
the different corporate governance structure, ultimately affecting the enterprise behavior and performance. 
Decentralized ownership structure needs a sound legal system for the protection of investors as strong support. As a   
company in the United States is the typical representative for decentralized equity structure, the one of reason why its 
capital markets can operate sowell is that the United States a country where protection for investors is strong through 
the legal system, while China is a country which protects investors is weaker through civil-law. In addition, 
excessive decentralized ownership structure easily leads to another kind of agency problems, namely the internal 
conflict between managers and external shareholders. More discussion of the ownership structure: see Hu Xucheng, 
2015. “Qianyi Guquan You Fensan Xiang Jizhong Zhuanbian de Zhanlue Xuanze- Guanliceng Guquan Shougou”, 
China Economist. (5) 2015. and see Sun Wenbo, 2005. “Guquan Jizhong yu Gongsi Zhili Xiaolv de Lilun Fenxi”, 
Social Science Front bimonthly. 06 2005. Pp. 267-271. 
43 OECD2005:11. 
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concept of “SOEs” covers commercial enterprises under central government ownership 
and federal ownership. In addition, this concept also applies to non-commercial SOEs 
for public policy purposes.44  
In the Chinese law context, 45  the term SOEs refers to ‘exclusively state-owned 
companies established in accordance with the Company Law of the People’s Republic 
of China; and limited liability companies and joint-stock limited companies funded by 
two or more exclusively state-owned companies, the people’s governments or the 
departments or institutions thereof, or other state-owned entities.’46 In the process of 
the reform of SOEs in China, different classification methods of SOEs were involved in 
practice.  
Firstly, according to the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese 
SOEs can be divided into exclusively state-owned enterprises, limited liability 
enterprises and joint-stock limited enterprises. The term ‘exclusively state-owned 
enterprises or wholly state-owned company’ refers to ‘a limited liability company 
invested wholly by the state, for which the State Council or the local people’s 
government authorizes the state-owned assets supervision and administration 
institution of the people’s government at the same level to perform the functions of the 
capital contributor’. 47  Secondly, Chinese SOEs are divided in accordance with a 
supervision system of the state-owned assets of enterprises, including central 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Here mainly refers to 1988 Law on Wholly State-owned Industrial Enterprises and the Company Law. 
46 See Ministry of Finance 2007.  
47 Company Law 2014 Article 64. 
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enterprises which are supervised by the state-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and SOEs supervised by 
local government.48 Finally, the terms “small, medium-sized SOEs” and “large-sized 
SOEs” are used by Chinese government in practice. Tracing the history of reform of 
SOEs in China, only the term “large-sized SOEs” was defined explicitly in Chinese law 
as “the State Council shall, on the behalf of the state, perform the contributor’s 
functions for the large-sized state-invested enterprises that have bearings on the 
national economic lifeline and state security determined by the State Council and the 
State-invested enterprises in such fields as important infrastructures and natural 
resources.”49 These SOEs which are concerning with important infrastructures and 
natural resources are  also considered to be central enterprises. More detail about 
classification methods of SOEs will be introduced in following chapter.  
In this thesis, the term of ‘Chinese SOEs’ refers to large-sized SOEs in China; and the 
state-owned listed company means a wholly state-owned listed company and state 
holding listed company. These types of SOEs will be mainly discussed in relation to the 
CG of SOEs.  
1.1.3 Corporate Governance of SOEs  
In the OECD Guidelines on the CG of SOEs, the specific difficulties of the CG of SOEs 
are illustrated: “Corporate governance difficulties derive from the fact that 
                                                 
48  Lu Fucai, 2011. ‘Report on Corporate Governance of Central State-owned Enterprises’, Beijing: China. 
Economic Publishing House. p17 according to the web of SASAC, there are 113 central enterprises. 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html access on 11-11-2014. 
49 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-owned Assets Enterprises 2009. 
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accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents 
(management, board, ownership entities, ministries, and the government), without 
clearly and easily identifiable, or remote, principals. To structure this complex web of 
accountabilities in order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance is 
a challenge.”50 
In the Chinese context, the term CG of SOEs refers to the corporate governance of 
state-owned enterprises in China needed to deal with a special relationship, namely the 
relationship among the shareholders’ meeting, board of directors and board of 
supervisors; the Party Committee, trade unions, commission for discipline inspection. 
The relationship between the old Sanhui-- shareholders meeting, board of directors and 
board of supervisors, and XinSanHui are all play an indispensable role in SOEs. But the 
relationship between them has not been regulated very well. 51  The CG of SOEs 
includes the internal and external governance of SOEs. The SOEs’ internal governance 
is the board of directors, board of supervisors and operators’ incentive constraint 
mechanism and the new Sanhui’s problems. China's external corporate governance 
system includes the securities market, legal system, institutional investors and other 
issues.52  
 
                                                 
50 OECD, supra note 16. 
51 Cui Tao, 2008. “Some Special Issues Concerning the Corporate Management of State-owned Enterprises”, 
Journal of South China University of Technology (social science endition), 10 (3) 2008.  
52 Liu Yanling, 2005. “Woguo Guoyou Qiye Gongsi Zhili Yanjiu”. And see Chen Qingtai, 2009. “Guoyou Qiye 
Gaige yu Gongsi Zhili”, Nankai Business Review. 05 2005. Pp. 4-5. also can see Liu Yinguo, Wu Chengfeng, 2006. 
“Guoyou Qiye Gongsi Zhili yu Zhengfu de Jiaose”. Economics Information. 12 2006. Pp. 27-32.  
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1.2 Research Questions 
As it is stated above, the reform of Chinese SOEs is extensive and profound. During the 
process of reform, some SOEs have not adapted to the demands of a market economy 
and have had to face up to some serious problems. For example, a loss of state-owned 
asset due to the long-term influence of the traditional system had led to difficulties in 
production and operations and falls in economic returns.53 The Chinese Government 
has tried to find a practical and effective approach to solve those problems. CG as an 
expected solution was therefore introduced into the reform of Chinese SOEs. In the 
early stage of development of CG in China, CG had been thought of as an unsuitable 
approach for China, because Chinese CG was not developed from a privatised but from 
a public ownership economy. With the development of CG in China, some 
achievements as well as lessons have been gained in Chinese SOEs reform which is still 
facing some new challenges. 
The central question of this research is: “How the law can make corporate governance 
more robust in further reform of SOEs in China?” In answering this question, the 
research will examine some relevant issues and questions which follow. 
The first group of issues and questions should be considered firstly include: the 
definition of reform of SOEs; the definition of the CG of SOEs, the nature of central 
enterprise and state holding listed companies; the functions of CG for reform of SOEs; 
the operation CG of SOEs in reality; the practical difficulties of CG of SOEs in practice; 
                                                 
53 See The Decision of the Central Committee of The Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning The 
Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises 1999.  
 35 
the standard for a robust system of CG; and functions of CG as applied in China’s 
reform of SOEs.  
The second group of questions and issues which will be examined include: the 
significance of corporate governance in China at the transition stage, the relationship 
between theory and practice of CG and SOEs; the problems in China’s reform of SOEs 
in the early period and the problems related to the CG of SOEs; the relationship 
between Chinese law and CG of SOEs; the importance of Chinese law for CG in the 
reform of Chinese SOEs; and the achievements and problems of CG of reform of SOE 
in the reform of SOEs in China.  
The last group of problems and issues to be examined concerns Chinese law and the CG 
of SOEs’ Chinese Law and CG of SOEs, including: discussions on whether current 
Chinese law and regulations are suitable for CG of SOEs; discussion from a legal 
perspective on the problems and development of separation of ownership and control in 
the CG of Chinese SOEs as there are some legal disputes can reflect the weakened part 
of the CG of SOEs; discussion on whether the current law can be helpful in solving the 
legal disputes related to CG of SOEs; discussion on the problems of internal 
governance of Chinese state-owned listed companies and suggestions for 
improvements; the characteristics and  suggestions about CG of Chinese state-owned 
listed companies; and the discussion about how the legal measures could improve CG 
of SOEs to become a robust system. 
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1.3 Methodology  
As mentioned above, the central question of this research is how the law can make CG 
more robust in the further reform of Chinese SOEs. In answering this question and 
those sub-questions and issues mentioned above, different methodological approaches 
have been applied in this research, including documentation analysis, fieldwork and 
case studies, qualitative perspectives.  
1.3.1 Documentation Analysis 
Documentation analysis can be diveide into two parts, namely, legal and policy 
sources and secondary sources. Legal and policy sources analysis is a legal system 
research method which discusses the CG of Chinese SOEs issue from two perspectives.  
On the one hand, national laws and regulations, as a useful tool, reflect the will and 
intention of policy makers. Policy makers are more normative than positive, as they 
tend to simply consider how reliably the theory produces correct answers to a particular 
question.54 There are many elements to be considered when policy makers make 
decisions, such as economic factors, historical factors, and social factors. In this 
research, the nature of the questions regarding CG call for legal and policy sources 
analysis, such as the concept, functions, and importance of CG. Legal and policy 
sources analysis, as an effective method, seeks for the best methods or course of action 
for reaching targets, a means-end way of thinking about government goals and 
                                                 
54 Hovenkamp, 1990. Positivism in Laws and Economics, California Law Review, 78 CAL. L. REV.  78.  
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actions.55 The background and definitions of CG and SOEs, historical reasons of CG of 
Chinese SOEs reform will be given an in-depth critical analysis. In addition, some 
sub-questions can be solved through this method, such as: the relationship between 
Chinese law and CG of SOEs; how and why the Chinese legal system offers legal 
security for CG of SOEs and whether and why Chinese law and regulations are suitable 
for the CG of SOEs 
On the other hand, the term “documents” does not mean the laws and regulations in the 
legal framework. Most of documents, such as notices or decisions concerning the CG of 
SOEs, played the role of pushing the process of reform before the relevant laws and 
regulations were promulgated. However, the documents are important for the CG of 
SOEs in China, because they affect the development of CG. Some specific documents 
will be introduced in the following section.  
Secondary sources will play an important role for this research when it comes to 
considering the background and history of the reform of SOEs, the relationship 
between CG and SOEs and achievements and lessons of CG of SOEs to date. For 
example, academic literature and newspapers offer various views for relevant topics 
and these views form a basis of this type of research.  
Secondary sources will be examined in this research. Firstly, the definition of some key 
terms, such as CG and SOEs, are identified in academic literatures. Secondly, 
representative arguments on the CG of Chinese SOEs reform in the literature will be 
                                                 
55 Jackson& Sorensen ,1999. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. Oxford University 
Press. P. 241.  
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critically reviewed, for example, the relationship between CG and SOEs and the 
achievements and lessons of CG of SOEs to date. This research will start by reviewing 
the relevant literature for different views from previous studies on the topic of CG, and 
then develop its own opinion.  
Through literature review, the following sub-questions will be answered. What is the 
definition of reform of SOEs?  What are the functions of CG for reform of SOEs? 
What is the relationship between CG and SOEs? Why the law is important to CG of 
reform of Chinese SOEs? After almost ten years of practical operation, what are the 
achievements and problems of CG of reform of SOE in China? What kind of 
experiences, knowledge, and lessons about CG should be shared from other countries?  
Finally, in the second year of this research, fieldwork was conducted in China, but the 
sources from books, journals, newspaper, internet, and documents from libraries are 
also helpful. In summary, secondary sources are an effective method because there is no 
physical distance limitation.  
1.3.2 Fieldwork and Case Studies Methods 
In the second year of this research, fieldwork had been carried out in China. The case 
tracking method was applied in the process of fieldwork. As John Gerring observed, the 
case study is as intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a large 
class of unities.56  The case study method is a suitable way of understanding definitive 
                                                 
56 Gerring & Iohn, 2004. “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?”, 98 American Political Science Review. 
342. 
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cases.57 Although case study method is not a way of analysing cases or a way of 
modelling causal relations, it will help one to peer into the box of causality and its 
purported effect if well-constructed.58 The aim of fieldwork in this research is to find 
the answers to these sub-questions: the functions of CG for SOEs reform applied in 
reality; the sum total of experiences, knowledge, and lessons about CG. 
In order to answer the above sub-questions, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), the China Minmetals Corporation, and Rainbow Group (a 
subsidiary of CEC) were selected as cases. Almost six months’ work would be shared 
by two different cities in China, namely, Beijing for SASAC, China Minmetals 
Corporation in Beijing, CNPC in Beijing and Rainbow Group in Beijing, and branch 
of CNPC in Jilin (a subsidiary of CNPC). These cases can be divided into different 
types from the perspectives of controlling shareholders, namely the subsidiaries of 
listed companies, affiliated companies, and the whole Group.  
The reasons for choosing SASAC, China Minmetals Corporation， CNPC and 
Rainbow Group to be cases for research are discussed below. Firstly, SASAC is an 
important government department candidate for reform of Chinese SOEs. One of 
contributions of SASAC is that SASAC established State-Owned Assets Supervision. 
It is responsible for managing SOEs in China, including appointing top executives and 
                                                 
57 Ibid, p341. 
58 Ibid, p341-348. 
 40 
approving mergers or sales of assets, as well as drafting laws related to SOEs.59 The 
data collected from SASAC helps this research to conduct in-depth discussion from a 
wider perspective. Specifically, the term “data” refers to notices, decisions, plans, and 
reports which can reflect the change of CG of SOEs in China. Through analysing the 
data from SASAC, further trends of CG of SOEs will be predicted. Secondly, CNPC 
and China Minmetals Corporation60 are first generation SOEs in China with a long 
history. Both of them have experienced the whole reform process of SOEs, therefore, 
they are typical cases for this research. Thirdly, CNPC and China Minmetals 
Corporation are Chinese state-owned listed-enterprises, so from the CG perspective, 
the experience and lessons of CG will more standardized. Last but not least, Rainbow 
Group was one of the central enterprises operated by SASAC in Beijing, transferred 
from the state-run colour picture tube factory in Shanxi Province. It was a wholly 
state-owned enterprise and founded in 1977. Rainbow Group was approved by SASAC 
and merged into the China Electronic Information Industry Group. Co, LTD. It became 
a wholly-owned subsidiary, and was no longer supervised directly by SASAC.61  
Through the fieldworks above, more details and differences about the CG of different 
SOEs were gained and analysed, including state-owned corporation, state-owned 
subsidiary, state-owned Group and state-owned listed company. The hardship, the gap 
and the conflicts between theory and practice of CG of SOEs, and the role of the Party 
Committee are the practical difficulties which have to be faced up to in developing CG 
                                                 
59 Lu, supra note 48, at p8. 
60 More details see http://www.minmetals.com.cn.  
61 More information can see http://www.rainbow-china.com. Rainbow was established as Xiangyang Color Picture 
Tube Factory in 1977, upon the ending of Cultural Revolution.  
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of Chinese SOEs. The fieldwork such as interviews was repeated over and over again 
during the period of research. The fieldwork of this thesis is a progressive and 
developmentally process. Although some arguments cannot be shown in this thesis 
because of the interviewers’ position and background, the fieldwork is enormously 
significant for this thesis as it helps further understanding for CG of SOEs. For example, 
on the one hand, from the point of view of the management system, the mode of 
management system for state-owned Group is the factory director responsibility system; 
it is not the CG of MES, in general, and the state-owned Group is operated by non-CG. 
On the other hand, a Chinese state-owned listed company is in accordance with the 
Company Law, and all the forms of CG are very comprehensive. Therefore, the scope 
of CG of SOEs in this thesis has been defined, that is the CG of Chinese state-owned 
listed company and CG of wholly state-owned company.   
1.3.3 Qualitative Research Strategy  
The next goal of this chapter is to focus on the difference between theory and practice 
of CG of SOEs in China. The methods to be applied are qualitative research strategy 
and fieldworks.  As mentioned above, in the second year of research, fieldwork was 
conducted in China. Qualitative research strategy is one of main methods used in the 
process of fieldwork. One of key aspects of fieldwork is the interview. The interviews 
had been carried out with managers and legal advicers, and employees of CNPC in 
Beijing and Jilin, Rainbow Group in Beijing, and China Menmetals Corporations in 
Beijing, government officers, lawyers. 
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Different answers were to be explored in the process of interviewing different groups. 
First of all, the interviews with managers of SOEs sought the difference between theory 
and practice of CG of SOEs. Because the managers of SOEs received the documents 
about CG of SOEs from central or local government which specify “what CG of SOEs 
should do”, while in practice, they may experience practical problems of CG and they 
may have their own understandings of “what SOEs are not able to do now and why”. 
Secondly, lawyers who deal with cases related to CG of SOEs and legal advisers of 
SOEs are the pioneers to get in touch with about the new situation for Chinese reform of 
SOEs. Their voices reflect the main debated points of CG of SOEs. Finally, employees 
are another important group who should not be ignored for CG of SOEs. The attitudes, 
feelings and suggestions of employees call for the practical change of CG of SOEs.  
To summarise, the interviews try to adopt different positions to examine how functions 
of CG are applied in reality for SOEs reform. These following sub-questions would be 
solved through interviews: What is CG of SOEs in reality? What is the difference 
between theory and practice of CG of SOEs? Which part of CG of SOEs often appears 
legal disputes? For the legal disputes aspects of CG, is the current law able to solve, and 
if not, why not? What are the difficulties of CG of SOEs in practice?  Which problems 
are caused by early reform of SOEs? Which problems are caused by CG of SOEs? 
What kind of difficulties would be solved through improving the CG of SOEs? How 
can laws improve CG of SOEs? 
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1.4 Theoretical Approaches and Literature Review 
The theoretical approach in this thesis is based on the assumption that there is a gap 
between theory and practice in the CG of SOEs in. This section tries to answer whether 
Chinese law is an appropriate approach (suitable for Chinese social situation) for CG of 
Chinese SOEs in current situation, and how Chinese law makes CG of SOEs better.  
Many scholars have studied the theory of CG from different angles, in particular, the 
theory on separation of property ownership and management, principal-agent theory 
and stakeholder theory, as represented by scholars as follows. They are the basis for the 
main theories about CG structure.  
Separation of property ownership and management 
The theory on separation of property ownership and management is developed with the 
emergence of the joint-stock company.  The representatives are Adolf Berie and 
Gardiner Means, and Alfred D. Chandler. Jr.  According to the report about 200 
larger-sized companies in American conducted by Berie and Means, quite a proportion 
of these companies were controlled by the senior management who did not hold the 
shares of the companies.62 Thus it concluded that separation of ownership and control 
had taken place in the modern company, and the company had been controlled by 
professional managers.  A similar argument was further analysed by Chandler who 
held that dispersed shareholding and professionalization of management led the 
                                                 
62 Berie, Adolf, and Means, Gardiner. 1932. ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’, Macmillan.  
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manager with a monopoly specialized business information and with professional 
management knowledge to grasp control of the enterprises, which then led to separation 
of ownership and control.63  
Principal-agent theory 
There is a core problem caused by the separation of ownership and control which is 
how to supervise the operators and managers for the owner who lost control and how to 
protect the operator and manager to conduct business decisions aimed at maximizing 
the interests of the owner, rather than abuse of management decision-making. This 
problem is fundamental for the principal-agent theory to solve.  The principal-agent 
theory is an important part of CG theory, which summaries the features of the owner 
(principal) and managers (agent) as follows: economic interests are not completely 
consistent, the risks for the company are not the same, and the information of operating 
and capital operation is asymmetric. The operator is responsible for the company’s 
business operations, with absolute information superiority. Therefore, if the operators 
pursue self-interest maximization, their behaviour is likely to be inconsistent with the 
interests of the owner and the company, and even damage the interests of the owner and 
the company, and then induce risks.64 In order to avoid this risk and ensure safety and 
the biggest return on investment, CG as a preventative mechanism which should be 
introduced into modern company, and realize the operator’s incentive and supervision. 
                                                 
63 Chandler, Alfred, D. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Belknap Press. 
Combridge. MA. 
64 Jensen M. and W. Meckling. (1976). Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
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In summary, the company’s shareholders are the owner, namely the principal, and the 
operator is the agent.  The agent’s behaviour is self-interested; their target concerning 
the business is different from the interest of owners, with a tendency towards 
opportunistic behaviour.65 Therefore, the key problem of CG is to solve the agency risk, 
namely how to make the agent to perform the duty of loyalty, and how to establish an 
effective mechanism of incentive and constraint, in order to supervise the operator 
service for the owners (shareholders) with the target of maximizing the shareholders’ 
interests.66  
Stakeholders’ theory 
Stakeholders’ theory is a new concept of connotation for CG, which in a broad sense 
refers to anyone who has an interest or relationship with the company, and the natural 
person or legal person or institution which have a bidirectional influence on the 
company, such as shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers and retailers, 
the community and government, individuals and groups. 67  Stakeholders’ theory 
developed principal-agent theory, believing that the purpose of company cannot be 
confined to maximizing shareholder profits, and should consider the other stakeholders 
mentioned above.68 To maximize the interests of various stakeholders should be the 
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modern company’s business objective, and can be seen as the value of the company as 
an economic organization. Therefore, the effective CG should provide rights, 
responsibilities and obligations which match the stakeholders’ interests.  
Around the goal, structure and reform of CG, different theories have been introduced. 
Stakeholders’ theory has gradually become the mainstream academic opinion. 
Furthermore, different academic theories have also developed in China. The main 
academic opinions from Chinese scholars will be presented in next section.  
Relevant issues review 
This section will review two main issues. The first main issue to be examined is the 
reform of SOEs in China. Firstly, background and origin of Chinese SOEs reform will 
be reviewed. Secondly, the importance and development of SOEs reform will be 
discussed, with reference to theories and schools of thought. Finally, the four stages of 
reform of SOEs will be highlighted to demonstrate different targets of development of 
Chinese SOEs.  
The second issue to be examined is the SOEs reform on CG in China. First of all, the 
definition of CG will be reviewed, with reference to theories and schools of thought 
from Chinese scholars and foreign scholars. Secondly, the origin and development of 
CG of SOEs in China will be analysed. Last but not least, the issues in the debating of 
CG of Chinese SOEs will be critically examined, such as internal governance, external 
                                                                                                                                            
to create wealth for the society. The key to CG reform is that should not give more rights and control to the 
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governance and other relevant issues which need to be solved by good governance.       
1.4.1 Reform of SOEs in China 
Since the economic reform which took place in the 1980s, the target of the reform of 
Chinese SOEs has been changing gradually. In 1999, the Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on the reform of SOEs pointed out: 
“Advancing SOE reform and development is an important and urgent task.”69 In order 
to achieve a comprehensive understanding on the reform of SOEs in China, the 
following part will discuss the reform of Chinese SOEs from different perspectives 
through a literature review and critical analysis, highlighting the importance and 
different four stages of the reform of Chinese SOEs.  
 Understanding the Reform of SOEs in China  
In understanding the reform of Chinese SOEs, there is no universal and certain 
definition across laws, regulations and academic literature. Scholars have tried to 
introduce the process of the reform of SOEs in China through defining the significance, 
targets and other relevant issues of the reform of Chinese SOEs.70 This thesis adopts 
the view that the reform of SOEs in China is not a static concept. On the contrary, the 
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thesis believes the reform of SOEs in China is a dynamically moving process along 
with the development of Chinese economic reform. Therefore, the concept of SOEs 
reform in China cannot be defined fully until the Chinese reform of SOEs is complete 
in future. If so, when will the reform of SOEs in China are completed? What are the 
achievements and aims that Chinese SOEs ought to seek in the reform?  Nobody can 
answer the question as to when the reform will be finished. However, the aim of 
Chinese SOEs reform was the hot topic for both public and scholars in the early years of 
the reform. The answer was hiding in a good summary: The reform of Chinese SOEs is 
related to the lay-out of state-economy, and tries to make considerable number of SOEs 
adapt to the demands of a market economy.71  
There are various aspects of the reform of Chinese SOEs that scholars have 
summarized and discussed. From a prominent and mainstream perspective, the 
dynamic process of reform of SOEs includes a series of changes. Firstly, back in the 
times of the planned economy, Chinese SOEs were appendages of central or local 
governments, and were controlled through policy and administrative instructions by 
governments. This old fashioned framework was criticised by Lu Fucai who argued 
that Chinese SOEs should be independent market operators and competitors and should 
be firmly embodied into laws and regulations with the development of reform of 
SOEs.72 Considering the criticisms made by scholars about the old model of SOEs and 
government, this thesis holds the view that such debates about the old model were 
                                                 
71 See The Decision of the Central Committee of The Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning The 
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helpful to develop SOEs in the early period of the reform. This was because the debates 
on the correct role for the government to play in the reform of SOEs in China attracted 
much attention from decision-makers. In 1980s and 1990s, the concept of CG was not 
officially introduced in China, but from a different perspective, the issue of how the 
state acts as an owner for SOEs in China forms a basic issue about CG of SOEs in 
theory today. To illustrate this point, the issue about how the states act as an owner of 
SOEs was discussed as a basic and important chapter in OECD Guidelines 2005.73 
Secondly, the SOEs under the traditional mode were formed with an all-inclusive 
organization structure.74 Such a structure failed to focus efficiently on specialized 
production capacity and thus lacked market competitiveness. The reform in this aspect 
was to bring changes so that SOEs should be structured as specialized corporations. 
Previously, before the reform, the state was the only investor and operator. Scholars 
argued that sources of investment must be diversified after the reform.75  Another 
opinion comes from Jiang Ping from the legal system to research. Jing Ping believes 
that the issues on CG- the governance structure of listed companies should focus on 
three important legal problems. Firstly, what on earth is the range of autonomy of the 
parties in the CG structure? Secondly, how the legal systems deal with the same 
interests of shareholders and company? Thirdly, what is the role of the jurisdiction 
intervention in the CG structure?76 
                                                 
73 OECD, supra note 16. 
74 The term of all-inclusive refers to a package of management for the overall planning of management. For more 
details, see Wu Xiaomin, Wu Fangning, 2006. “Guoyou Qiye Jianchi Dangguan Ganbu Yuanze de Renshi yu 
Shijian”, Journal of Jiangxi Administration Institute. 04 2006. Pp. 19-22. 
75 Qian Weiqing, 2006. ‘From Legal Perspective, Analysis the Reform of Chinese SOEs’, Legal Rrport of SOEs’ 
Reform.  Beijing: CITIC Publishing House. Pp.55. 
76 Jiang Ping, 2002. ‘Wanshan Gongsi Zhili Jiegou de Jiben Falv Wenti’, Finance and Economics, (11) 2002. 
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The various kinds of changes discussed above were taken as the goal for the reform of 
SOEs by policy makers in early period of Chinese reform of SOEs.77 During the 
process of the reform of SOEs in China, some of those goals were achieved.78 However, 
some problems were not solved and then became central points of the reform, such as 
the issue on the role of state and government for SOEs. Those problems pushed the 
reform of SOEs in China to new direction.  
 Background of Reform of SOEs in China 
Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central 
Committee, China has embarked on a new way of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, guided by Deng Xiaoping’s Theory. Against this the background, the 
reform of Chinese SOEs, as a part of economic reform in China, were advanced 
gradually to overcome the defects of the traditional planned economy. The term 
“defects” here refers to the problems and contradictions of SOEs which emerged during 
the transition stage, such as redundant construction of SOEs and lack of flexibility in 
terms of operations of SOEs.79 Those defects could be seen as a result of some SOEs 
                                                 
77 Different periods of reform have had different targets. According to decision of the Fifteenth Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China, the reform of state-owned enterprises and the development goal is "to adapt to 
the economic system and economic growth way two fundamental shift and enlarge the demand of opening to the 
outside world, basically complete reorganization strategic adjustment, the state-owned economic layout and 
structure of reasonable, to establish a relatively perfect modern enterprise system, the economic benefit is 
improved obviously, science and technology development ability, market competition ability and the ability to 
resist the risk enhanced obviously, the state-owned economy better to play a leading role in the national economy." 
The task of the reform of state-owned enterprises is to make the state-owned enterprises become the basic modern 
enterprise, establish modern enterprise system in large SOEs; the second target is to adjust the structure of the 
state-owned economy, and establish dominant position in the national economy. 
78 After the expenence of almost twenty years reform of SOEs in China, some goals had been achieved, such as 
establishing modern enterprise system in large SOEs and adjusting the structure of the state-owned economy, 
establishing a dominant position in the national economy; however, the result of reform should become deeper in 
future. More discussion can be seen in Xu Jingyong, Huang Huanwen, 2002. “We Are not Ready to Achieve the 
Goal of State-owned Enterprises Reform”, Economic Review. (7) 2002.  
79 See The Decision 1999, supra note 9. 
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not having adapted to the demands of a market economy. In fact, those problems were 
not to be solved in the following decade.  
 The Importance of Reform of SOEs 
The public-ownership economy, which includes the state-owned economy, is the 
economic base of China’s socialist system. The SOEs are a pillar of China’s national 
economy. Reform of SOEs will enhance the vitality of the SOEs and the control of the 
state-owned economy in an overall way, and this is of great significance from the 
establishment of a socialist market economic structure, to the improvement of the 
people’s living standards, as well as maintaining a good political situation of stability 
and unity.80 
 The Four Stages of Reform of SOEs in China  
The development of the reform of Chinese SOEs was a part of the implementation of 
the Reform and Opening up Policy in China. It is widely accepted that the history of 
reform of SOEs can be divided into several periods. For example, according to Qian 
Weiqing, there are four stages of reform of SOEs. The first stage was from 1978 to 1983, 
when the Chinese government tried to expand enterprises’ autonomy. The second stage 
was from 1983 to 1987. The focus of reform of SOEs in this period was on the issue of 
interest distribution between government and enterprises. In the period between 1987 
and 1992, the SOEs contract responsibility system was enhanced by the Chinese 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
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government. From 1992 until to now, most SOEs are trying to establish a modern 
enterprises system.81In summary, Qian’s opinion on the four stages of SOEs shows that 
SOEs were reformed by means of administrative measures, policies and laws.  
In this research, the history of reform of Chinese SOEs will be divided into four stages, 
namely, the first stage from 1978 to 1988, the second from 1988 to 2002, the third from 
2002 to 2011, and the fourth from 2012 to present and future. The way in which these 
stages are divided is in accordance with the different focuses regarding state-owned 
asset as was administrated by the Chinese government in different stages. 
 The first stage: 1978 - 1988 
First of all, from 1978 to 1988, the main goal of reform of SOEs in China was to 
separate governments from SOEs. During this period, there were no relevant laws and 
regulations on SOEs, but some important policies and decisions about this issue were 
implemented which directed the reform in a better and clear way. As mentioned above, 
those policies and decisions will be described as “documents” in this research.  
For example, The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee was held in 
Beijing in 1978.82 It marked the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up policy. The 
                                                 
81 Qian, supra note 31, at p61. 
82 The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Cental Committeee correctly solved the key problem of the 
relationship between the reform and opening up, so as to find the correct way for Chinese modernization 
development, and greatly propelled the development of China's modernization process, firmly grasp the socialism 
direction of China, and establish the correct coordinates for the formation of the socialist modernization with 
Chinese characteristics, to ensure the steady development of China's modernization. See Du Yanhua, 2008. 
“Lundangde Shiyijie Sanzhongquanhui Zai Zhongguo Xiandaihua Shishang de Teshu Diwei”, Academic Forum. 
10 2008. pp. 62-66. the meaning of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Cental Committeee can see Zhao 
Xianming, Feng Jing, 2010. “View on the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee Learning and 
Dealing with the Historucal Problems—Postscript on Learning the Committee of the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee ”, Journal of Xichang College (Social Science Edition), 22 (4) 2010. Also see, Ning 
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policy offered a good condition and background for the reform of SOEs. In addition, in 
1984, the Third Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee adopted the 
Decision of the Chinese Central Government on Economic Reform, particularly 
stressing the need to enhance the vitality of the state-owned large and medium-sized 
enterprises.83 Moreover, in 1986, the State Council issued Provisions on Deepening 
Enterprises Reform to Enhance the Vitality of Enterprises, proposed the 
implementation of the various forms of management responsibility systems for large 
and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, such as the contract responsibility system.84 
In summary, the first stage of reform of SOEs was the reform in a superficial standard, 
policy and plans more than in specific actions. In relation to this research, it is worth 
noting that one of the main goals of this period of reform was to establish a concept of 
economic reform for the whole country.   
 The second stage: 1988 - 2002 
The second stage is from 1988 to 2002. Most scholars state that in this period the 
reform of SOEs focused on the establishment of a modern enterprises system.85 This 
research agrees with this argument and holds the opinion that in this stage the Chinese 
government paid more attention to the definition and administration of state-owned 
assets. For example, in 1993 the CPC amended the Constitution of the PRC and 
                                                                                                                                            
Nan, 2008. “Shiyijie Sanzhong Quanhui Lakai Zhongguo Gaige Damu”, Business Watch Magazine, 14 2008. Pp. 
58-59. 
83 Lu, supra note 48, at p5. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Zhou Guanqiang, 2007. “Guoqi Gaige yu Xiandai Qiye Zhidu Biange”, Modern Enterprises. 11 2007. P. 14 and 
see Lin Yifu, Li Zhou, 1997. “Xiandai Qiye Zhidu de Neihan yu Guoyou Qiye Gaige Fangxiang”, Economic 
Research Journal. 03 1997. Pp. 3-10. 
 54 
established a socialist market economic system in this context, the concepts of 
“state-owned” and “state-operated” were separated in law.86 
 The third stage: .2002 - 2011 
The year from 2002 to 2011 should be seen as the third stage of reform of SOEs, 
because in this period the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs was completed.87 
Also at this stage, the CG of SOEs in China had become the core of reform of SOEs, 
especially after 2003.88 Therefore, from a perspective of the CG of SOEs, experiences 
and lessons from the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs should be applied to 
large-sized SOEs. The specific events which can show that the CG of SOEs had 
become central to the reform of SOEs will be discussed in the following section.   
 The fourth stage:  2012 - present and future  
The main goal of the reform of SOEs from 2012 onwards concerns the CG of 
large-sized SOEs.89 This research will focus on a number of sub-questions including:  
 What is the difference between the CG of small and medium-sized SOEs and CG 
of large-sized SOEs in the reform? 
                                                 
86 Lu, supra note 48, at p5. 
87  Shao Ning, 2012, The Report from SASAC Boao Forum for Asia in Apr. 2012. 
http://news.chengdu.cn/content/2012-04/03/content_926063.htm?node=1880 Last accessed, 17/06/12. 
88 For the reform of state-owned enterprises, 2003 was a milestone; the establishment of the SASAC indicated the 
reform of SOEs had entered a new stage. After the reform of state-owned enterprises, The kuoquan rangli, the 
implementation of contracted responsibility system of the SOEs gradually introducd SOEs into the market; pushed 
the establishment of MES in the large SOEs and Zhuada fangxiao, experienced the process of reorganization and 
joint, merging, leasing, contract operation, the joint stock cooperative system and sell or other forms to enliven the 
state-owned small and medium-sized enterprises; the establishment of SASAC means the reform of SOEs has made 
great progress in the exploration, and has entered a new historical stage. See Luo Zhirong, 2013. “Guoqi Gaige: 
Shinian Gongjian Tanchu Fazhan Xinluzi”. Enterprises Civilization. (3) 2013. and see Lin Yifu, 2003. “Guoziwei 
dui Guoqi Gaige Qi Shenme Zuoyong”, China National Conditions and Strength. 10 2003. P. 2. 
89 Ibid. 
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 What is the aim and target of the reform of large-sized SOEs in China? 
 What is the target of the CG of large-sized SOEs? 
 How will the large-sized SOEs achieve the target? 
1.4.2 CG of SOEs 
From both national and international perspectives, the definitions of CG and SOEs 
were discussed in the introduction part of this thesis. In order to avoid repetition, this 
section does not review each definition in detail. It mainly provides a brief account of 
the relationship between CG and SOEs in China, the background and development of 
CG of reform of Chinese SOEs and debated issues on the CG of Chinese SOEs.  
 The Understanding of CG of SOEs 
In OECD Guidelines on CG of SOEs, the specific difficulties of CG of SOEs are 
illustrated: “Corporate governance difficulties derive from the fact that accountability 
for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of agents (management, board, 
ownership entities, ministries, and the government), without clearly and easily 
identifiable, or remote, principals. To structure this complex web of accountabilities in 
order to ensure efficient decisions and good corporate governance is a challenge.”90 
The SOEs had to face up to those difficulties after a long time, and the OECD 
experience showed that good CG of SOEs is an important prerequisite for economically 
effective development.  
                                                 
90 OECD, supra note 16. 
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In China, the concept of CG is officially introduced after 2000, but the practice has 
begun long before that. In fact, most problems mentioned in OECD Guidelines, such as 
management, ownership entities and the government, were handled by Chinese SOEs 
in the reform. However, because CG as a concept was introduced into Chinese SOEs 
later than practice, the uniform concept of CG of Chinese SOEs was not defined. A 
number of scholars believe that CG of SOEs in China is a complex and extensive 
system. A representative argument is from Qian Weiqing, who argues that the CG of 
SOEs in China is an adjustment system about government, SOEs, employee and other 
relevant parts.91    
In this thesis, the CG of SOEs in China will be discussed based on Qian’s opinion, but 
the scope of CG of SOEs will be defined clearly mainly from the perspectives of 
internal governance and external governance.    
 Background and Development of CG of Reform of Chinese SOEs 
The concept of CG of reform of SOEs in China has become a core focus especially after 
2003.  This section analyses the reasons why the CG of SOEs became so important to 
the reform of SOEs in China.  
In the practice, the most debated issues of SOEs in the history of Chinese reform 
include the management, state acting as owner, government and ownership. In 2001, 
China accessed the World Trade Organization (WTO). To meet the international 
                                                 
91 Qian, supra note 84, at p 61. 
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standards, China had to solve weak points in all respects in a short time, included the 
CG of SOEs. This is to enable Chinese SOEs to face up to competition from the entire 
world. At the same time, in 2002, CG Guideline for Listed Companies was issued,92 
and a normative standard was proposed for CG for Chinese SOEs, which was 
advantageous for improving CG of Chinese SOEs. Some Chinese SOEs were changed 
in the process of reform by taking the CG Guideline for Listed Companies as an 
important reference. 
From a national perspective, in 2003 the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
entered into a new era. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) were established in 2003. SASAC is a specialist commission, 
directly under the State Council. It is responsible for managing China’s SOEs, 
including appointing top executives and approving any mergers, sales of stock or assets, 
as well as drafting laws related to state-owned enterprises.93 It is the view of this thesis 
that the establishment of SASAC has significant implications in practice for the reform 
of SOEs in China. This is because it is the first opportunity for SASAC to clarify the 
issue of ownership of SOEs in practice and act as an investor and owner of SOEs. After 
the establishment of the SASAC, some attempts were made to establish a legal 
supervision system for state-owned assets in China. These attempts include the 
                                                 
92 Code of Corporate Gocvernance for Listed Companies in China, issued by CSRC, and State Securities and Trade 
Commission on January 7, 2001. The Code combined with Chinese Company Law and Chinese Securities Law, 
CSRC Guidelines for Articles of Association of Chinese Listed Companies, established a corporate governance of 
Chineses listed company’s evaluation system, for example, the Code influenced the Chinese Audit Committee 
System, according to the Article 52 of the Code, The board of directors of the listed company may set up the strategy, 
audit, remuneration and appraisal committee in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the shareholders' meeting, 
the audit committee under the authorization of the company, responsible for handling the company's financial and 
supervising internal control system, especially play an important role in the process of financial disclosure and 
prevent financial reporting fraud.  
93 Lu, supra note 48, at p8. 
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issuance of the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, 
the Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in 
Charge of Central Enterprises, and a document on High-tech Central Enterprises to 
carry out the Work of Stock Option Incentive Pilot.94  
At the same time, four main points were proposed by the Resolution of Certain Issues 
from CPC Central Committee on Perfecting the Socialist Market Economic System:95 
first of all, establishment of state—owned capital management budget system and 
development performance evaluation system of business operators; secondly, 
improvement of the authorized management system; thirdly, establishment of property 
rights trading rules and regulatory measures; last but not least, establishment of 
regulation on the supervision and management for state-owned financial assets, 
non-operating assets and natural resources assets. These four main points reflected a 
positively good signal that policy from Chinese government had begun to develop CG 
of SOEs. After that, some attempts have been made in the Chinese legal system to 
promote the development of CG of SOEs. For example, the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, which was adopted upon 
deliberation at the 5th sessions of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s 
Congress on October 28, 2008, came into force on May 1, 2009.96 It has had a major 
impact on improving the state-owned assets’ administration system and advancing the 
                                                 
94 Ministry of Science and Technology in China, 2004. 
95 The Resolution of Certain Issues from CPC Cental Committee on Perfecting System of Socialist Market Economy, 
adopted on October 14, 2003 by the Communist Party of China through the Third Plenary Sessions of the Sixteenthe 
Cental Committee. 
96 Lu, supra note 48, at p8. 
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reform and development of the state-owned enterprises.97 
In summary, the issue of the CG of Chinese SOEs has become a core agenda over time 
for the reform of Chinese SOEs. In the history of Chinese SOEs reform, many factors 
have encouraged the CG of SOEs to occupy a central place in the Chinese SOEs reform. 
Next, the following parts will analyse the experience and lessons of CG of Chinese 
SOEs between 2003 and 2011.   
 The Experience and Lessons of CG of Chinese SOEs 
In the process of the reform of SOEs in China, some of the most debated points have 
attracted scholars’ attention. These points are mainly concentrated upon the issues of 
internal governance and external governance. From a legal perspective, the following 
part critically discusses arguments from scholars about these two issues.   
Internal Governance of CG of SOEs 
Firstly, the ownership of SOEs in China was not in the past clearly defined and clarified. 
As mentioned above, some scholars believe that the establishment of the SASAC is a 
big improvement for the CG of SOEs in China. But this thesis argues that the 
establishment of SASAC cannot make up for the lack of a completed legal system. 
According to Qian Weiqing, the ownership of SOEs under the traditional system was 
                                                 
97 The Law of the People's Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises makes many issues clear, 
including ownership of state-owned assets, the duties of the investor, the selection of state-funded enterprises, 
management personnel, operation and management of state assets, state assets assessment and transfer of 
state-funded enterprise restructuring and restructuring of state-owned capital management budget management, 
state-owned assets supervision and operational auditing, and legal responsibilities of the state-owned asset 
management. 
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failing, because the owner and operator were not separated.98 Qian argues that the 
decision-makers of SOEs were the owners who controlled SOEs. If they made wrong 
decisions, the loss made by the SOEs was accepted by the State.99 Another scholar Li 
Baoyuan reveals a similar opinion that unclear ownership of SOEs will lead to 
insider-control.100 This thesis agrees with their views. In fact, this thesis believes that 
the undeveloped and traditional ownership of SOEs is the source of loss of state-owned 
assets, because the traditional ownership of Chinese SOEs cannot be suitable for the 
development of a market economy. That is why the SOEs restructuring is necessary to 
meet the need of market economy.101 In addition, a lack of clear protection by legal 
system for the owner of SOEs is another main problem. According to Interim 
Provisions on the Ownership of State-owned Shares of the Pilot Enterprises of the 
Stock Ownership,102 Articles 2, 3, 13, 14, 15, 16, 25, the regulation only described the 
obligation of the equity for the state, but did not describe the interests of the equity for 
the state. It will discourage owners of SOEs to pursue improvement of SOEs due to lack 
of motivation.  
Secondly, another weakness of CG of SOEs in China concerns the protection of small 
shareholders’ rights and interests. According to OECD Guidelines 2005, the state and 
                                                 
98 Qian, supra note 84, at p 66. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Li ,Y, 2007. ‘New Wave on Equity Incentive of Reform of State-owned Enterprises’, China Report. Pp. 78-81 
101 Loss of state-owned assets can be divided into two stages in the process of state-owned enterprises restructuring. 
The first one is that losses due to underestimated value of SOEs in the process of restructuring. The second one is the 
loss of interest of state-owned shares in the operation after the restructuring. The main reason is the supervisor 
system for state-owned assets is not sound, assets appraisal is not in accordance with the regulations, and circulation 
of state-owned shares cannot be listed. For more discussion, see Wang Zhenjiang, Li Jing, 2000. “Guoyou Qiye 
Gaizhi Zhong Guoyou Zichan Liushi de Yuanyin Fenxi ji Falv Duice”, Journal of Lanzhou University (Social 
Sciences) 02 2002. Pp. 87-91. and see Yang Dan, 1999. “Guoyou Qiye Zichan Zhuanrang Dingjia Xingwei 
Fenxi—Jianping Guoyou Zichan Liushiguan”, Economic Research Journal. 12 1999. Pp. 15-23. 
102 Interim Provisions on the Ownership of State-owned Shares of the Pilot Enterprises of the Stock Ownership 
adopted by State-owned Assets Administration Bureau on July 27 1992. 
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SOEs should recognise the right of all shareholders and ensure their equitable treatment 
and equal access to corporate information.103 However, these rights and equitable 
treatment are not stated in current Chinese law. Without clear provisions to define the 
specific rights and interests of shareholders, especially small shareholders, their rights 
and interests cannot be protected properly. Using a similar argument, Yao Yang points 
out that in Company Law of the PRC the protection of shareholders is only mentioned 
in some Articles.104  For most Chinese SOEs, the state-owned equity stands at a high 
proportion; minority shareholders always lose interest in shareholders meeting and are 
then absent from shareholders meetings. This being so, the law on protecting the right 
of shareholders just exists in name only.  
Thirdly, the board of directors is undeveloped for most Chinese SOEs. The board of 
directors of Chinese SOEs is established by reference to OECD Guidelines. 105 
However, in practice, some scholars have pointed out several problems. For example, 
Lu Fucai pointed out that the board of directors of Chinese SOEs lacks independence, 
because the relationship between the state and SASAC is unclear.106 Zhu Xiangyu 
concludes that the functions of decision-making and supervision of the board of 
directors of Chinese SOEs are underdeveloped.107 The basic functions of a board of 
directors of Chinese SOEs cannot work well in practice, because the theory of CG was 
copied from western countries. 108  In China, the concept and mode of CG were 
                                                 
103 OECD, supra note 16. 
104 Gu& Zhou, 2004. ‘Breakthrough Corporate Governance Bottleneck, Deepen the Reform of SOEs’, Journal of 
Social Sciences. Pp. 121-122. 
105 OECD the State-Owned Enterprises’ Corporate Governance Guidelines 2004. 
106 Lu, supra note 48, at p152. 
107 Zhu, 2009. The Research of Low Efficiency on Management of Chinese SOEs, Academic Research. 1-4.  
108 More details about transplant of corporate governance will be discussed in Chapter 6, the characters of Chinese 
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established over a short period of time, therefore, in practice, the traditional mode has 
not changed completely.  
Fourthly, the board of supervisors of SOEs in China is titular. The function of the board 
of supervisors of SOEs is only an ideal, but not a reality in practice.109 Practical 
problems about the board of supervisors of SOEs in China can be summarised as 
following two points. On the one hand, there is no clear provision to define the 
authority of board of supervisors in Chinese Company Law.110  On the other hand, the 
function of supervision of the board of supervisors of Chinese SOEs is ex post facto.111  
 
1.5 Outline and Overview of Chapters 
This thesis includes seven chapters as follows. 
Chapter 1 offers an introduction of this research. It provides a background of the 
Chinese reform of state-owned enterprises over more than the last twenty years. 
Corporate governance, as a new solution to improve efficiency of Chinese SOEs, has 
been the focus of Chinese reform of SOEs since 2003. It is demonstrated in the first 
chapter that the concept of corporate governance in this research means ownership, 
shareholders, board of supervisors and board of director.112 This thesis believes that the 
                                                                                                                                            
CG of SOEs.  
109 More details will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
110 See Chinese Corporation Law, Articles: 102 103 112 119 126 143 148 106 126 and more details will be discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
111 Ibid and more details will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
112 More information about CG can see Pp.16-20 this Chapter.  
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nature of CG is as a check and balance mechanism between owner and operator. CG is 
an institutional arrangement which includes formal and informal, internal or external 
systems to coordinate the interest relationship between company and all stakeholders 
(including government, shareholders, creditors, employees and suppliers), to ensure the 
correctness of decision-making, and eventually to guarantee the interest of the 
company in all aspects. Although the CG of SOEs includes internal governance and 
external governance, this thesis focuses on the internal governance of Chinese SOEs, 
including shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and managers. This 
chapter also introduces research questions, methodology, literature review, and the 
significance of this research.  
Chapter 2 is a historical review of the four stages of reform of state-owned enterprises 
in China. The relationship between CG and the reform of SOEs will be discussed. This 
is followed by an introduction of the current situation of CG of Chinese SOEs. Firstly, 
the importance of CG will be discussed. Secondly, the experience and lessons through 
the reform of small and medium SOEs before 2011 will be summarised and analysed. 
Thirdly, the chapter also distinguishes between small and medium SOEs and large 
SOEs, and identifies good governance experience. Fourthly, the aims, characteristics, 
achievements and difficulties of the reform of large Chinese SOEs will be discussed.  
The international and national background of Chinese CG is demonstrated at the end of 
the chapter two.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the transformation concerning the ownership and control of SOEs 
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in the reform period. The term Corporate Governance was introduced in China after 
1990, but the adjustments involving the ownership and control of SOEs had already 
started before then. The transformation process experienced different periods, 
including an expansion of the SOEs’ autonomy, payment of taxes by state enterprises 
replacing turning over their profit to the state, the reform of shareholding system in 
Chinese SOEs, a move to grasp the large and let it go the small, the debt-into-equity 
reform, and the ownership and control of SOEs under the SASAC. The difficulties and 
breakthroughs of CG of SOEs in the transformation period will be summarized in this 
chapter.  
Chapter 4 discusses the main problems of CG of Chinese SOEs, including internal 
governance, external governance and related issues. The specific problems related to 
CG are in the areas of ownership, board of directors, shareholder, and board of 
supervisors, market control and financial supervision. This Chapter focuses on the 
current situation and problems of internal governance (the shareholder meeting and the 
rights of shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, the managers, 
information disclosure and the stakeholders) of Chinese state-owned listed companies. 
National laws and regulations addressing the problems mentioned above will be 
introduced, and in this context some existing loopholes will be discussed. 
Chapter 5 further discusses the issues about internal governance of Chinese 
state-owned listed companies, including the problems about ownership structure and 
controlling shareholder’s behaviour, the problems about related party transactions and 
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information disclosure, and the defects of Sanhui and stakeholders.  
Chapter 6 starts with a discussion on the characteristics of CG of Chinese SOEs in the 
transition period, followed by an exploration on the solutions for the problems in the 
CG of Chinese SOEs reform through a legal approach to be taken in the future.  
The last chapter is a summary and conclusion of the research.  
 
1.6 Contributions made by this Thesis  
The development of CG of reform of Chinese SOEs has entered a new stage. The focus 
of reform has transferred from small and medium-sized SOEs to large-sized SOEs. 
However, current literature has not offered much in-depth research for the 
understanding of this new stage. Therefore, the CG of large-sized SOEs is my focus and 
the first contribution of this research to the body of knowledge. Secondly, the features 
of CG of SOEs at the transition time have been summarized as follows: strong 
intervention by the government, transplantation of Chinese CG into state-owned listed 
companies and wholly state-owned enterprises, insider control and formalized Sanhui.  
Thirdly, my research will discuss main practical problems of CG, they are also can be 
seen as the characteristics of the CG of Chinese State-owned listed companies, namely, 
strong government intervention and the governemtn-led driving force, transplantation 
of Chinese CG; and this thesis helps to fill in the gap between theory and practice 
related to the CG of Chinese SOEs reform. The suggesions include fundamentally 
solve the problem of related party transactions; perfect the management systmen of 
 66 
the state-owned equity, standardize the scope and procedure of government 
intervention. Improve the efficiency of CG of state-owned holding listed companies; 
strengthen the supervision of insider informantion sources; improve the stat-owned 
equity transfer system. Finally, my first hand documents from cases studies will fill in 
the gap for English language literature in the field.  
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Chapter 2:  The Development of Corporate Governance 
of State-Owned Enterprises in China 
 
In 1978, China embarked on a path of economic reform. Over more than 30 years, this 
economic reform brought significant changes for China. For example, from 1978 to 
2008, China’s per capita GDP  doubled every ten years; China’s economic aggregate 
world ranking rose from 13th in 1978 to 4th in 2007; China’s import and export as a 
proportion of world trade rose to third place in 2007 from 23rd 30 years previously.113  
Indeed, the past three decades of economic reform have shown the world an economic 
miracle and delivered contribution to the world. At the same time, it has brought about 
new issues and challenges. As a big contributor to China’s flourishing economy, the 
development of Chinese SOEs will largely influence the sustainability of economic 
booms. However, corporate governance of SOEs has lagged behind, and it has become 
an essential and critical link which needs to be improved.  
 
As an important component of the economic reform, the reform of Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises has been continuously discussed by scholars.114 The debates 
                                                 
113 In early of 1980s, Deng Xiaoping set a goal for Chinese economy, which was that the Chinese national income 
would be doubled by 2000. But lots of people doubted it and considered it was an impossible task. In Zhang’s article, 
he took these cases and examples to support Chinese economy increasing so fast, even beyond the early goal. For 
detail discussions of the contribution of Chinese economy reform see Zhang, Weiying, “Zhonggguo Gaige 
Sanshinian” ( The 30 Years of Chinese Economic Reform)2009: 10. 
114 Here are some important and representative scholars and their work: Li Yining, Chinese famous economist and 
doctoral supervisor of Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, thinks there are two levels for Chinese SOEs reforma 
higher level is the capital system reform of SOEs which means SASAC does not control SOEs directly, but consists 
of the SOEs and manages the SOEs’ capital configuration. And the lower reform is reform of SOEs system which 
includes establishing and perfecting the corporate governance structure. For more details, see Li Yining, 2013, 
Chinese Economy in Dual Transition, Beijing: China Renming University Press. And the former books can refer to 
Li, Yining, 1994. Gufen Zhi Yu Xiandai Shichang Jingji. Jiangsu, Jiangsu Renmin Press. Another scholar is Li Weian, 
he thinks actively developing the state-owned capital, collective capital, non-public capital and other 
cross-shareholding; mutual integration of the mixed ownership economy is a key to promoting the reform of 
state-owned enterprises. The reform of state-owned enterprises has gone through three stages, the first: set up 
corporate governance structure; the second is the perfect governance mechanism; the third one is how to improve the 
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include the effectiveness of the reform of SOEs in China, the changes to SOEs caused 
by the reform, and the evaluation of SOEs reform measures in the early days. 
115Moreover, with further expansion of the process of reform of SOEs, corporate 
governance of SOEs has become a heatedly discussed issue.116   
 
This chapter will first review the background of reform of SOEs in China. It will then 
examine the relationship between the reform of SOEs and corporate governance of 
SOEs. Finally, it will explore the features of corporate governance of SOEs in a 
transition stage. 117  The chapter aims to expound, through explaining these three 
                                                                                                                                            
effectiveness of governance. How to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance is the current plight of the 
reform of state-owned enterprises. Mixed ownership must be introduced to solve the dilemma. For example, a lot of 
SOEs have been established with the governance structure and mechanism of state-owned enterprises, but the 
serious problem is corporate governance behavior of the security administration. Some issues should be determined 
by the internal governance functions, such as the executive to appoint or remove, salary, equity incentive, but have 
been determined by the external governance. And many of the external management functions, such as the social 
functions of the enterprise, have been determined by the degree of internal governance. These problems seriously 
affect the effectiveness of the state-owned enterprises, hindering the reform process. Therefore, introducing the 
mixed ownership to reform of state-owned enterprises, implementation of cross-shareholding to state-owned capital 
and private capital and other non-public sectors capital, state-owned capital advantage can be merged with the 
private capital advantage of flexible market mechanism, in order to improve the governance effect. for more 
opinions about Chinese SOEs reform of Li Weian see Li Weian, 2009. Corporate Governance Study. China 
Economy Press. And Li, Weian, 2013, Chinese Corporate Governance: Road to Transition and Perfection. China 
Machine Press.  
115 Ibid. See the books and articles above. And some more articles which engaged with these debates including: 
Keister, L. A. 1998. ‘Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China’ s Transition 
Economy’, American Journal of Sociology, 104: 404-440. ; Liu, G.S AND Sun, P., ‘the Class of Shareholdings and 
Corporate Performance- A Case of State Shareholding Composition in Chinese Publicly Listed Companies’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, forthcoming. ; Liu, G. S., Sun, P and Woo, W. T., ‘Triggering the 
Chinese –style Privatization: Motives and Constraints’, in Green, S. and Liu, G. S. (eds), Exit the Dragon ? 
Privatization and State Ownership in China, Blackwell, forthcoming.; Qi, D. Wu, W and Zhan, H 2000. 
‘shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance of Partially Privatiized Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese 
Companies’, Pacific- Basin Finance Journal, 8: 587-610.; Sun, Q., and Tong, W.H,S,2003. ‘China Share Issue 
Privatization: the Extent of its Success’, Journal of Financial Economics, 60: 183-222. 
116 See the second footnote in this Chapter. Li, Yining and Li, Weian can be seen as the famous scholars who have 
researched Chinese corporate governance of SOEs, and their opinions and books are typical. The same issue had 
been discussed by many scholars, such as Wu, Jiong, 2014. Corporate Governance. Beijing. Beijing University 
Press; and Yue Wu, 2006. Corporate Governance: Ownership and Goals in SOEs, Law Press. 
117 Mainly refers to the economic transition period. Now China is in economic transition period, from single to 
complex, planned economic develop towards the market economic, and eventually to integration with the world. 
Monomer to the development of the complex is embodied in the connection degree between the departments, such as 
the change of penetration. As before the Tax and Customs are two independent departments, the link between each 
other is weak, but now the contact between them is more and more close. The tax bureau has a record of the customs 
information, and the customs, tax related records also can be checked. The embodiment of the planned economy 
developing into a market economy in the transition of the economic development mode, uch as the economic 
marketization and interest rate marketization. The ultimate goal of these changes is reach the target with the 
international community. 
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aspects, how the Chinese SOEs have improved CG and distanced themselves from the 
states, and how CG has played a key role for the development of SOEs in future.  
 
2.1 The Background of Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprise in China 
 
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the main economic goal 
of the country was to establish a centrally planned economy. China established a 
state-owned assets management system to adapt to a planned economy at the same time. 
The Cultural Revolution (1966-76) left China in chaos. Over these ten years, China 
dismantled the formal legal system which it had begun to create in the early 20th 
century and continued under Soviet influence in the 1950s. One of the impacts on the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises was a highly centralized management.118As a result, 
when China started its economic reform and tried to re-build the legal system in the late 
1970s, the management of state-owned enterprises was involved.119 The so-called 
‘Chinese reform of state-owned enterprises’ was closely bound up with the economic 
reform. Therefore, a short review of the relevant economic and political environment 
will provide essential information to understanding the Significance of this history. 
                                                 
118 The term of highly centralized management refers to: firstly, the management right of State-owned assets had 
been controlled by central government, and the investment plan had been led by government, and the money can be 
use by government for free, without interest. Secondly, the main measure for the State controlled State-owned assets 
was material object magnitude pattern, and carried out planned transfer for production and uniform distribution. And 
finally, the central government controlled too much of the SOEs, the ownership and the rights of management and 
the rights of operation overlapped.  
119  Lu, C Zhongyang Qiye Gongsi Zhili Baogao, (Report on Corporate Governance of Central State-owned 
Enterprises) 2011:5  More traditional way in which the management of SOEs was involved as can be seen in last 
footnote, because the traditional methods cannot be suitable for the development of Chinese SOEs.  
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2.1.1 Economic Reform and its Impacts on State-owned Enterprises Reform 
There are two terms frequently used in relation to the rise of economic reform, namely 
‘socialist market economy’ and ‘socialist economy with Chinese characteristics’. These 
two concepts were first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in order to incorporate the market 
into the planned economy in China at that time.120  
As discussed in Chapter One, corporate governance was introduced into China in 1990s. 
However, the activities of SOEs existed before then. What then was the focus of SOEs 
before 1990? What was the difference between traditional SOEs and SOEs after the 
reform? What was the background for CG development? In order to answer these 
questions, two concepts should be introduced as fundamental for further research into 
the relationship between SOEs and economic reform, namely state-owned assets 
management and state-owned assets management system.121 In the Chinese context, 
“state-owned assets management" refers to the way in which the state representing 
common wealth manages the state-owned assets.122 “State-owned assets management 
system” refers to the ways and forms of management of state-owned assets, including 
how to deal with the relationship between owner and operators of state-owners assets, 
and how to choose relevant incentive and restraint measures.123  Indeed, these two 
                                                 
120 Following Deng Xiaoping’s speech of inspecting the south, in 1993 the Communist Party Committee amended 
the Constitution of China, to establish a socialist market economic system, and to change state enterprises to 
state-owned enterprises, and to separate the concepts “state-owned” and “state-operated” in law. More details see 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianshe Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jijing Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (Decisions of 
the Communist Party Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market 
Economy System), adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Fourteenth National Congress on 14 Nov. 1993. 
121 These two concepts are popular phrases in the Chinese Report on the Work of the Government and rules, laws of 
Chinese SOEs. 
122 Lu, supra note 48, at p4. 
123 Ibid, P4.  
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concepts were frequently mentioned during the early time of SOEs reform.124 Even in 
the reform period, the traditional SOEs management system was still playing an 
important role in practice for some SOEs in China.  
 
 The Traditional SOEs Management System 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 1, after the nation was established, SOEs in China were 
the principal producers of energy, transportation, telecommunications, semi-finished 
materials and technical equipment. The dominant feature of economic entities in China 
was SOEs as a representative of ‘the whole people’ or ‘commonwealths’. The highly 
centralized SOEs management system pushed SOEs development in the early era of the 
establishment of the PRC. The features of this system can be summarized in the 
following three points. Firstly, the central government controlled the state-owned assets, 
decided the investment plan and free utilization without paying money. Moreover, the 
asset management mode of SOEs was the material object magnitude pattern in time of 
the planned economy.125 The main production material was planned and centrally 
distributed by government. Finally, a great number of SOEs were managed by central 
government; therefore, central government had the ownership and operation of SOEs at 
the same time.126  
 
                                                 
124 Ibid, P4. The same opinion can see Liu, Z. 2002 Zhongguo Guoyou Zichan Guanli Tizhi Gaige Yu Chuangxin. 
Beijing. Economic Science Publish.  
125 Relevant information see footnotes 6 this Chapter. And see Lu, supra note 48, at p4. 
126 Ibid, P4. 
 72 
The features above are the reasons why Chinese SOEs were in a non-competitive 
environment in the period of planned economy.  When the Opening Up policy was 
proposed in the late of 1970s, subsequent changes pushed Chinese SOEs to compete 
with every single rural enterprises, joint venture and foreign enterprise. 127  SOEs 
struggled with serious problems such as financial losses, and high cost but low 
efficiency. Chinese government statistics showed that about one third of SOEs were 
losing money, and even in debt, in the 1990s.128 
 
According to Sun, there were about 380,000 SOEs in China in 1997.129 Most of these 
enterprises were organized between the 1950s and the 1970s by different levels of 
governments. As discussed in Chapter 1, large-sized SOEs refers to those large-sized 
state-invested enterprises that the State Council shall, on behalf of the state, perform the 
contributor’s functions and that have bearings on the national economic lifeline and 
state security as determined by the State Council in such fields as important 
infrastructures and natural resources, and so on. In contrast, SOEs which are 
established by local governments are normally small and medium sized. The 
employees of these130 SOEs have reached about one hundred million, and directly 
affect the lives of more than three million Chinese people.131 Hence, the importance of 
SOEs in China not only relates to the Chinese economy, but also to the lives of people. 
 
                                                 
127 Ibid, P4. 
128 Sun, X 1999:21 Sun believed that under the centrally planned economy, the noncompetitive environment lead to 
lack the efficiency of SOEs.  
129 supra note 136, at p21. 
130 The term of these means small/ medium seized.  
131 Ibid, P21. 
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Scholars conducted researches from various perspectives, trying to explain experiences 
of Chinese SOEs. Some scholars concluded that the SOEs were lacking autonomy, 
initiative and adequate incentive for efficiency and productivity.132 By contrast, others 
offered more specific reasons: the Chinese Communist Party was not separated from 
the government; SOEs relied on the government heavily and the government was 
intertwined with SOEs.133  
 
It is the view of this thesis; these different arguments can be summarized in terms of 
relationships among owner, manager and operator.134 How to deal with the relationship 
among those three is a key and central point in the process of reform, contributing to the 
reform activities and helping economic reform achieve a better result. 135  The 
contribution of the traditional SOEs management system for the development of SOEs 
was undeniable in a historical perspective. However, the highly centralized 
management system could not adapt to a changing environment and an immediate 
consequence was that some SOEs lost money and even shut down, and became burden 
to Chinese economy.136 The social responsibility of SOEs was non-existent at that 
time.137 Influenced by these circumstances, CG of SOEs was slowly emerging. The 
reason can been shown and explained by the attempts below, some of them achieving, 
                                                 
132 Art, R and Gu, Minkang, 1995. ‘China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China’, 20 Yale Journal of International Law, P. 277. 
133 Ibid, P277.  
134  Under the traditional mode, the owner, manager and operator were all the State, but under the management of 
SASAC, the owner is the State, manager is SASAC and the operator is SOEs.  
135 In China now, theses three are refer to government, SOEs, and SASAC. Find a method to keep balance to make 
the government just play the owner’s role, and not to control the SOEs too much.   
136 see Lu, supra note 48, at p4. 
137 Social responsibilities of enterprises refer to enterprises obligations to maintain and improve social interests in 
addition to their pursuits of shareholder maximal profits. For China at that time, SOEs without profits even in debt, 
cannot take on their own social responsibilities.  
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but some of them failing. The main issues of CG of SOEs, as the key factors after the 
attempts, became the new issues for SOEs.  
 
In general, the attempts of Chinese government and SOEs to change the situation of the 
traditional management system of SOEs can be divided into two steps in early period of 
the reform. The first step of SOEs reform was converting SOEs operational 
management mechanisms while leaving their basic ownership and organizational 
structure unaltered in the period between 1978 and 1988.138 The activities of this period 
focused on improving the efficiency and productivity of SOEs. Indeed, the first step 
accorded with the goal of economic reform at that time.139 Over those ten years, China 
replaced profit-retention systems with a taxation system.140  Moreover, the pricing 
system was relaxed to encourage market transaction. 141  Finally, China started to 
incorporate SOEs and give more power to their decision-makers.142  
 
The second step was the corporatization of SOEs. In the Chinese context 
corporatization refers specifically to the transformation of SOEs into joint-stock 
                                                 
138  Under the traditional operational management mechanisms, each right of SOEs had been controlled by 
government at each level. SOEs are the appendages for the governments. It was not good for the enthusiasm of 
employees of SOEs After 1978, some new attempts for SOEs had been completed, such as Kuoda Qiye Zizhu Quan, 
Li gai Shui, and some others to reduce the intervention from the government, and give more autonomous rights to 
SOEs. In the Chapter 3, more reasons, methods and results about those attempts will be discussed.  
139  Chinese economic reform was aimed at: firstly, moving the economy toward greater decentralization of 
decision-making; secondly, increasing reliance on market forces and on material incentives for motivating desired 
economic behavior and resource allocation; finally, opening the economy to external competition through foreign 
investment. See Xia, Mei, 1992: 22. 
140 More details about this system can see Chapter 3.  
141 The new pricing system made more profit for the SOEs themselves; the SOEs had more motivation to create 
more and more profit through transactions.  
142 See 1984 May issued by the State Council Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Guoying Qiye Zizhuquan de Zanxing 
Guiding， ten aspects had been given more power to SOEs’ decision-makers, namely, operation, sales, the 
production, price of production, choosing the material, using money, using assets, setting the departments, personnel 
management, salary, and joint-operation.  
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companies, in which the state, or its agents, continues to hold the controlling interest.143 
With an experience of almost ten years’ reform, China realized that SOEs reform 
needed fundamental legal and institutional changes.144 Corporatization of SOEs was a 
key solution at that time.  
 
Jonathan and Laurent identified a clear line between Chinese corporatization and 
privatization; they thought the corporatization of Chinese SOEs was not a true 
privatization.145 Privatization means ‘transfer of ownership or control of assets from 
the public to the private sector’.146 They thought the SOEs reform in China would fail 
because the so-called ‘corporatization’ was a fake privatization, and was not 
thorough.147 By contrast, Chinese scholars in the fields of law or economics argued that 
corporatization was a correct solution because it applied to the Chinese situation.148 
They believed that the privatization of European or Russia style was not suitable for a 
country with a big population, such as China.149  This thesis agrees partially with the 
                                                 
143 Ocko, J and Campo, L 1994-1995. ‘Focus on the Corporatization Process in China’, Vol. 5:145 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law, p. 145. 
144 Sun, supra note 136 at 21. 
145 Ocko, J and Campo, supra note 151, at p145. 
146 Amy L, Chua, ‘The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Market and Ethnicity in Developing 
Countries’, 95 Colum.L.Rev.1995:223-226. 
147 Zhang, W, supra note 5 at 145 When Chinese economic reform started, there were some economists who thought 
China should follow ‘shock therapy’, because the countries which followed shock therapy would experience a short 
financial crisis, but would welcome sustained increase in the economy. They took Russia and Eastern Europe as 
examples. In Zhang’s article, he did not agree this argument, because after the shock therapy period, Russia 
experienced protracted inflation and then got a chain reaction in economy.  Poland was the most successful country 
that experienced shock therapy reform in Eastern Europe; however, the SOEs of Poland were not privatized. Russia 
followed shock therapy, but got the bad result. It is cannot be say Poland enforced strict shock therapy. This thesis 
agrees with Zhang’s argument, and will do the further research based on his view.  
148 Ibid, P146 The state and social institution of China are different from Russia and other countries of Eastern 
Europe, especially the population problem, so that China should adopt different strategies. That is also another 
reason why Zhang cannot agree with the argument about shock therapy.  
149 Chinese scholars in the fields of law or economics thought the style of privatization of Europe or Russia cannot 
be implemented in China, there are two reasons, first of all, bankruptcy of SOEs is the common method for 
privatization of Europe; however, for SOEs in China, such a SOEs with a huge population, bankruptcy will make lots 
of people lose their jobs and lead to storm and stress in one night. Moreover, China is in transition, and most SOEs 
were advanced at that time. It is necessary to continue to have and develop SOEs. 
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argument of Jonathan and Laurent; Chinese corporatization was not a typical western 
privatization. In fact, as an important component of SOEs reform, the corporatization is 
just a reflection of Chinese characteristics.150 Chinese corporatization should not have 
been considered halfway.151 As it is not privatization, the application of the standards 
of privatization as the criteria would be appropriate in judging Chinese corporatization 
of SOEs.  
 
It is the view of this thesis that the corporatization of Chinese SOEs contributed to some 
breakthroughs, although there were negative evaluations of such corporatization. On 
the one hand, huge numbers of workers were laid off in the process of corporatization 
and became a big burden for society.152  In addition, the incomplete legal system leads 
to a drain of state-owned assets of every steps of corporatization, such as evaluation, 
liquidation, mergers and acquisition.153 Last but not the least, the bad debts of SOEs 
became an impossible task to recover in the process of corporatization. Most of the bad 
debts were from policy loans before SOEs reform from commercial banks or other 
                                                 
150 Because Chinese SOEs developed in their own style, it is different from the normal and standard company. 
Therefore, when Chinese SOEs need to develop towards a standard and international company, the first thing that 
must be done is setting the basic mode of modern enterprises. Corporatization is the process of setting the basic 
framework and mode of modern enterprise for Chinese SOEs. This process is particular for China. The companies 
developed in other countries without- corporatization. That means Chinese characteristics.   
151 Compared with the privatization in the Western countries, the result of Chinese corporatization is not the same. 
The standards and the aims for privatization and Chinese corporatization are not the same. The functions for Chinese 
corporatization just reached the goal for standards of modern enterprises. Therefore, from this point of view, 
corporatization had some achievements.   
152 The issues of laid-off workers of Chinese SOEs in 1990s are the main social topic. Because laid-off workers were 
the main measure to reduce the burden for SOEs, also the key way to improve the effectiveness for SOEs at that 
period, so the laid-off workers became a label of Zhu Rongji’s time (Zhu’s planning policies). Zhu thinks for some 
SOEs, too many workers means a loss-making enterprise. And this it conduced from Zhu’s advice for a Chinese SOE 
in 1993. For more information, see Gao Yangwen. 1999. “Jianyuan Zengxiao Xiagang Fenliu-Zhumei Gongsi 
Zongjingli Lidong Tan Shenhua Qiye Neibu Gaige Fanglue.”. Meitan Jingji Yanjiu. 
153 This argument has been conducted from interviews with a legal advice of a Chinese SOE and a senior manager of 
another Chinese SOE, and the record of the interviews had been kept by the author. For example, the agency or 
institutions which can be selected to do evaluate, liquidate and mergers for SOEs, most of the time did not rely on 
rigorous procedures because the rules or laws in legal system were not perfect. Therefore, some agency or 
institutions, which have some related transaction with SOEs, may be selected. During the process to evaluate, 
liquidate and mergers, it is possible to reduce the value of SOEs intentional.  
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financial institutions or were in the form of ‘triangular debts’.154 Undoubtedly, bad 
debts were a historical problem, but which also became an obstacle and hardship for 
SOEs reform. And a chain reaction of bad debts exploded during the corporatization of 
SOEs.155   
 
On the other hand, the corporatization process brought about some breakthroughs for 
Chinese economy. Firstly, as it was described by Lan Cao, corporatization was a means 
by which the transition from a planned economy to a market economy could effectively 
take place. 156  Secondly, corporatization created a good environment for the 
development of CG of SOEs. The modern enterprises system, as a new concept and 
solution of corporatization, was built for improving the efficiency of SOEs in 1990s in 
China.157 A core element of modern enterprises system was identified by the Chinese 
government to be CG.158 This identification led to the policy being focused on CG and 
related reform. Finally, another component of the economic reform was the 
establishment of shareholding companies.159 At that time, conversion of SOEs into 
shareholding companies was taken as a fundamental activity for the listing of some 
                                                 
154 In the context of Chinese research, triangular debt means the linked debts relationship among three or more 
business enterprises. The triangular debts problem had been a main hard task for Chinese economic reform. In the 
practice, there are many causes of the triangular debts in the process of transaction. Most reasons can be attributed to 
the weakness of traditional SOEs, and the conflicts between the free market and the old management system. 
155 The chain reactions include: firstly, SOEs finds it hard to obtain new loans from banks, or high interest rates for 
new loans. Secondly, bad debts hurt tax revenue and the profit of Chinese economy. Finally, bad debts of SOEs made 
heavy burdens for employees, such as low salaries, cheap social benefits including pensions, free medical care and 
monetary support for low-income families. For more specific information about bad debts see Kai C, 1997:433-436.  
156 Lan Cao, 1995. ‘The Cat That Catches Mice: China’s Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model’. Brook 
Journal of International Law. P.97 Lan Cao means privatization, but the in Chinese context, here it means 
corporatization. According to Lan, in the view that is now dominant, privatization debates center around the 
transformation of an economy from centralized to more decentralized arrangements, its subtext is on political 
liberalization. For China, corporatization is always linked with transformation time.  
157 Tenev, S and Zhang, C, 2002. ‘Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institutions 
of Modern Markets’, Washington, D.C.: World Bank and the International Finance Corporation 1. 
158 see Lu, supra note 48, at p 23-25. 
159 Xi, Chao, 2009 Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China, London: Wildy, Simmonds& Hill Publishing. 
7-14. 
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SOEs in the following years.160    
2.1.2 Different Targets of SOEs Reform  
Target I: Reform and Opening up Policy 
 
‘The policy of opening up domestically and internationally means domestic reform and 
opening-up to the world. Opening-up to the world is important for China. It is 
impossible that a country will be better in a closed environment…opening up, from the 
domestic perspective, was reform. And reform needs to be a comprehensive reform, 
including economic, political, science, technology, education and other industries’. 161 
This paragraph can be read as the definition of the policy of opening up from Deng 
Xiaoping, former Chinese leader and the founder of this policy.  Included in the 
proposed comprehensive reform was the SOEs reform which should be viewed as a part 
of the strategy of the economic reform anticipated by Chinese leaders at that time, 
except that the result and length of the reform were probably beyond their expectations.    
  
As discussed, the goal of Chinese economic reform aimed at establishing a socialist 
market economy.162 However, the establishment of this goal lasted more than twenty 
years. The earliest attempt at economic reform could be traced back to the mid-1950s. 
                                                 
160 After the establishment of shareholding companies, Chinese SOEs reached the basic goal of modern enterprises; 
this is first to convert into the shareholding company before they could be listed. Form 1994, the State Council 
determined 100 SOEs to be the pilots as modern enterprises, and the governments in different levels also determined 
2600 pilots, and transferred them to be wholly SOEs, State-owned holding enterprises and the State-owned shares 
(limited liability companies and joint stock limited companies) through the reform. See Lu, supra note 48, at p25 
161 Speech made by Deng Xiaoping on meeting with Vice-President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of 
Tanzania in 1985. 
162 See 2.1.1. 
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The centralization of power and interest had been identified as the main problem of the 
underdeveloped economy at that time; and also true for SOEs.163 Consequently, the 
Chinese government copied the model of the planned economy of Russia, and tried to 
balance the power and interest of SOEs between central government and local 
government, between enterprises and employees in the following twenty years. During 
the development period, the case Rainbow is the good evidence to support. According 
to the case study and the interviews, Rainbow was established as Xiangyang Color 
Picture Tube Factory in 1977, upon the ending of Cultural Revolution. The opening 
up started before 1977, as this was the part of the plan and target of the opening up.  
 
A breakthrough came at the Communist Party Thirteenth National Congress in 1987.164 
With a view to opening up to the world, Deng Xiaoping supported some economists’ 
opinion that some capitalist methods could be employed to build socialism.165 As for 
domestic reform, a strategy of economic reform was to give priority to the development 
of non-public sectors of the economy, specifically, the establishment of 
market-orientated non-state-owned enterprises (including foreign trade enterprises and 
joint venture enterprises) to develop the economy.166 Until 1987, the theory of public 
and non-public sectors of the economy was encouraged by Chinese policy.167 It was 
                                                 
163 Mainstream view (such as Li Yining and Wu Jinglian) in the period between 1950 and 1970 believed that over- 
centralized power and interest damaged the producing zeal of employee and enterprises. Therefore, the Chinese 
government tried to incorporate SOEs and gave more power to their decision-makers.  
164 The Communist Party Thirteenth National Congress on 25 Oct. 1987. 
165 As Deng Xiaoping said, it does not matter if the cat is black or white, so long as it can catch mice. That some 
capitalist methods could be employed to build socialism is inference of the theory about ‘black cat white cat’. This is 
a pragmatic economic policy which was appointed by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Forore discussions of this 
theory see Wu, J Rushi Yu Jingji Gaige De Mubiao He Quanqiuhua, (WTO, the Targets of Economic Reform in China 
and Globalization),No.6 Jounral of Shanghai Institute of Foreign 2001:1.  
166 Ibid. 
167 See policy of Communist Party Thirteenth National Congress in 1987. 
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stated that China, as a socialist country, was still in the primary stage of socialism.168  
It was also stated that public ownership must continue to predominate; however, 
non-public sectors may contribute to production and employment alongside of public 
sectors. 169   The changes of the government policy showed that any solution of 
developing Chinese economy should confirm a leading role for public ownership.  
 
According to Wu, some economists believed that the reform in this period was 
unsuccessful, because the Chinese government did not carry out any fundamental 
transformation for SOEs.170 Wu also pointed out that SOEs had taken two thirds of 
Chinese economic resources but just contributed one third of GNP (gross national 
product).171 By contrast, others argued that the strategy of economic reform reduced 
obstacles and gained experiences for further reform. 172  The achievements and 
drawbacks of economic reform during early periods were learned and adopted by 
policymakers who, following the view of Deng Xiaoping, put forward that ‘making 
foreign things serve China and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical 
results in building socialism’.173  
 
This thesis considers that both Wu and Meryer’s views focused on the result of SOEs 
reform during a short time. The attempts made and their influence in the SOEs reform 
                                                 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Wu, supra note 28 at 1 Here economists mean the state sectors just completed shift superficial. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Meyer, Jennifer, ‘Let the Buyer Beware: Economic Modernisation, Insurance Reform, and Consumer Protection 
in China’, 62 Fordham Law Review,1994: 2131-2132. 
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in the period between 1978 and 1988 deserve more attention. 174  Chinese public 
ownership was a core policy and was stressed repeatedly through several policy 
documents, rules and laws.175 It is the view of this thesis that a clear position of public 
ownership was the most helpful direction for SOEs reform. Although for a long time 
after 1988 SOEs reform was dealing with the ownership of SOEs as a main issue, the 
Chinese leaders at that time were concerned about the methods of the reform and social 
responses caused by the reform.  
 
Target II: Establishment of Modern Enterprises System  
 
In 1992, the speech of Deng Xiaoping made during his tour of south China brought 
another breakthrough for the theory of Reform and Opening up policy. Following 
Deng’s south China tour, in October 1992, the socialist market economy was defined as 
a clear goal by the Communist Party Committee.176 The shift of policy showed that 
Chinese economic reform had moved from a partial ground to a comprehensive ground 
leading to a socialist market economy. In November 1993, the establishment of modern 
enterprises system (MES) of SOEs, as a new strategy, started to play a key role and 
SOEs reform became one of new targets for this stage of economic reform.177 The 
                                                 
174 The Chapter 3 will discuss the attempts and their influence. Here some relevant policy can be listed: expansion of 
the enterprises’ decision-making powers, economic responsibility system, Li Gai Shui, and contracted managerial 
responsibility system for enterprises.  
175 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978; several 
Provisions on the Expanding the Autonomy in Operation of the State-owned Industrial Enterprises issued by the 
State Council in 1979, Procedures for State enterprises to pay taxes instead of turning over their profit to the state 
(ligaishui), issued by Ministry of Finance was forwarded by the State Council in 1983, the provision on the 
Deepening Enterprises Reform and Enhance the Vitality of Enterprises, issued by the State Council on 5 th 
December 1986. And so on.  
176 The 14 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 12-18 October 1992.  
177 See the documents about MES of SOEs on the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China 14 in 
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same strategy was reiterated and further developed at the 15th CCP Congress in 
1997.178 
 
In the history of Chinese SOEs Reform, MES has been an effective way to combine 
public ownership with the market economy, and is the direction of the reform of SOEs. 
The main task of MES can be summarized as: (1) Continue to push forward the task of 
separating administrative and enterprise functions. (2) Actively explore effective ways 
for management of state assets. (3) Introduce the standardized corporate system into 
large and medium-sized SOEs. (4) Concentrate efforts to gear enterprises operation 
mechanisms to the market.179 
 
Traditional SOEs generally had the following features: firstly, the state owns the assets; 
secondly, the SOEs control the production and sales of goods; finally, sale revenues of 
SOEs bear a relationship to cost because if there are too many policies, rules could lead 
high cost but low benefit.180 Until 1990s, the tension between the first and second 
features had existed for a long time.181 It was also a root of obstacles for the modern 
enterprises system.182   Therefore, some scholars thought MES was an attempt at 
                                                                                                                                            
1993.  
178 See the documents about MES of SOEs on the 15 th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1997.  
179 See The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning the 
Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises 1999. 
180 Sun, supra note 136 at 21. 
181 The tension means the State owns the assets of SOEs, the State played the owned, operator and sales at the same 
time. The requirement of market had been ignored in the early time. And the State did not care requirement of market, 
the State decided how many to produce and sell. After the Opening Up Policy, the requirement of market had been 
increased in valuedgradually. The State was not the decider for market supply and demand, but the market was.   
182 As stated in the last footnote, the market mechanism did not develop in China, but the development of MES 
needed a market mechanism as a basic requirement. That is the reason why it is said that the congenital condition of 
MES is missing.  
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reform for state-enterprise property relationship.183  
 
It is easy to understand the reason why so many scholars had doubts about the 
establishment of MES.184 A main method for establishing a MES of SOEs is through 
ownership restructuring, characterized by the incorporation of SOEs with the state as 
the sole or majority shareholder and as the owner of the state-owned assets. 185 
However, the conditions for establishing MES were premature in China at that time.186 
For most SOEs, CG is the first and main task of internal reform. Clarke pointed out that 
external reform aims to change the environment in which SOEs operate, for example, 
the reform of the pricing mechanism, crucial to determining whether an enterprise is 
actually making a profit.187 Baev further claimed that the external reform can be 
divided into ‘demonopolization’ (‘the liquidation of privileges and peculiar advantages 
vested in one or more state enterprises’) and ‘deintegration’ (‘ the management reform 
of the national economy by means of reorganizing Ministries and Government 
Departments, and abolishing the system of control over the distribution and 
consumption of commodities’).188 This thesis prefers Baev’s arguments rather than 
Clark’s. For China at that time, the first core task of MES was ownership restructuring, 
                                                 
183 The reform of SOEs can be divided into two broad categories. The reform of the state-enterprises property 
relationship falls most nearly into the category of internal reforms. According to Clarke, these reforms seek to 
restructure SOEs to Change the way that SOEs respond to environment. Clarke, 1991:8. 
184 See Li Bingyan, Niu Zhengke 2007. “Chongxin Shenshi Woguo Xiandai Qiye Zhidu: Zhiyi yu Chonggou”, 
Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology 01 . Li thinks MES is a regimen which is transplanted from 
developed countries, and the MES was not suitable for Chinese society. The same opinion can seen from Hou Ruoshi, 
2004. “Zhiyi Xiandai Qiye Zhidu”, Zhongguo Dangdai Sichao. June. No. 3. China Opening Herald. According to 
Hou, the opinion from Zhang Weiying, Li Yining and Wu Jinglian, who carried out the MES in China is a one sided 
theory, Hou thinks the MES was not the only one measure for modern production organization.  
185 Clarke, 1991:8. 
186 The conditions for establishing MES was not perfect at the beginning of 1990s. The main problem if the role of 
the State for the SOEs was not clear.   
187 Ibid.  
188 Andrei Baev (1993) ‘Alternatives to Privatization: Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in 
Post-Socialist Economies’, 12 Pac. Basin L. J. Pp.131-137. 
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more specifically, a task of clearing the relationship between SOEs and governments, 
and of distinguishing the power of SOEs and government. This strategy was similar in 
some way to Baev’s arguments. 
 
There were different views about the specific strategy and principle of establishing 
MES. According to Robert, some Chinese economists believed that establishing MES 
should hold the principle of successfully managing large enterprises while invigorating 
small ones and readjusting the lay-out of state economy.189 The economists’ opinion 
that the State economy was over-distributed, with its overall quality remaining low, and 
the distribution of resources unreasonable, was adopted by policymakers, and the 
Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues 
Concerning the Reform and Development of SOEs was adopted at the Four Plenum of 
the 15th CPC Central Committee on September 22, 1999. To sum up, the Chinese 
government made changes in the following four areas.  Firstly, the Chinese 
government defined industries and sectors that needed to be controlled by the national 
economy, including industries that are related to national security; industries that are 
naturally a monopoly; industries that supply major products and services for the public; 
and pillar industries and backbone enterprises in high and new technology sectors.190 
Secondly, with the exception that some enterprises must be controlled by the state, most 
                                                 
189 For China at time, the state economy was over-distributed, and the distribution of resources was not reasonable. 
For example, the ownership of Chinese firms falls into state, collective, and private. The nature and composition of 
these three has fluctuated prior to the readjusting lay-out of state economy during the reform period. For more details 
see Robert, F. Dodds, JR (1995-1996). ‘State Enterprise Reform in China: Managing the Transition to a Market 
Economy’, Law & Policy in International Business, 699-707. 
190 The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning the 
Reform and Development of SOEs was adopted at the Four Plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee on 
September 22, 1999. 
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enterprises should be realizing a diversity of equities.191 Thirdly, the invigorating range 
should be extended to medium sized enterprises. Finally, the standardized corporate 
system should be introduced into large and medium-sized SOEs.  
 
It is clear that the Chinese government tried to establish a relative balance of power 
between the owner and senior managers of SOEs and aimed to establish a fair market 
environment.192 This goal was achieved over different periods and faced up to and 
solved many challenges.193  
 
In summary, the SOEs’ reform during this period of time attempted to make ownership 
of SOEs better arranged through a series of experiments, including establishing MES 
and managing large enterprises while invigorating small ones. As a result, the power of 
government become narrower, and the scopes of state-owned assets and public 
ownership were defined. Concurrently, the issue of ownership is a main component of 
CG. It could be said that as a result the CG of SOEs were pushed to a higher level of 
development. In another words, corporate governance as a new concept was introduced 
into China through Chinese reform of SOEs in the 1990s.194 
 
                                                 
191 Ibid. Some industries such as national defense installations and hydraulic engineering must be controlled by the 
State. Thees kinds of SOEs are endowed with a mandatory social public goal, without economic targets.The 
functions of this kind of SOE is to provide public services directly.  
192 Wu, supra note 28, at 2. 
193 A fair market environment includes many factors. Here for China it mainly refers to the information disclosure 
system which is not perfect, the relevant appraisal institutional selection system which is not sound, laws for 
selection agency which is not sound, and punishment implementation is not strict. These above are the challenges 
which SOEs need to face up to and solve.  
194  Tan, L and Wang, J (2007) ‘Modeling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China’s Listed 
State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, P. 
143. 
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Target III: Reform of Small and Medium- Sized SOEs 
 
In practice, compared with the reform of large sized SOEs, the small and medium-sized 
SOEs were the pioneer of reform. With further reforming and opening up to the world, 
the development of small and medium-sized enterprises became a heated issue. In the 
context of Chinese research, “small and medium-sized SOEs” refers to the enterprises 
which were established in the 1970s and operated by state, including small coal mines, 
refineries, cement works, glass factories and small thermal power plants.195 Conducted 
from Tan and Wang, these enterprises had been wasting resources or were 
technologically lagging behind. Some were manufacturing poor-quality products or 
polluting the environment.196  The issue of small and medium-sized enterprises was 
debated by economists and legal scholars mainly about the following aspects:  the 
administration of small and medium-sized SOEs; the changes and development of 
small and medium-sized SOEs; the external environment of small and medium-sized 
SOEs.197 According to Shao Ning, by 2011, the reform of small and medium-sized 
SOEs had almost been completed.198 It is the view of this thesis that as a key part of the 
SOE reform, the experiences of the small and medium SOEs reform provide valuable 
lessons.199 As some obstacles were removed in the process of reform of small and 
                                                 
195 Ibid. 
196 Supra note 202. 
197 Shen, J 2000:1 The issued summarized by author Shen J. 
198  Shao Ning 2012, The Report From SASAC BOAO Form for ASIA in Apr.. 
http://news.chengdu.cn/content/2012-04/03/content_926063.htm?node=1880 Last accessed, 17/06/12  According 
to Shao Ning, in fact, after completing the small and medium-sized SOEs’ reform, the state economy had been 
narrowed. Narrowing the range of the state economy step by step is the main intention  for SOEs’ reform. The next 
project of Chinese SOEs reform is the large-sized SOEs.  
199 The methods, steps, aims and time duration of reform of small and medium SOEs cannot be the same with the 
large sized SOEs.  
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medium-sized SOEs, it cleared the way for further reform of large SOEs. For the next 
stage of reform, the large SOEs are the clearer target.   
 
The measures for the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs can be divided into two 
steps. Firstly, small and medium-sized SOEs were deregulated and revitalized through 
various means such as reorganization, combination, merger, leasing, contracted 
management, joint venture, transfer of state-owned property rights, the joint-stock 
system, and the joint-stock cooperative system.200 For those small and medium SOEs 
that had been losing money for a long time, or had been insolvent and could not pay due 
debts, a policy-oriented shut-down and bankruptcy should be conducted in strict 
accordance with relevant provisions if certain conditions were met.’201After the reform, 
small and medium-sized enterprises of various ownerships played an important role in 
China, including private enterprises, township enterprises, individually owned 
enterprises, foreign-funded enterprises and private science and technology 
enterprises.202 According to the Chinese economist Shen’s study, the proportion of 
small and medium-sized enterprises was reaching ninety percent of all enterprises in 
                                                 
200 Supra note 202. 
201 Supra note 202 For those small and medium SOEs that hnd been losing money for a long time, before reform, the 
Chinese government  gave a lot of subsidies Here an example can demonstrate (in this case, the SOEs which 
complained including small/ medium and large SOEs ): Trade was a main focus of the U.S.-China dialogue, with 
each side seeking assurances that the other’s market would remain open. The U.S. always made complaints about 
Chinese trade and human rights practices in some dialogues, although they tried to focus on the need for better 
communication and trust.  The U. S. thought Chinese SOEs were subsidized by Chinese government, and restricted 
competition, because subsidies to SOEs may be specific and actionable, and will cause potential  effectson 
international trade. Shao did not agree with the U.S’s argument; he said Chinese subsidies to SOEs are very small; in 
fact, the target of roll-back of subsidies was completed in Zhu Rongji’s time. There are mainly four types about SOEs 
subsidies in China, including tax preference, policy-related subsidies to cover enterprises losses, preferential loans 
and funds for special purposes. For more debates on  Chinese subsidies  see Ding Yan 2008, WTO Kuangjia Xia 
Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye Butie Falv Wenti Yanjiu, (The Legal Research on Chinese SOEs Subsidies and WTO). 
Xiamen: Xiamen Da Xue. And see Michael Daly 1998 Special Problems Concerning the Measurement of Subsidies, 
Annex to Investment Incentives and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,5, Journal of World Trade. And see 
Julia Ya Qin, 2004, Regulation of Subsidies to State-owned Enterprises (SOEs)—A Critical Appraisal of China 
Accession Protocol, 12, Journal of International Economic Law. 
202 Supra note 205, at 1. 
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China. Moreover, the Gross National Product of small and medium-sized enterprises 
increased to almost sixty percent. In addition, it was claimed that most of the small and 
medium-sized enterprises were the major payers of local taxes.203 Finally, small and 
medium-sized enterprises offered more jobs for the people who were laid-off in the 
reform of SOEs.204  
 
As a result, the adjustment of state-owned capital and reorganization of SOEs to some 
extent achieved the initial expectations of the reform of SOE. Up to 2008, those SOEs 
that were insolvent and had no prospect to eliminate losses had completed the 
policy-oriented shut-down and bankruptcy proceedings; and up to 2010, enterprises 
which were managed by the SASAC started perform the contributor’s responsibility.205  
 
It was thought that both the MES and the reform of small and medium-sized enterprises 
presented different perspectives of a constantly deepening reform of SOEs and the 
whole economic system.206 This thesis considers that the core of the reform of small 
and medium-sized enterprises was about ownership restructuring. That is because when 
the reform of all the small and medium-sized enterprises had been completed, the 
                                                 
203 Here the data still comes from Shen’ s study.  
204 Ibid. In Zhu Rongji’s time, tens of millions of skilled but mid-aged workers were laid off from SOEs and 
remained unemployed in the process of SOEs reform. How to create jobs for workers laid off because of economic 
transformation or because of enterprises reorganization, restructuring, closure or bankruptcy was a big challenge for 
China. There were many methods vigorously promoted by the Chinese government to help laid-off workers become 
re-employed. The one of methods was that laid-off workers would be re-employed by small or medium-sized 
enterprises. Small or medium-sized enterprises contributed more opportunities and jobs for Chinese laid-off 
workers. 
205 Shao, N 2012, The Report From SASAC BOAO Form for ASIA in Apr. 
http://news.chengdu.cn/content/2012-04/03/content_926063.htm?node=1880 Last accessed, 17/06/12. 
206 Ibid. Shao, N 2012, The Report From SASAC BOAO Form for ASIA in Apr.. 
http://news.chengdu.cn/content/2012-04/03/content_926063.htm?node=1880 Last accessed, 17/06/12  According 
to Shao Ning, review the history of the Chinese SOEs reform, small and medium SOEs’ reform was the key 
connecting link between the preceding and the following.  
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SOEs’ range became clear, leaving just large SOEs.  Before the formal reform, the 
definition, size, models and fields of small and medium-sized enterprises was 
confirmed by laws. This reform, as an attempt for large SOEs reform, gained lessons 
and experience under the preparation period. At the same time, it is also won more time 
for large SOEs reform to improve laws, rules and market environment.  
 
Target IV: Reform of Large Sized SOEs 
 
After many years of attempts and accumulation of reform, the Chinese government 
created a relatively mature plan for large SOEs reform.207 In a standard way, the 
definition, size, models and fields were firstly confirmed by rules or laws. ‘Large-sized 
SOEs’ were defined in Chinese law as those for which “the State Council shall, on the 
behalf of the state, perform the contributor’s functions for the large-sized state-invested 
enterprises that have bearings on the national economic lifeline and state security 
determined by the State Council and the State-invested enterprises in such fields as 
important infrastructures and natural resources.” 208  Large SOEs have played an 
important role in China for more than fifty years; the 2009 Law of the PRC on the 
State-owned Assets of Enterprises and its confirmation regarding the large SOEs 
marked a step forward for large SOEs reform.   
 
In addition, the target of large SOEs reform was not just focused on the ownership issue. 
                                                 
207 Shao Ning, 2012, The Report From SASAC BOAO Form for ASIA in Apr. 
http://news.chengdu.cn/content/2012-04/03/content_926063.htm?node=1880 Last accessed, 17/06/12.  
208 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-owned Assets of Enterprises 2009. 
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SASAC held up a clear target for reform of large-sized SOEs, with the aim that most 
large-sized SOEs should have completed a transformation to listed companies and 
become main market players, able to assume civil liabilities independently.209 In other 
words, the core issue for reform of large-sized SOEs is to find a method for adaptation 
to the demands of a market economy. Therefore, in order to find the correct method, it is 
better to know the current situation of large-sized SOEs in order to understand the 
importance, strengths, weaknesses, responsibilities, and achievements up to that point, 
and the obstacles to face up to and solve.  
 
Furthermore, the concept of CG of SOEs became a profound and more formal focus of 
the SOEs reform, and the internal and external governance of SOEs were borrowed and 
introduced for large SOEs. The CG of SOEs was improved to an international level. A 
far-reaching breakthrough for large-sized SOEs happened in 1999, when the Decision 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues 
Concerning the Reform and Development of SOEs was adopted. The Decision 
specified that the goal of the first step of large-sized SOEs reform was: by the end of the 
20th century, most large and medium-sized SOEs with financial losses should emerge 
from their difficulties, and majority of backbone large and medium-sized SOEs should 
try to set up a modern corporate system.210 The second step targets of SOEs reform 
would be basically completing strategic readjustment and restructuring, creating a more 
rational layout and structure for the State-owned economy, and establishing a fairly 
                                                 
209  See the interview of Shao Ning for SOEs reform in Apr. 2012 
http://business.sohu.com/20120402/n339668260.shtml Last accessed, 13/11/12. 
210 Ibid.  
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complete modern corporate system.211 It is the view of this thesis that this Decision, as 
the first government document, actually positioned the tasks and targets of large-sized 
SOEs reform and one of the achievements of this Decision was to divide the targets of 
SOEs reform into a partial task and a comprehensive task, because of the influence of 
the traditional system and the many problems left over from the past. The strategy of 
making different steps is also in evidence for supporting a long and protracted nature of 
SOEs reform.  
 
Coincidentally, the same strategy was applied to the reform of large-sized SOEs in 
practice. At the initial stage of the reform of large-sized SOEs, the Chinese government 
followed the principle that ‘large and medium-sized SOEs, especially superior ones and 
those suited to the shareholding system, should be turned into shareholding enterprises, 
in the form of a standardized listing, Sino-foreign joint ventures and inter-enterprise 
equity participation.’212 By means of this method, the mixed ownership economy of 
China was developed, and the State controls the most stakes in major enterprises; 
specifically, sixty percent of net worth of the central enterprises listed.213 The overall 
conclusion is that the partial strategy made a significant contribution to the SOEs 
reform.  
 
                                                 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Before the establishment of SASAC, most SOEs separated the good assets from bad assets and liabilities, then 
followed the principle of fine listed assets first, completed partial listing on the stock market. This method was 
common for SOEs at the initial stage of reform of large-sized SOEs. After the establishments of SASAC, there were 
117 central enterprises managed by SASAC, 43 of them completed the main business listed. More details see the 
interview of Shao Ning for SOEs reform in Apr. 2011. http://opinion.hexun.com/2011-04-21/128941997.html Last 
accessed, 13/11/12. 
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Based upon the result of the partial strategy, the goal of reform of large-sized SOEs 
becomes more ambitious for an overall listing.214 Since 2011, the overall listing has led 
to an unprecedented boom for large-sized SOEs.215 As an institutional reform, overall 
listing of SOEs has been the most popular feature in Chinese SOEs. However, at 
present, the domestic mainland market for overall listing research is still in its early 
stages, and there lacks mature theoretical system for large-sized SOEs.216 Because it is 
an absolutely new attempt217 for China, there is no previous experience which can be 
referred to for overall listing of large-sized SOEs. For the CG of large SOEs, overall 
listing as a new goal will impel and improve the CG in large SOEs and achieve 
international standards.  
 
When it comes to the solutions of overall listing of large-sized SOEs, Shao Ning 
thought that the experience of reform of small and medium-sized SOEs could not be 
                                                 
214 There is some accounting data that must be reached if shares-listed tries to be a listed company. In order to 
achieve this goal, shareholders generally will spin-off a large business into two parts: joint-stock company and the 
parent company, the good quality assets will spin-off into the joint-stock company, some others businesses and bad 
quality assets being left in the parent company, such as canteens, kindergartens, and loss of assets. It is the spin -off 
listing. After being listed successfully, the joint-stock company uses the money gained through listing, and buys their 
parent company, called the overall listing. More information can be seen in articles as follow: Huang Qing, 2004. 
“Guoyou Qiye Zhengti Shangshi Yanjiu- Guoyou Qiye Fenchai Shangshi he Zhengti Shangshi Moshi de Anli Fenxi”, 
Management World..  Qian, Qidong, Wu Qingsheng, and Wang Guojin, 2004. “Guanyu Zhengti Shangshi de 
Yanjiu”, Shanghai Economic Forum. Deng Xiaozhuo, 2004. “Zhengti Shangshi de Fangshi Bijiao”, Financial theory 
and practice.  
215 Overall listing of SOEs played a role to unique advantages in key sectors, and employs the market resources to 
optimize configuration. The SOEs’ overall listing also has an exceptionally big meaning for the long-term 
development of the capital market. Overall listing of SOEs appears on the market not only to expand the scale of the 
capital market, but also improve the rate of asset securitization in our country, more effectively improve the size of 
its market value, improve the overall quality of assets. From the point of the view of the listed company having 
completed overall listing, SOEs after the overall listing had greatly increased the company's profitability, and 
improved the fundamentals. Overall listing has the following advantages for their own development: firstly, it is 
conducive to making better use of and giving full play to the advantages of group resources, management, 
optimizing the structure of the company's products and improving the level of profit; Secondly, it helps reduce the 
connection transaction and competition, and can make some hidden profits. 
216 Overall listing of SOEs in China has just started. The long-term result of overall listing SOEs needs more time to 
be examined. The method of overall listing may not suitable for every SOE. There are no useful lessonswhich can be 
learnt before the overall listing. The research followed the cases.  
217 Ibid. 
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applied.218 SASAC illustrated that the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs were 
completed through reorganization, combination, merger, leasing, contracted 
management, joint venture, and transfer of state-owned property rights, joint-stock 
system, and joint-stock cooperative system, but those methods cannot be used for 
large-sized SOEs; SASAC showed the reasons through explaining the types, 
responsibility and importance of large-sized SOEs for China.219 This thesis agrees with 
the arguments of SASAC and Shao that the lessons and experience of reform of small 
and medium-sized enterprises cannot be copied for large SOEs. Because the nature, 
size and responsibility of enterprises are completely different, the methods of reforms, 
especially CG of SOEs, cannot be the same. The biggest contribution of small and 
medium enterprises was that they tested the market reaction, eliminated obstacles and 
won more time for larger SOEs reform.  
 
Another indication of China’s readiness to start large SOEs reform was the way in 
which different SOEs were distinguished by different natures. It is the view of this 
thesis that the CG of SOEs would be improved by applying different plans and 
strategies for SOEs different in nature. According to different natures, the large-sized 
SOEs are divided into two types according to their different main tasks and 
responsibilities in China. On the one hand, some large-sized SOEs can offer protection 
for economic development and Chinese people’s lives. These large-sized SOEs spread 
throughout all the country and different industries. Some industries supply 
                                                 
218  See the interview of Shao Ning for SOEs reform in Apr. 2011. 
http://opinion.hexun.com/2011-04-21/128941997.html Last accessed, 13/11/12.  
219 Ibid. 
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infrastructures and public goods such as water supply, petrol supply, gas supply and 
public transportation. Some industries are related to the exploitation of natural 
resources, coal mines being a good example. The reason why such large –sized SOEs 
are so important for those industries is because one of their main tasks and 
responsibilities is to serve social benefits. So sometimes the large-sized SOEs must 
continue supplying although they are losing money, which cannot be accepted by 
non-SOE enterprises. In addition, large-sized SOEs can offer the supply of gas, petrol 
and electricity to cover most parts of China.220 
 
On the other hand, some large-sized SOEs can improve China’s comprehensive 
national strength, including economic strength, defence capability and so on, such as 
the military industry, aerospace, petroleum exploration and communication. Those 
industries require high technical inputs, more investments, and undertake higher risks 
in competing with international enterprises. For China at present, only large-sized 
SOEs or state holding enterprises can carry out activities involving high costs but 
negative profits in order to support social stability.221 The following programs are the 
best evidence: SOEs made huge contributions to such programs as the Three Gorges 
construction, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, west-east gas transmission, the south-to-north 
                                                 
220 There is a case referred to by Shao Ning to support the importance of large-sized SOEs. There are five central 
enterprises of electric power which took up 66% share of the market. And at one time, the Chinese the electricity 
price was lower than cost. Nevertheless, those five central enterprises kept supplying electricity for China. However, 
itwould be impossible for non-SOEs to do the same things.   
221 Some examples about SOEs or central enterprises’ contribution are: the selling prices drop away from the state 
purchasing pricing in China in a certain period, such as China Minmetals Corp. Sinochem, and China Petroleum 
Corp. Social responsibility, and supporting social stability are the main reason why they do like this. Only large 
SOEs can offer this kind of business loss.  
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water diversion project, and the launch of the Shenzhou series of spacecraft.222  
 
Therefore, the large-sized SOEs are very important for China. Because of their size and 
characteristics, they cannot copy the methods of reform for the small and medium-sized 
SOEs. What is then the solution for large-sized SOEs reform? How could the CG of 
large SOEs be improved? In Feb 2012, representatives of SASAC at a conference of 
State Council information office, announced following five tasks: (1) concentrate 
resources on crucial industries and pivotal fields, further develop large-sized SOEs, (2) 
make the distribution of resources appropriate through regrouping and structure 
readjustment, (3) improve CG of large-sized SOEs, (4)  further improve the 
state-owned assets supervision system, guarantee transparency, more efficiency and 
more scientific assessment and evaluation, and (5) further promote the internal reform, 
make the internal mechanism more market-oriented, and reduce various burdens of 
SOEs.223    
 
It is the view of this thesis that the five tasks above are based upon the initial 
achievements of SOEs reform.224 The completion of the five tasks requires higher 
standards of CG of SOEs, and the tasks themselves are specific descriptions for internal 
governance, external governance and sound market environments for SOEs. In fact, the 
Chinese government has prepared for a long time and the achievements made in the 
                                                 
222 The same considerations apply tothe Three Gorges Project.Projects like this, and the projects mentioned in the 
thesis, can only be done by only large-sized SOES.  
223 Supra note 48. 
224 The initial achievements of SOEs reform means former steps are already completed, such as reform of small and 
medium- sized SOEs, and establishment of MES. The basic conditions of CG for large SOEs have been established.  
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past lay down a basis for further reform. Next section will illustrate the initial results, 
changes, direction, and evaluation of SOEs reform.  
 
2.2 CG at the Transition Stage 
 
 
The following results had been achieved at the initial stage of the Chinese economic 
reform.  First of all, with the deepening of reform and opening up, China’s foreign 
trade rocketed. In 1999 it was 367 hundred million dollars, compared with 20.6 
hundred million in 1978, which increased almost 17.5 times.225 Furthermore, various 
regions were opened up and established in coastal areas, inland and western regions. 
Last but not the least, absorption of foreign capital was expanded, which enriched the 
form and use of foreign capital, including Sino-foreign joint ventures, Sino-foreign 
cooperative ventures, foreign owned enterprises, BOT investment, and securities 
finance.226 Li Yining argued that the largest achievement of economic reform was the 
corporatization in the process of reform of SOEs through the establishment of 
shareholding companies in the late 1980s.227 China then established the securities 
market and pushed the SOEs reform to a higher and international standard.228 For the 
reform of SOEs, according to Li, the economists thought monopolistic behaviours of 
the SOEs was the most significant problem which needed to be solved at the same 
                                                 
225 Wu, supra note 28, at 2 According to Wu, SOEs were the big contributors to the Chinese economy, but 
undeveloped CG of SOEs was still limiting the development of the economy.  He believed this problem should be 
solved by domestic reform, such as Chinese legal construction, and fair market environment.  
226 Ibid. 
227 Li, Y, in “Zhonggguo Gaige Sanshinian” ( The 30 Years of Chinese Economic Reform) 2009: 125. 
228 Ibid.  
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time.229  
 
China adopted a gradual path of reform, both for the economic reform and SOEs reform, 
and in every stage of practice to evaluate the effectiveness of reform measures. 
According to a report of SASAC in 2012, the different approaches and targets were 
designed for SOEs reform.230 The first concern was about the financial relationship 
between government and SOEs. According to Deng Yan, some American scholars 
suggested that the Chinese government should cut the subsidies to SOEs.231 However, 
SASAC argued that cutting subsidies for SOEs had been done at Zhu Rongji’s time. In 
support of this argument, SASAC showed that there were 5000 SOEs with financial 
difficulties who had to file for bankruptcy, and if government still provided subsidy for 
SOEs, those SOEs would have grabbed the opportunity rather than become bankrupt.232 
The other approaches were about SOEs reform through market-based measures, 
including deregulating the small and medium-sized SOEs, making large SOEs with 
financial difficulties bankrupted, and taking on management of normal SOEs by 
SASAC after 2003.233  
 
In the process of reform some progress and achievements have been made and there 
came to be some formalization, such as CG of SOEs. Under the social and economic 
                                                 
229 Ibid. 
230 See supra note 55. 
231 Ding Yan 2008, WTO Kuangjia Xia Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye Butie Falv Wenti Yanjiu, (The Legal Research on 
Chinese SOEs Subsidies and WTO). Xiamen: Xiamen Da Xue. And see Michael Daly 1998 Special Problems 
Concerning the Measurement of Subsidies, Annex to Investment Incentives and the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment,5, Journal of World Trade. And see Julia Ya Qin, 2004, Regulation of Subsidies to State-owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)—A Critical Appraisal of China Accession Protocol, 12, Journal of International Economic Law 
232 Ibid. Zhu Rongji’s time is from 1993 to 2002.  
233 About in which way deregulated small and medium SOEs can see Chapter 3. 
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conditions in old China and the planning economic, new concepts and systems such as 
CG of SOEs were unable to exist; in China now, these new concepts and systems need 
time to be adopted. However, China is trying to solve some problems through the mode 
of ‘Chinese characteristics’. Hence, the same words have the same connotations but 
may have different extensions and meanings between what they are in their own 
original country and in China. The concepts of CG, internal and external governance are 
representative examples. In addition, there are some concepts and modes of 
management that were unfamiliar for western scholars, such as the way in which the 
factory director (manager) assumed overall responsibly and the importance attached to 
the Party Committee of CG in China.234 More details about Chinese characteristics in 
the reform of SOEs will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
To sum up, Chinese characteristics are a typical consequence of transition. This thesis 
tries to conduct an objective evaluation for SOEs reform in China. The general trend of 
Chinese reform of SOEs is long, arduous, and irreversible.  
                                                 
234 The Chinese SOEs tried to achieve international standards and according to the urban situation of China, 
companies regarding chairman of the board under the leadership of manager, factory manager responsibility system, 
has formed a specialization standardization and modernization of the production system.  
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Chapter 3: Transformation of the Owner and Control of 
SOEs in the State-Owned Enterprise Reform 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the traditional main participants of Corporate Governance 
include the owner (shareholder/s), decision makers (board of directors), executives 
(management), employees and other stakeholders. 235  The term  “Corporate 
Governance” was not used in official documents before it made its first appearance in 
the articles about Chinese SOEs in 1992.236  
 
The absence of the term was misleading because the practice of CG had in fact been 
carried out for some time. There were examples of the theory and practice of CG of 
SOEs, including practices such as defining and simplifying the ownership and solving 
the problem of excessive state control over SOEs.237 Placing limits over excessive state 
control involved two elements. As the discussed in this Chapter, the first was defining 
                                                 
235 See Chapter 1 Pp. 16-20. 
236 In 1992, the 14 th NPC had a clear goal about the building of the socialist market economic system reform. In 
order to seek effective integration of state-owned economy and market economy, China's reform measures were 
mainly divided into two aspects: one is the reform of state-owned assets management system, the other one is to 
establish a modern enterprise system in China. The legal meaning of modern enterprise system is to draw lessons 
from western enterprise’s effective legal system, establishing system of Chinese enterprises to adapt to the market 
economy, namely no longer traditionally divided enterprises system according to the ownership of enterprise’s 
nature, but according to the investors in the risk of its portfolio companies and the rights and interests enjoyed 
characteristically to differentiate in the form of enterprise – in other wordsto enable  China's enterprise system to 
connect with enterprise system of the world. 
237 The reform of state-owned enterprises before 1992, mainly resulted in expanding the autonomy of state-owned 
enterprises.Starting in 1992 is the reform of state-owned enterprises t towards a new way of ownership reform, 
shareholding system reform started, namely implementing diversification of state-owned enterprises, equity 
diversification, diversified ownership problem, which is bound to be involved in the diversity of members of the 
board of directors and management personnel. Corporate governance had been introduced into China in 1992. 
Begining in 1979, the Chinese legal academics and economists began to seriously study western companies’ system 
(in 1981 version of the American standard company law), the direct purpose being to draw lessons from western 
experience and solve the problem of independent legal entity of SOEs. The next step is put forward to solve the 
ownership of the state-owned enterprises and the management of separate issues, put forward against the background 
of the two rights separation in the United States and other western countries is the inevitable production by the 
company for the equity too scattered surface phenomenon; but this measure in China is totake the state-owned 
enterprises out of the control of the the State (nearly all the stake controlled by in the state administrative organs), in 
order to enable the enterprise operation and management to get rid of the administrative organs of the direct 
intervention.  
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the owner and manager of Chinese SOEs, their respective responsibilities, rights and 
positions. The second element consisted of establishing the scope of the SOEs.238 
When these reforms had taken place, some traditional SOEs developed into modern 
enterprises with the essential features of international enterprises.239 This was the most 
significant step in SOE reforms. 
 
The changes to and improvements of Chinese SOEs mentioned above have brought 
changes to CG of SOEs. This chapter will focus on the changes of owner (shareholder/s) 
and control in the reform, and discuss the inevitability, strengths and weaknesses of the 
changes for Chinese SOEs. The other participants – decision makers (board of 
directors), and executives (management) of Chinese SOEs will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
3.1 Expanding the SOEs’ Autonomy (Kuoda Qiye Zizhuquan) 
 
Chinese SOEs are officially ‘under the ownership of the whole people’. 240  As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, in the period after 1949, the ownership structure of 
Chinese SOEs was highly concentrated. The central government gradually liberalized 
                                                 
238 In order to enable the enterprise operation and management to get rid of the administrative organs of the direct 
intervention, Fangquan Rangli and the system for contracted responsibility had been tried during that period.  
239 After the periods about independent legal personality of SOEs and the separation of ownership and management 
of SOEs, Chinese SOEs gradually got rid of the mode about traditional management under the planned economy. 
The separation of owner and managers of SOEs was a good achievement in order to face up to the market economy. 
Here the international enterprises refer to enterprises under the market economy.  
240 More discussions of this term can see the articles below: Tong Rou, Shi Jichun. 1990 “Wo Guo Quanmin 
Suoyouzhi Liangquan Fenli de Caichanquan Jiegou”, Social Sciences In China; Wang Lanping, 1994. “Lun Woguo 
Quanmin Suoyouzhi Qiye Chanquan Zhidu Gaige de Falv Shixian Fangshi”,Journal of Shandong . Wang Wei, Li 
Yunfeng, 2012, “Cong Quanmin Suoyouzhi Kan Guoyou Qiye de Chanquan Guishu”University; Legal System and 
Society.  
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the relevant provisions of autonomy and decision-making of SOEs because of the 
negative effect of the traditional ownership structure. The administration system was 
faced with a new dilemma. 241   For Chinese SOEs reform, expanding the SOEs’ 
autonomy was the first step in the modification of the relationship between ownership 
and control of SOEs. Autonomy, according to the official documents of the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, was 
defined in relation to SOEs decision-making, operation and management.242 
 
Expansion of SOEs’ autonomy gained great economic benefits; both the number of 
experimental enterprises and their profits saw significant growth.243 While this was 
occurring, the limits to the expansion of SOEs autonomy became exposed.  On the one 
hand, the relationship between the state and SOEs was put into question: the degree or 
level of expansion of SOEs autonomy had been not defined very clearly.  With a rapid 
development of the SOEs’ autonomy and a lack of related law, the managers of SOEs 
required more decision-making powers in order to obtain more profit for the SOE. A 
search of all relevant laws at the time showed that while there were some provisions, 
                                                 
241 In order to help the economy recover, the State accelerated the pace of the construction of state-owned economy. 
According to Su’s ‘the Report for Thirty Years of Chinese SOEs’ Shareholding Reform’ (guoqi gufenzhi 
gaige :sanshi nian), by around 1980, compared with the gross output value of industry and agriculture, the public 
sector of economy accounted for 95.3%, occupied the absolutely superior position in the national economy. In 
addition, the shortcomings of planned economy management system were exposed, and restricted the development 
of the Chinese economy. High-investing, low-output, and low efficiency were the main characteristics of State 
enterprise. In the past, the dilemma for the government was whether to liberalize the autonomy and decision-making 
of SOEs, the new dilemma means the degree and level of expansion of SOEs autonomy.  
242 In the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the problems about 
SOEs subordinated to the State were pointed out. It was the first time that owner, control and management of SOEs 
were discussed by the government. The reform of expanding the SOEs’ autonomy, Chengbao Zhi Gaige, and the 
reform of State enterprises pay taxes instead of turning over their profit to the state were originated from this Plenary 
Session. 
243 Su. 2012: 3. 
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rules and regulations, they focused on the provincial or city levels.244 It can thus be said 
that SOEs’ autonomy as defined in laws and regulations at national level in China was 
vague. First, there were few laws, provisions, rules or regulations which elaborated 
upon the key points of the reform; for example, how and when to distribute profits 
between the State and SOEs and the specific limits of autonomy were not included in 
the subjects of regulations. Secondly, the rules and regulations were limited at regional 
level or within an industry and were thus not universally applicable to SOEs across 
China. Finally, legislation lagged behind economic developments.245 The Amendment 
to the Constitution in 1993, which was relevant to SOEs autonomy, made revisions so 
that it read as follows:  
‘State-owned enterprises have decision-making power with regard to their 
operation within the limits prescribed by law. State-owned enterprise practice 
democratic management through congresses of workers and staff and in other ways 
in accordance with law’.246  
This amendment used the term ‘state-owned enterprise’ instead of the term ‘state 
enterprise’ that had been used in the 1982 Constitution. While the Amendment changed 
the tone of a planned economy, it did not answer vital questions about how and when 
SOEs could be expanded and what limits there were on such expansion. Moreover, 
                                                 
244 According to the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the 
policies for the city and the country were different. For the country, the policy was to push the household contract 
responsibility system on the basis of the public sector (see the sixth part of the tasks), for the city, the policy was to 
separate the ownership and management, and expand enterprises’ autonomy.  
245 In China, the SOEs and company system were transferred from planned economy. Legal certainty is behind the 
transaction phenomenon. When the enterprise is moving from the planned economy to the market economy, social 
phenomena underwent new changes, but the law was not updated it still suffers the problems resulting from the 
planned economy period. So, to a certain extent, the lagging behind of the law influence the healthy development of 
the economy 
246 See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982,，and Amendment to the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China 1993（1993）. 
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there were few rules, regulations and laws which defined the proportion of tax payable 
when the State enterprises made a loss. Obviously, the lack of such a law was a latent 
risk for the SOEs reform. Even in the special law for SOEs enterprises -- Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1988 
-- most of the provisions described the nature of enterprise without addressing the 
issues of ownership and managerial authority.247 The Articles on expanding SOEs 
autonomy provided only a framework of SOEs’ rights without providing sufficiently 
detailed rights and how they should be exercised.248 Instead, Article 67 stated that ‘The 
State Council shall, in accordance with this Law, formulate rules for 
implementation.’249 It was not until 1992 that the State Council issued the Regulation 
on the Transformation of Operational Mechanism of the Industrial Enterprises Owned 
by the Whole People. 250  This Regulation identified fourteen rights in SOEs 
autonomy.251 It may thus be said that between 1988 and 1992 SOEs autonomy existed 
more in theory than in practice.  
 
                                                 
247 See the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1988 
Article 2. ‘An industrial enterprises owned by the whole people (hereinafter referred to as the enterprise) shall be a 
socialist commodity production and operation unit which shall, in accordance with law, make its own managerial 
decisions, take full responsibility for profits and losses and practices independent accounting. The property of the 
enterprise shall be owned by the whole people, and shall be operated and managed by the enterprise with the 
authorization of the state in line with the principle of the separation of ownership and managerial authority. The 
enterprise shall enjoy the rights to possess, utilize and dispose of, according to law, the property which the state has 
authorized it to operate and manage’. 
248 Ibid. Article 2. 
249 Ibid. Article 67. 
250 See Regulation on the Transformation of Operational Mechanism of the Industrial Enterprises Owned by the 
Whole People 1992 issued by the State Council. 
251 Ibid, See Regulation on the Transformation of Operational Mechanism of the Industrial Enterprises Owned by 
the Whole People 1992 issued by the State Council. The fourteen rights were: an enterprises shall enjoy the 1 
production and management decision-making right, 2 the right to fix price of its products and labor services, 3 the 
product selling right, 4 the material purchasing right, 5 the import and export right, 6 the investment decision-making 
right, 7 the right to dominate the retained capital, 8 the asset disposing right, 9 the right of joint venture and merger, 
10 the right of labor employment, 11 the personnel management right, 12 the wage and bonus distributing right, 13 
the internal structural establishment right, 14 the right to reject inappropriate apportionment.  
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On the other hand, the limits to the expansion of SOEs autonomy existed in that the 
State was the owner of SOEs, and at the same time it controlled the SOEs. The 
‘autonomy’ was explained and defined by the State, and the fact that the SOEs were an 
appurtenance (fushuwu) of government remained.  
 
3.2 State Enterprises252 Pay Taxes Instead of Turning over their Profit 
to the State (Ligaishui) 
 
The case about the reform of expanding the SOEs autonomy showed a beneficial 
distribution mechanism which was important for the SOEs reform, especially for the 
relationship between the owner and manager. When the state enterprises suddenly 
obtained more decision-making rights, their initiative in production was encouraged. 
However, the problem of unfair and vague distribution of profits was the reason for 
many disputes between State enterprises and the state or departments responsible for 
finance.253 Finally, a policy named ‘State enterprises pay taxes instead of turning over 
their profit to the state (ligaishui)’ which was launched in 1983 helped improve the 
relationships. 254  According to Su, the old distribution solution made the State 
                                                 
252 In this thesis, the term of state enterprise refers to “Guoying Qiye”. The state enterprise is the predecessor of 
SOEs in China. After the period of separation of ownership and management, when the state enterprise became an 
independent enterprise legal person, the term of state enterprises became to the term of SOEs in Chinese legal 
system.  
253 After the period of separation of ownership and management, under the market economy, the state enterprises 
gained more profit than before, but because of the vague distribution of profits, the state enterprise left less profit 
when they handed over profits to the government. Byhen enthusiasm of for the state enterprise had been reduced, and   
disputes about distribution of profits arose more and more.    
254 (Tentative) Procedures for State enterprises pay taxes instead of turning over their profit to the state (ligaishui) 
issued by Ministry of Finance was forwarded by the State Council. And in 1994, the Second Step of Reform for State 
enterprises pay taxes instead of turning over their profit to the state (ligaishui) had been issued by the Ministry of 
Finance was forwarded by the State Council. As discussed in last footnote, after the method of distribution of profits 
between SOEs and the State had been changed, the enthusiasm of SOEs had been improved, because SOEs would 
gain more profits after taxed.  
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enterprises hand over profits to the government, while the new fixed proportion of tax 
system defused tension between enterprises and government, and mobilized the 
enthusiasm of enterprises for profits.255  
 
The reform for the state enterprises paying taxes instead of turning over their profits to 
the state was the first important measure towards modernizing the system of state 
enterprises. The tax system stabilised the relationship between State enterprises and 
government. State enterprises owned the rights of decision-making and management, 
and the government just focused on tax system of collection and thus played the role of 
a more remote enterprise owner. However, after around four years’ effort in reforming 
the tax system, this system collapsed when some State enterprises found that they were 
unable to pay taxes to the government and the government found that their revenues 
had diminished drastically. There are a number of elements that made the reform 
unsuccessful, such as social background, economic environment and problems left over 
by history in terms of law.256 However, the reform of State enterprises paying taxes 
instead of turning over profits to government achieved more than the reform of 
expanding the SOEs’ autonomy. Both these two reforms were completed under the 
planned economy framework, but these two reforms were a progressive process, and 
step by step. Li Gai Shui left more money for the state enterprises on the basis of 
expanding the autonomy.  
The drawbacks of these two reforms were the same, which was that there were no rules, 
                                                 
255 Su, supra note 251, at 3. 
256 For example, whether social background is planned economy or market economy, economic environment is fair 
or unfair, the legal system is sound or not.   
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regulations or laws for defining the proportion of tax when the State enterprises made 
losses.257  
  
3.3 The Reform of Shareholding System (Gufenzhi Gaige) in Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises Reform 
 
Where the reform of the shareholding system is concerned, there is a popular view that  
‘shareholding reform is one of the key elements of the corporatization reform, with 
corporatization itself as one of the key measures in the larger policy of the MES 
(Modern Enterprises System)’.258 Due to the fact that shareholding was seen only as a 
part of corporatization rather than as part of SOEs reform, many scholars neglected the 
significance of the reform of shareholding system for SOEs reform.259 In addition, this 
classification method also might explain the reason why there was not same amount of 
research about Chinese shareholding reform in the legal field. Most research 
considered shareholding reform to be a part of corporatization reform, and considered 
shareholding reform to have lasted a short time only.260 This focus on corporatization 
meant that the thirty five years of Chinese SOEs reform was overlooked in this context.  
 
                                                 
257 These two reforms did not distinguish the double identities for the State – social and economic management and 
the owner of state-owned assets. Professional management and supervision of te state-owned assets department had 
not been built. On the division of state-owned assets management’s function, the reforms did not point out the 
functions about asset’s owners of the State or SOEs’ property rights.  
258 Zhang Y, 2008.  Large Chinese-State-Owned Enterprise, New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. P. 39. 
259 Ibid. More scholars neglected the significance of the reform of shareholding system for SOEs reform can see: Li 
Ji, Sun Jianmin, Liu Xiangyang, and Ba Shusong, 2005. “Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gufenzhi Gaige de Shizheng 
Yanjiu”, Management World, 01 2005. Xu Ying.2013. “Guoyou Yinhang Gufenzhi Gaige Libi Fenxi”, New Finance 
Economics, (2) 2013. Duan Zhongpeng, Duan Baida, 1997. “Guanyu Gufenzhi Gaige de Jige Wenti”, Economic 
Reformation and Development, 08 1997. 
260 Ibid. 
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There is of course consensus that corporatization reform shares the same objectives 
compared with shareholding reform (the objectives of corporatization reform will be 
discussed in the next chapter), and in this sense it is impossible to talk about 
shareholding reform without mentioning corporatization reform, because these two 
terms always appeared together after 1992.261 However, it should be noted that in 
China the shareholding reform started earlier than corporatization reform,262 and that 
these two reforms are independent processes, not as a part of each other. This is because 
the shareholding reform is a radical reform which had an effect of modification of 
property rights system of SOEs (the other main function of shareholding reform is 
relocating capital resources through M&A effectively, but we just focus on property 
right system of SOEs here). In contrast, the corporatization reform, as a core step of 
MES, is trying to change the SOEs towards modern enterprises.  
 
As discussed above, it can be seen clearly that the reform of expanding the SOEs’ 
autonomy (kuoda qiye zizhuquan) and the reform for taxation to replace profit transfer 
(ligaishui) failed. Yet, Chinese SOEs reform accumulated much experience through 
these two reforms. It was against these two failed reforms that SOEs shareholding 
                                                 
261 The terms of ‘corporatization’ and ‘shareholding reform’, as two independent reforms, are the main different 
reforms for Chinese SOEs reform. Their common points can be summarized as follows: first of all, they focus on the 
relationship between the owner and manager of SOEs, secondly, they push the Chinese SOEs towards an 
international and modern direction. However, shareholding reform was proposed earlier than corporatization in 
China by the documents of central government. In fact, the result of shareholding reform of SOEs was not very good 
in the period between 1980 and 1997, but the failed experiences showed the importance of ownership issue and those 
experiences prepared for corporatization. Therefore, the first difference between corporatization and shareholding 
reform is that shareholding reform started earlier and served to prepare for corporatization reform, and 
corporatization reform started after 1992; the second difference is that shareholding reform focused on ownership 
and property rights of SOEs while corporatization reform paid more attention to the board of directors, shareholders 
and board of supervisors, and that helped SOEs to transform to international and listed enterprises.   
262 Shareholding reform was proposed in 1980s, and the central government paid great attention to developing SOEs 
shareholding reform in 1992. After 1997 the shareholding reform developed very well. Corporatization reform was 
proposed in 1992 as a core of MES, and started after 1992. 
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reform attracted more attention from the government.  
 
According to Huang, shareholding reform in China started around 1978, the prototype 
of shareholding system of SOEs was the rural joint-stock system enterprises.263 It was 
considered by Li, a distinguished scholar in this field, that a core problem of SOEs was 
excessive concentration of property ownership, so the reform of the shareholding 
system was the best solution.264 Before 1992, Li held his opinion and developed a 
series of methods for SOEs, included the structure of the ownership, the structure of the 
SOEs after the reform, and the solutions of transition from the original contracting 
system enterprise to joint-stock enterprise.265 But some scholars argued for several 
opposite points. First, some believed that the shareholding system of SOEs was the 
product of the development of modern capitalist society and for that reason had to be 
rejected by a socialist society.266 Another main point they argued was that shareholding 
reform was not the objective of SOEs reform. 267  They thus urged the Chinese 
                                                 
263 After the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China in 1978, some of China’s rural ‘Sheban’ 
enterprises for expanding production capacity, spontaneously adopted financing investment, cooperation, share 
dividends, a series of new solutions which made the scale of enterprises larger than before. Farmers through a variety 
of factors of production became a shareholder, formed the rural joint-stock system enterprise, which is the prototype 
of the shareholding system.  
264 Su, supra note 251, at 3 Li Yining, Vice Commissioner, Economic Policy Committee, National People’s Political 
Consulate, PRC; Dean, Division of Social Sciences, Peking University. Li compared China and many other countries 
on the practice of economic operation. On the basis of his comparative study; he developed a theory to explain 
China’s economic operation. At the beginning of the Chinese reform, Li proposed shareholding system of SOEs 
should be used for China’s economy, so in China, many people called him Li Gufen. 
265 The specific methods: employees to buy shares in order to make the factory become an internal shareholding 
enterprises; establishing new shares through enterprise merger; enterprises shares or stock exchange each other, form 
the compact enterprises group; Sino-foreign joint venture and foreign joint venture, establishing joint-stock system; 
issue B shares, the enterprises change to be a sino-foreign joint venture; become to be a joint-stock enterprises 
through using of bank loans for enterprise; several companies joint investment, establish an investment company, the 
latter will be participation in the former enterprises, and transform them by instalments for a stake in enterprise and 
so on.  
266  According to Huang Zehua, the economists such as Lang Xianping, criticized sharply for SOEs reform- 
shareholding reform. See Huang Zehua, 2008. “Zhongguo Gufenzhi Gaige Sanshinian Huimou”, China Report. 07 
2008.  
267 Ibid.  
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government and SOEs not to pay attention to it.268 
 
When looking at the initial reforms today, it is easy to find that in the early time of 1980, 
the argument of shareholding reform of SOEs from Li was so new, strange and difficult 
for Chinese government, scholars, and managers of SOEs. We have traced the roots of 
this phenomenon and believe that a lack of the economic theory, a lack of resources 
allocation theory and the problems left over by history are the main reasons.269 Indeed 
most scholars thought the reform of shareholding of SOEs was a temporary relief 
method for solving the problem of huge labour employment 270(170,000,000 youths 
from the cities were sent to the countryside between … and … in the ‘shangshan 
xiaxiang’ campaign271 and they were starting at that time to return to the cities. During 
                                                 
268 Su, supra note 251, at 4. 
269 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was a historical event prior to China’s economic reform in late 1970s. The 
official line on the Cultural Revolution is that it was a time of ‘chaos’ that was bad for the country. In the early years 
of the PRC after a long civil war, China went into a historical stage of socialism too quickly, and the central leaders, 
the public and the government were lacking adequate preparation and scientific understanding of ‘how to build 
China in a backward economy and culture and in the construction of socialism’. In the ‘Cultural Revolution’, the 
heads of the democratic parties, celebrities from all walks of life and the masses had been framed and persecuted. 
The Party and the government institutions at all levels, people’s congress and people’s political consultative 
conference organization were paralyzed and in an abnormal state for a long time. The public security organs, judicial 
and procurator organs, and other authority organs were in a chaotic period. Academia was a dealt blow by the 
Cultural Revolution, when the Red Guards shut down all institutions of higher education and persecuted thousands 
of teachers and administrators. During such a long period of social unrest, the development of national economy was 
slow, and economic management system was affected. So when the reform came to China, it broke the traditional 
order and modeabout lacking economy theory and resources allocation theory, according to Yang Ruilong, the 
significance of the economics of innovation about State-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprise shareholding 
system reform is: China's reform is the transition from the planned system to market system. From the perspective of 
transformation, it is mainly changing the method of allocation of resources, meaning the rule of resource allocation is 
changing from equivalent rules to property rights, right of resource allocation from the government to the micro main 
body essentially. More details see Yang Ruilong, 2010. “Guoyou Qiye Gufenzhi Gaige Lilun de Jingjixue Chuangxin 
Yiyi”, Contemporary Finance & Economics, 02 2010. 
270 This opinion can see Wang Jiaoliu, 1998. “Dangqian Guoyou Qiye Gaige yu Zaijiuye Wenti Qianxi”, Qian 
Dongnan Minzu Shifan Gaodeng Zhuanke Xuexiao Xuebao. S1 1998.  and see Bai Jinfu, 1998. “Fuyu 
Renyuan—Guoyou Qiye Gaige Bijie de Nanti”, Theory Front, 06 1998. 
271 The term “Shangshan Xiaxiang campaign:orginates from January 1956 when the political bureau of the CPC 
central committee proposed the 1956-1956 national agricultural development outlines (draft). According to Zhang 
Zemin, Mai Wenlan, began in 1955 and ended in 1980, experiencing two periods. The first period, 1955-1968, it is a 
normal social and economic measure to solve the lack of knowledge in the development of agricultural productivity 
and urban employment problem; the second period 1969-1980, it is a political education movement, in order to solve 
"against revisionism proofing" and upbringing of successor. The first periodt meets the need of the state and society; 
knowledgeable youth also basically played their part and should be given the basic affirmation; the second 
perioddamaged national vigour anddid more harm than good, should be denied. More details see Zhang Zemin, Mai 
Wenlan, 1998. “Zhishi Qingnian Shangshan Xiaxiang de Lishi Kaocha yu Sikao”, Journal of Henan Normal 
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the same period, some 32,000,000 youths were not sent to the countryside but allowed 
to stay in the cities, including those who were an only child or a child whose siblings 
had all been sent to the countryside). 272  The overwhelming impact of the social 
problems made most scholars overlook the importance of the shareholding reform of 
SOEs and its important position in overall Chinese economic reform. A superficial and 
shallow question ‘whether the shareholding system of SOEs belongs to modern 
capitalist society or socialist society’ had been argued against a background of reform. 
From the point of view of the scholars who argued against Li Yining’s argument, the 
shareholding reform of SOEs was judged not by the standards of development, 
performance or strategy of SOEs, but by prevailing ideologies.273  
 
The reform of SOE shareholding was also disturbed by political factors. In fact, the 
experience of the reform started in 1986 and during a chaotic time of discussion on 
reform theories. It began with the Provision on the Deepening of Enterprises Reform 
and Enhancement of the Vitality of Enterprises issued by the State Council on 5th 
December. This policy document indicated a possibility that some medium or 
large-sized enterprises could be chosen as the experimental SOEs for the purposes of 
shareholding reform.274 It would have been a good start for the shareholding reform of 
                                                                                                                                            
University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition). 05 1998. and see Mi Hedu, 1999. “Xi Shangshan Xiaxiang 
Yundong de Qiyuan”, Contemporary China History Studies, 02 1999. see Ye Xin, 2006 “Discussing about the 
Movement of Educated Youth Went to and Worked in Countryside and Mountain Areas in China”, Journal of Social 
Sciences. 05 2006. 
272 Liu Xiaomeng, 1995. “Xuetong Lun yu Zhiqing Shangshan Xiaxiang Yundong”, Youth Studies. 02 1995. 
273 The opinion can see Daiyi. 2000. “Guoqi Gufenzhi Gaige Silu de Zaisikao”, On Economic Problems. 06 2000  
And see Shi Haixia, Wang Yu, 2005. “Makesi Gufen Jingji Lilun yu Guoqi Gufenzhi Gaige Shijian”, Commercial 
Research. 06 2005.  
274 See the Provision on the Deepening Enterprises Reform and Enhance the Vitality of Enterprises which issued by 
the State Council on 5th December 1986. 
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SOEs if Hu Yaobang, who supported the shareholding reform, had stepped down as the 
General Secretary of the CPC.275 This political change meant a loss of support from 
leaders of the central authority, so the process of shareholding reform stalled.276 If we 
trace the history of the practice of shareholding reform, it seems that both the leaders of 
the central authority and the executives of SOEs resisted the shareholding reform.277 In 
essence, the controversial shareholding reform disappeared into obscurity but the 
largest transition in shareholding reform was yet to come. This time it had political 
backing.  
 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘southern tour’ and the 14th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China created a more conducive political environment for 
enterprise reform. Deng was determined to go ahead with shareholding reform.278 
Moreover, based on the experiences drawn from failed former reforms, the scholars 
                                                 
275 Between June 1981 and September 1982, Hu Yaobang served as chairman of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, from September 1982 to January 1987, served as general secretary of the CPC central 
committee. Hu Yaobang resigned in 1987 due to poor opposition of bourgeois liberalization. Hu Yaobang was the 
Party leader who supported the shareholding reform. Here anexample can show his opinion. According to Xin, in 
July 1983, approved by the government of Baoan County, Guangdong province, a joint investment company was 
raising funds from society, and collected more than 1300000 Yuan in the firstatempt. China's first stock- Shen Baoan 
was born.after the Opening up. Hu Yaobang, as the CPC Central Committee General Secretary was issued a stock's 
proposal and he had close relationship with the China Youth Press- which enforced share-holding system in new 
China at the earliest time. For more information see: Su, supra note 3, and Xin Ye. 2014. “Hu Yaobang yu Gaige 
Kaifang Hou Woguo de Diyizhi Gupiao”, Over the Party History. (7) 2014. 
276 Lose the support of the Central leader- Hu Yaobang, the controversial idea of shareholding system reform has 
dropped. 
277 According to Su, around 1986, the Shenzhen government pushed forward the pilot fors joint-stock system in 
state-owned company, and many people thought that shareholding system set up the board of directors, and added a 
role which controlled the SOEs, so there was no SOEs tried. Only Vanke's general manager Wang Shi 
volunteered.He realized "vanke is at a crossroads, the shareholding system reform is a chance for Vanke can gain 
independent operation". Because since it was founded in 1984, Vanke and its parent company, Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone Development Corporation strived openly and secretly. For Vanke, the proposed shareholding system 
reform, was also rebuffed by the parent company. Visibly even state-owned enterprise itself was not accepted for the 
joint-stock pilot. Su, supra note 251. 
278 In the southern conversation, Deng Xiaoping advanced remarkable insights into the market economy, and 
reflected to the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, namely, the goal of China’s economic 
reform is to establish the socialist market economy system. Concerning the debateabout Joint-stock enterprise and 
shareholding reform of SOEs, he pointed out that the debates could be lasting, but the reform must be done and tried. 
After that, the main central leader had a special talk to different subjects scholars such as Li Yining, and most of them 
agreed that shareholding reform was not only necessary, but also was feasible.  
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finally agreed on the shareholding reform as a solution forward.279 At the same year, 
the experimental SOEs developed towards standardization and normalization. The 
details about experimental SOEs will be stated in the next paragraph.   
 
In 1992, the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System (SCRES) issued 
a number of documents including ‘the Pilot Measures for Joint-Stock Enterprises’, 
‘Opinions on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares’, ‘Opinions on Standards for 
Limited Liability Companies’, and other documents about joint-stock enterprises 
accounting system and human resource management system (a total of fourteen in all). 
In practice, on the basis of the original experimental enterprises, 400 new pilot 
joint-stock enterprises were established, and by the end of 1992, the total number of 
pilot joint-stock enterprises reached 3700, of which 69 enterprises traded their shares in 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 280  In addition, the China Securities 
                                                 
279 Su, supra note 251. 
280  Su, supra note 251, at 4  the fourteen instructive rules were promulgated by the State Commission for 
Restructuring the Economic System (SCRES) are including that: 1. the Pilot Measures for Joint-Stock Enterprises 
1992, 2. Opinion Standards for the Companies Limited by Shares 1992; 3. Opinions on Standards for Limited 
Liability Companies 1992; 4. Regulation on the Transformation of Operation Mechanism of the Industrial 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 1992; 5. Interim Provisions of the State Commission of Science and 
Technology and the State Economic Restructuring Commission on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of 
High and New Technology Incorporated Companies within National High and New Technology Industry 
Development Zones 1992; 6. Reply of the State Council on the Provisional Measures for Experiments of Employee 
Stock Option Plans in Joint-Stock Limited Companies of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 1994; 7. Notice 
of the Ministry of Finance, the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, the State Economic and 
Trade Commission, the State Administration of Taxation and the Bureau of the Legislative Affairs under the State 
Council on Stopping the Implementation of the Provisions That 40% of Income Tax Will be Refunded if an 
Enterprise Makes Reinvestment by Using the Retained Profits 1994; 8. Circular of the State Council on Deepening 
the Reform of the Pension System for Staff and Workers of Enterprises  1995; 9. Notice of the State Council to 
Standardize Original Limited Liability Companies and Joint Stock Limited Companies in Accordance with the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 1995; 10. Supplementary Notice of the State Council on the 
Relevant Issues about the Pilot Implementation of the Merger and Bankruptcy of State-owned Enterprises in Some 
Cities and the Reemployment of Workers 1997; 11. Circular of the State Council on the Approval and Transmission 
of the Suggestions of the State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission and the State 
Restructuring Commission on the Work of Deepening the Expe 1997;, 12. Letter of the Ministry of Finance 
Concerning the Issue on the Standard with which the Enterprises with Foreign investment Work out the Accountant 
Report Forms 1997; 13. Circular on the Related Issues of Granting Import and Export Operation Right and Foreign 
Contracted Project and Labor Service Cooperation Right to the Trying out Enterprises Group 1998; 14. Letter Reply 
by the General Office of the State Council on the Legal Status of the Meeting of Employee Stock Ownership in 
Enterprises of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations 2001. 
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Regulatory Commission was set up to strengthen and unify coordination and 
supervision of the securities market.281 Moreover, the State Council approved nine 
SOEs restructuring into stock companies, and listed abroad and in Hong Kong. 
Shareholding reform was moved further forward in 1993 when the term ‘property 
rights of SOEs’ was proposed for the first time in a document of the Central Committee 
of the CCP concerning the establishment of the Modern Enterprises System (MES).282  
 
Although the central government played an active role in promoting the shareholding 
reform of SOEs, the reform still developed slowly during the period between 1992 and 
1997.283 According to Su, the main reason was that there was a major debate in China 
about shareholding reform.284 The debated issues, as summarized by Su, included: first, 
did the SOEs needed any institutional innovation? Secondly, if so, did institutional 
innovation mean property rights reform? Finally, what was the main form of MES? 
Would the correct answer be corporations and a shareholding system? The debate and 
controversy lasted about four years (1993- 1996), but no clear answer came up, even 
from the government.285  
                                                 
281 The China Securities Regulatory Commission is directly under the State Council, in accordance with the laws 
and regulations and authorized by the State Council, the unified supervision and management of the national 
securities and futures market, maintaining the securities and futures market order, protect their legitimate operation. 
The CSRC is in the capital, Beijing, is now composed of one chairman, four vice chairman, one discipline inspection 
commission secretary, three chairmen of the assistant; Authority with 18 functional departments, an audit team, three 
centers;  According to the Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 14, the CSRC also has the 
stock issuance examination committee, member of the CSRC’s professionals and will be hired by external experts. 
The CSRC set up 36 securities regulatory bureaux, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen securities regulatory 
commissioner offices in the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government 
and cities. According to the Regulations on the Administration of Futures Tradingprovisions of the State Council, the 
CSRC to implement centralized and unified supervision and administration to the futures market". Obviously, the 
CSRC is legal and regulatory department authorized by the government.  http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite. 
282 See Several Problems on Establishing a Socialist Market Economic System of the Decision 1993. The main tasks 
of MES can be found in the discussions of Chapter One.  
283 Su, supra note 251. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid.  
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Before looking at the further reform of Chinese SOEs, it is necessary to pause to 
consider the reasons why it was that there was so much resistance to shareholding 
reform. First, new concepts and shareholding model could not be understood in a short 
time given that there was a lack of economic and resource allocation theory. The 
traditional mode of SOEs and the chaotic social background led to a fear of new modes 
and new concepts amongst the public at a time of transition. Another reason is that the 
reform of SOEs was like ‘a person crossing a river by feeling his way over the stones’ 
and there was little experience which the SOEs reform could learn from.  
 
Furthermore, the regulations, rules, and laws about shareholding reform were copied 
from other countries, such as America, the UK, Japan and Germany. Because China 
needed to develop the economy rapidly,286 some stages were skipped over in the 
development of SOEs to save time and catch up to modern enterprises in other 
countries, including related laws and regulations, both of which lacked foundation in 
China.287 The legal system on SOEs was established by some scholars who compared 
the pros and cons of laws, legal system, ownership structure of developed countries; the 
Chinese legal system was developed and transplanted from other countries and lacked 
previous foundations for that law.288  
 
                                                 
286 Liu Yan, Lou Jianbo, 2014. “Gongsifa Ziben Zhidu yu Zhengquan Shichang: Zhidu Bianqian, Falv Yizhi yu 
Zhongguo Shijian”, Zheng Quan Fa Yuan. 12 (3) 2014. 
287 Ibid. and see another article which holds the same opinion: Huang Hui, 2013. “Lue Lun Gongsifa Yitihua: 
Zhongguo Shijiao Ji Qishi”, Journal of Comparative Law. 05. 2013. 
288 See Chen Guangwei, 2011. “Falv Yizhi de Fanshi”, North China University of Technology. 2011. 
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The legal transplantation in China leads to some consequences. First, the law 
transplanted from other countries was not always suitable for China’s national 
conditions.289 Secondly, because China was undergoing a period of change, the pros 
and cons of the law could not be identified immediately.290 Finally, the practice of SOE 
reform is the evaluation of standards of the law,291 and the evaluation process is one 
that takes a long time. Since there was a not adequate relevant law in China, the option 
was then to transplant laws, but if the law transplanted from other countries was found 
not very suitable for China’s national conditions, it would take more time to rectify 
these laws.  
 
The discussion above indicates a hysteresis situation concerning legislative 
development in China in relation to SOEs reform. The situation also explains to some 
extent the reasons why a new kind of reform was so difficult to be accepted in China 
and thus a long time was needed. Such new reform or related law transplantation needs 
to be tested and proved through a long period of practical implementation. It should 
also be noted that policies were issued before a law was formally introduced and such 
policies contributed to guiding the reform process. This could serve as a good piece of 
evidence which can support the argument that it may take many years for the concept of 
                                                 
289 The law was transplanted from other countries with the characteristics of their own country, such as the 
independent director system originating from Britain and America. China did transplant the law of the independent 
director system, however, the Chinese legal environment and economic development level cannot reach the British 
and American level in the development of corporation’s aspect. So the independent director system developed 
slowly in China. See Liu Junhai, 2003. “Woguo Gongsifa Yizhi Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Sikao”, Tribune of Political 
Science and Law. 03 2003. 
290 Because in China in the time of transition, the law, economic and social conditions were changing a lot more than 
before, so when some new policy, law or system has been set up through law transplanted in China, the result- pros 
and cons on its suitability for China needed a period to examine. And the reasons could be summarized and 
illustrated in a short or long term after the case.  
291 Ibid. 
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shareholding reform to be accepted by the public and the government. As discussed 
above, the nature of shareholding reform of SOEs was defined by the 15th Congress of 
the Communist Party of China in 1997, as stated “joint-stock system is a kind of capital 
organization form of modern enterprises, it is conducive to the separation of ownership 
and managerial authority, it is beneficial to improve the efficiency of enterprises and 
capital operation, both capitalism and socialism can be used. It cannot be broadly 
defined if shareholding system is public or private, the stake in the hands of who is 
critical.”292 This was the first time that the traditional ownership theory in China was 
made as a major revision in the official documents by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China. This breakthrough brought to the end of the debate between 
supports and sceptics for the shareholding reform. From the time that shareholding 
reform was first proposed by Li in 1980, until the shareholding system was recognized 
in 1997, the process took over eighteen years.  
 
3.4 'Grasp the Large and Free the Small' (Zhuada Fangxiao) 
 
According to OECD, 'grasp the large and free the small' (zhuada fangxiao) is a policy in 
the time of transition  for China to revitalize larger SOEs through corporatization 
(zhuada), while letting the small ones go through privatization (fangxiao).293 Grasp the 
large and free the small (zhuada fangxiao), as a new policy to solve the hardest 
problems for SOEs, was promulgated officially at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP’s 14th 
                                                 
292 See the Report of the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1997. 
293 OECD 2000 a :51-53. 
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Central Committee in September 1995.294 This policy was discussed in Chapter One as 
consisting of two parts, namely, reform of small and medium-sized SOEs, and reform 
of large sized SOEs. For the small and medium-sized SOEs, the major industries’, the 
solutions of reform, and the importance of small and medium-sized SOEs for Chinese 
economy have been analysed in Chapter One as well. 
 
Much research focused on Chinese businesses has emphasized the strategic importance 
of the ‘grasp the large and free the small' policy.  They thought this policy was mainly 
implemented in strategic industries,295 and the evidence on which they based their view 
was the industries where large SOEs retained a controlling position, whether before or 
after the reform,296 for example, the public utilities, basic goods industries, pillar 
industries, high-tech industries and defence industries.297 From a different perspective, 
without considering the strategic objectives, the rationale of this ‘zhuada fangxiao’ 
policy was simple. The smallest and medium-sized SOEs were lost around 1990.298 
According to McNally and Lee, ‘most of these enterprises were below optimal scale 
and duplicated industrial activities among provinces and countries’.299 However, the 
large SOEs were mostly profitable, although most large SOEs were distributed in 
                                                 
294 See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Zhiding Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Jiuwu Jihua he Er ling yi er Nian 
Yuanjing Mubiao de Jianyi, which was promulgated officially at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP’s 14th Central 
Committee in September 1995 (28.09.1995). 
295 Zhang, supra note 267, at 41-42. 
296 Ibid. 
297 More details for large SOEs industries see Chapter One, the part about reform of large of SOEs.  
298 The World Bank 1997. For more details about lost around 1990 for the smallest and medium-sized SOEs  see Ni 
Xuying, 1998. “Tan Ruhe Fuchi Zhongxiao Qiye”, Journal of Wuhan Commercial Service College. Z2 1998.  Tong 
Xueqiong, 1990 “Zhuhai Tequ Guoying Qiye Kuisun Qingkuan Qianxi”, Gang Ao Jingji. 11 1990 ; see Shi Jianxiang, 
1990. “Woguo Caizheng Butie de Gaikuang, Chengyin ji Duice”, Zhejiang Economy,06 1990. 
299 McNally and Lee 1998;24. 
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monopolistic or oligopolistic industries.300 So the burden of small and medium-sized 
SOEs was the biggest problems for development of Chinese SOEs. The solution of 
releasing such a burden and developing large SOEs was the best and unique method at 
the time. Whatever the initial intentions of zhuada fangxiao reform, the result was a 
restructured state sector which concentrated on the large SOEs. Therefore, this was the 
biggest contribution to SOEs reform in ownership restructuring in bottom the strategic 
and non-strategic sectors.    
 
This Zhuda Fangxiao policy was reaffirmed and reinforced at the 15th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1997. Some scholars hold the opinion that 
‘China has undertaken a nationwide corporatization reform, especially targeting large 
SOEs’.301 Their argument asserted: firstly, the policy of “grasp the large and free the 
small” was a main part of corporatization reform, especially for large SOEs; secondly, 
the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs started earlier than the large SOEs. This 
latter opinion reflected the process that the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs 
(fangxiao) had been almost completed by 1997. As for large SOEs, the core of SOEs 
reform and the main objective of CG reform in China, is still being carried out today, as 
the next chapter will show.,.  
 
Regarding the relationship between the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs and 
corporatization, it is believed that the large SOEs are the targets of corporatization 
                                                 
300 See Shi Jianxiang, 1990. “Woguo Caizheng Butie de Gaikuang, Chengyin ji Duice”, Zhejiang Economy,06 1990. 
301 Zhang, supra note 267, at 40. 
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reform and the reform of small and medium-sized SOEs was a good preparation for 
corporatization, because the policy had gradually begun the process of breaking down 
the monolithic ownership of the state.302 The scope of the state’s ownership e of SOEs 
became clearer as a result of the reform of small and medium sized SOEs. So the reform 
of grasping the large and freeing the small” made a great contribution to ownership 
restructuring for SOEs reform. And corporatization based on the shareholding system 
was introduced into the large SOEs.  
 
3.5 Debt-into-Equity Reform (Zhai Zhuan Gu) 
 
Debt-into-equity reform as one of three measures to revitalize SOEs was launched by 
the State Council in September 1997.303 Another two measures were the availability of 
national bonds at subsidized interests to quicken technology upgrading and innovation, 
and written-off bad debt. Because only debt-into-equity was included in ownership 
restructures of SOEs, the discussion in this chapter will focus only on this reform.  
                                                 
302 Zhang, supra note 267, at 42. 
303 Almanac of China’s Economy 2001;4-5 Approved by the state council, on March 25, 1997, the Securities 
Committee of the State Council issued "convertible corporate bonds management interim measures", direct 
regulated conforms to the condition of the listed company and the key state-owned enterprises can issue corporate 
bonds in China which converted into shares. Convertible corporate bonds and the "debt-to-equity swap" referred to 
in this thesis have the same meaning; there is no difference in nature. After that, relevant state ministries and 
commissions and the State Council issued the relevant administrative regulations and rules on the specification, for 
example, the State Economic and Trade Commission, the People's Bank of China released on July 30, 1999 “on the 
Implementation Opinions on some Issues of Debt to Equity ", the State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry 
of Finance, the People's Bank of China announced on November 23 In 1999 the Corporate Bonds Convertible Audit 
Regulations, the State Economic and Trade Commission were announced on November 6, 2000 on the Notice of 
Debt-to-Equity for Enterprises and Strengthen the Management of Standard Operation, and issued by the State 
Council on November 10, 2000 of the Financial Asset Management Companies Ordinance. These rules and 
regulations of financial institutions bonds convertible made specific provision, and the implementation of 
debt-to-equity as major decisions of the Party Central Committee and the State Council to guard against and defuse 
financial risks, improving the situation of the reform and development of state-owned large and medium-sized 
enterprises. This kind of debt-to-equity is often referred to as "policy debt turned stock". In practice, debt-to-equity is 
not limited to the scope of the "policy of debt turn" and appeared in general increase endowment spread of activity of 
enterprises, especially in the process of restructuring and reorganization of enterprises, listing. For example, the 
issuing of shares listed "Keda electrical", "star horse car", and other companies in the restructuring is through debt to 
equity. 
 120 
 
Debt-into-equity reform means that ‘funds from government ministries and 
state-owned banks are converted from loans to investment so as to lower debt to assets 
ratios. Debts owed to other SOEs are converted to investment in the same way.’304 This 
policy focused on large SOEs, and there were two standards for SOEs to be eligible for 
debt-into-equity reform. ‘First, those who were in heavy losses; second, those who 
were profitable but with debt-to-asset ratios so high that profit could not cover bank 
interests.’305 The advantages of debt-into-equity reform for ownership restructures of 
SOEs can be summarized in three points. Firstly, this reform created the SOE 
restructuring, changed the single state-owned capital, and increased the activity of 
state-owned capital.306  Secondly, it strengthened supervision over the business of 
SOEs. In China, as the capital market had not fully developed in the past,307 the SOEs 
funds  heavily relied on bank loans; however, the bank, as creditor, could not constrain 
the behaviour of SOEs. After the reform of debt-into-equity, the bank gained more 
supervision rights for SOEs, increased the restriction on the behaviours and 
management of the debt SOEs, and safeguarded the rights and interests of the bank.308 
Then last but not the least, the debt-into-equity reform reduced the burden of SOEs, and 
                                                 
304 Hassard et al. 1999:67. 
305 Zhang, supra note 267, at 45. 
306  Zhang Xiaohong, 2001. “Ziben Jiegou yu Guoyou Qiye Zhaizhuangu”, Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan 
Yanjiusheng Yuan.. li Xueqing, and Zou Jun, 2006. “Youguan Zhaizhuangu Wenti de Sikao”, Prices Monthly. (05) 
2006. Wei Wei, 1997. “Dui Zhaizhuangu Jizhong Moshi de Sikao”, China Economist, 07 1997.  Li Zhonghua, 2000. 
“Guoqi Gaige yu Zhaizhuangu Tanxi”, Xinjiang Finance, 04 2000. Chen Chuanxin, Li Xiaoyong, Miu Qihao, 2000. 
“Guanyu zai Woguo Shixing Zhaizhuangu Ruogan Wenti de Sikao”, Reform of Economic System, S1 2000. 
307 Asset-liability ratio was 65.81% on average in 1995 state-owned industrial enterprises, of which more than 90% 
of the debt is on bank debt. This issue not only affects further development of the state-owned industrial enterprises, 
the state-owned commercial Banks carrying a heavy burden to the real commercial operation, but also has become 
the enormous obstacle to the whole national economy’s sustained, stable and healthy development. Zhang Xiaohong, 
2001. “Ziben Jiegou yu Guoyou Qiye Zhaizhuangu”, Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiusheng Yuan.  
308  Zhang Xiaohong, 2001. “Ziben Jiegou yu Guoyou Qiye Zhaizhuangu”, Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan 
Yanjiusheng Yuan.  
 121 
helped SOEs realize the goal of turning losses into gains.309  
 
Legal conflicts of Debt-for-equity and how to solve them 
 
From the angle of the legal system, debt-into-equity reform created a conflict between 
legality and Chinese Civil Law, Chinese Contract Law and Chinese Guarantee Law. 
The market’s economic behaviours must be regulated by law. First of all, as the one of 
main bodies of debt-to-equity, the state-owned commercial Banks actually enjoy 
preferential treatment in China. The present approach is that the State sustains a large 
number of hidden losses of bad creditors’ rights in order for the state-owned 
commercial Banks actually to enjoy the preferential treatment.310 It conflicts with 
articles of Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks.311 This behaviour must be changed, 
or debt-to-equity will promote the moral hazard of state-owned commercial Banks. The 
result is that state-owned commercial Banks rely on the State too much to dispose of 
bad creditors’ rights. 
 
The conflicts between debt-to-equity and Chinese Civil Law are, on the one hand, that 
excessive administrative intervention crashes the concept of equality of Chinese Civil 
Law. Huge bad debt for banks was widespread, and the debt-to-equity allowed only 
                                                 
309 Ibid. 
310 Zheng Zhijun, 2003. “Zhai Zhuan Gu Ruogan Falv Wenti Yanjiu”, Zhouzhou University. 2003. and more 
discussion about legal issues on debt-to- equity can see Lu Hao, 2005. “Zhai Zhuan Gu Shishi Zhong de Ruogan Falv 
Wenti Yanjiu”, Wuhan University. 2005.  
311 See the Article 4, Law of PRC on Commercial Banks which was approved by the standing committee of the 
eighth National People's Congress by the 13th meeting, according to the tenth National People's Congress standing 
committee sixth conference, modified and corrected by” commercial bank law of the People's Republic of China 
decision"., Chinese commercial banks take on their own risks, self-financing and self-discipline.  
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four state-owned commercial Banks to complete, other commercial Banks having been 
excluded.312 On the other hand, for the corporations in debt-to-equity, only part of the 
large sized state-owned enterprises can participate,, most other types of enterprises and 
medium and small sized state-owned enterprises being ineligible to participate, thus 
artificially breaking the equal status of civil subjects in market economy.313 As for the 
intermediary financial asset management companies in the process of debt-to-equity, 
referred to as "independent market main body" in relevant policy document,314 this is 
without the rights that an independent liability subject should have, and this is conflicts 
with principle that  obligations and responsibility should be consistent with  rights the 
Chinese Civil Law. 
 
There are two conflicts between debt-to-equity and Chinese Contract Law: the first one 
is that both sides of the main body of debt-to-equity are financial asset management 
                                                 
312 Zheng Zhijun, 2003. “Zhai Zhuan Gu Ruogan Falv Wenti Yanjiu”, Zhouzhou University. 2003. And see Guan 
Xiuzhong, 2001. “Zhai Zhuan Gu de Jige Wenti”, China Economist. 02 2001. 
313 Ibid. 
314 In China, due to a surge of bank bad loans and operational difficulties of SOEs, the Notice about Implementing 
Opinions on some Issues of Debt to Equity approved by the State Council on July 30, 1999, issued by State 
Economic and Trade Commission and the People's Bank the (the Economic and Trade Industry [1999] no. 727), the 
Opinions put forward to revitalize the state-owned commercial Banks non-performing assets, and recovery of the 
state-owned Banks' capital, standardize enterprise company reform at the same time, the four financial asset 
management companies as the main body executes debtto-equity investment (later increased by the National 
Development Bank);  On September 22, 1999, the Party of the 15th Meeting Four Times approved "the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China about the Reform of State-owned Enterprises and the Development of 
Certain Major Issue Decision" , and proposed "to improve the state-owned enterprise assets and liabilities structure 
and reduce the burden to society", and combined with the reform of non-performing assets of state-owned Banks, 
financial asset management companies through debt-to-equity for part of key state-owned enterprises which because 
of excessive debt and troubled debts in the difficulty, but the products have the market, development prospects to 
solve the problems about high debt ratio. Implementing the enterprise debts into shares, must transform operating 
mechanism, their reform to convert themselves into standard companies, and independent audit of financial asset 
management companies. According to the principle of market economy and the relevant provisions of the standard 
operation, prevent the loss of state-owned assets. Later, the State Council approved the study of the work related 
issues on debt-to-equity, and announced on November 1, 2000 the Financial Asset Management Companies 
Ordinancewhich specific regulated the activities of the Financial Asset Management Companies, especially for its 
creditors’ right to engage in equity to make detailed. On February 23, 2003 the State Council general office 
forwarded the Notice of State Economic and Trade Commission of Finance of the People's Bank on further doing a 
good job of State-owned Enterprise’s Debt to Equity Opinion. This suggested the setting up of the new company 
creditor's rights shares, reducing the debt burden of the enterprises, revitalizing the bad finance assets, supporting the 
development of the enterprises of implementing debt-to-equity. 
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companies and enterprises, therefore, the main signature body should be the same. But 
in the practice, the main signature bodies are the proposed convertible corporate 
shareholders and the financial asset management companies. Convertible corporate 
shareholders, even if they are the only shareholders, cannot replace the proposed 
convertible enterprise itself.315 The second conflict is that the Regulations of Financial 
Asset Management Companies stipulated in the financial asset management company, 
the relationship between the state-owned commercial bank creditors’ rights and the 
financial asset management company is "buy", meaning the transaction should be 
independent and voluntary. However, in fact, the financial asset management 
companies were "compulsory acquisition".316  
 
3.6 The Owner (shareholder) and Control of the SOEs under the 
Supervision and Administration of SASAC 
 
In 2003, the reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises entered into a new era, marked 
by the establishment of State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). SASAC is a special commission of the central government, 
directly under the State Council. It is responsible for managing China’s SOEs, 
including appointing top executives and approving any mergers, sales of stock or assets, 
                                                 
315 Zhan Lei, 2009. “Shilun Zhengce Xing Zhaizhuangu de Falv Goujia yu Zhidu Wanshan”, East China University 
of Policy and Law. The same topic had been discussed in Qi Qun, 2001. “Zhaizhuangu de Hefaxing Wenti Tantao.” 
Journal of Shanghai Finance University 03 2001. 
316 Zheng Zhijun, 2003. “Zhai Zhuan Gu Ruogan Falv Wenti Yanjiu”, Zhouzhou University. 2003. And see Guan 
Xiuzhong, 2001. “Zhai Zhuan Gu de Jige Wenti”, China Economist. 02 2001. 
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as well as drafting laws related to state-owned enterprises.317 Enterprises under the 
administration of SASAC can be divided into two types: firstly, those central SOEs 
who are administered by the central SASAC, under the State Council’. Secondly, the 
local SOEs had been administered by the local SASAC. According to Sheng and Zhao, 
129 central SOEs owned RMB 6,293.09 billion of state-owned assets and equities, with 
the total assets reaching RMB 21,058.08 billion.318 By the end of 2013, the number of 
central SOEs had decreased to 113.319  
 
According to Article 3 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
State-Owned Assets of Enterprise, ‘the state-owned assets shall be owned by the state, 
i.e. owned by the whole people. The State Council shall, on behalf of the state, exercise 
the ownership of state-owned assets’, and Article 4 ‘The State Council and the local 
people's governments shall, in accordance with laws and administrative regulations, 
perform respectively the contributor's functions for state-invested enterprises and enjoy 
the contributor's rights and interests on behalf of the state’. The State Council shall, on 
behalf of the state, perform the contributor's functions for the large-sized state-invested 
enterprises that have bearings on the national economic lifeline and state security 
determined by the State Council and the state-invested enterprises in such fields as 
important infrastructures and natural resources. The local people's governments shall, 
on behalf of the state, perform the contributor's functions for other state-invested 
                                                 
317 Lu, supra note 48, at p8  More functions and responsibilities of SASAC’S can see 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85463/n85976/index.html.  
318 Shen, H and Zhao N (2013) China’s State-Owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform, Singapore: 
World Scientfic Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.. at p. 37. 
319  State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html, Accessed 03/12/2013. 
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enterprises. 320  Both the central SASAC and the local SASACs, are specific 
representatives on behalf of the state contributors. Hence, the establishment of SASAC 
promoted the process of establishment of a clear property rights representative system 
concerning SOEs.321 
 
SASAC is neither an administrative authority, nor a business entity, but a government 
institution directly under the State Council with national sponsor and takes part of the 
administrative functions of the government. But from its natural properties, it should be 
a pure national sponsor, exercise the rights of the investor, and undertake the 
obligations of the investor. Supervision and Administration State-Owned Assets of 
Enterprise Tentative Regulations322 as the main regulations which SASAC should 
follow, clarify the SASAC’s duties, especially highlighting the national sponsor status 
and the function of state-owned assets supervision and administration commission. 
This is successful,323 but, in terms of specific provisions, was not in accord with the 
regulations of the investor having the right to regulate the rights of the SASAC. At the 
same time there are phenomena about right "offside" and "absence".324 However, in the 
                                                 
320 See Article 3 and 4 of Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprise 2009  
321 Shen, Luo 2005: 65. 
322 Supervision and Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises Tentative Regulations promulgated by the 
State Council on 27 May 2003 and effective as of date of promulgation.  
323 Zhao Kun, 2004. “Guoziwei de Zhineng Dingwei yu Guoyou Zichan Guanli Tizhi Gaige”, Collected Essays on 
Finance and Economies. 03 2004 According to Zhao, the establishment of the SASAC and the implementation of, of 
Supervision and Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises Tentative Regulations marked a major reform 
of the state-owned assets management system in China. SASAC exercising the investor right will help the 
state-owned capital to be orderly narrowed step by step and the restructuring of listed companies, to provide 
institutional guarantee for reduction of state-owned shares, can also help in the cultivation of manager market and 
perfect it. More discussion of SASAC’s characters can see Hao Yunhong, and Qu Liang, 2004. “Expound the 
Beyond Government & Analogous Corporation, Characters of National Assets Supervise and Administrate 
Committee ”, China Industrial Economy. 3 2004. 
324 Wang Xinhong, Tan Lin and Zhou Junhua, 2005. “Lun Guoziwei de Xingzhi—Jianping Qiye Guoyou Zichan 
Jiandu Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli Zhi Buzu Zhichu”, Contemporary Finance & Economics. 05 2005 the same opinion,  
see Zhang Suohua, 2009. “Lun Guoziwei Falv Diwei de Zaidingyi”, Seeker. 11 2009. According to Zhang, The legal 
status of the SASAC has been the disputed. Due to Supervision and Administration of State-owned Assets of 
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years (2003-2015) of the implementation of the process, the SASAC carried out the 
investors’ rights and regulatory powers at the same time, attracting numerous queries. 
The nature of the investor rights and regulatory powers are completely different: the 
former is the private right, the latter is a public right. Both of them had been vested in 
SASAC at the same time, inevitably led to conflicts, resulting in the nature of the 
state-owned assets supervision and administration being in chaos. So the investor rights 
and regulatory authority shall be given responsibility for two main bodies, and two 
formal relations - the state-owned assets supervision and state-owned capital 
operation. 325  This situation need to be further improved. The SASAC should be 
positioned by regulators in the choice of investors and regulators.326 The reasons can be 
summarized into three points. first of all, the background of the SASAC’ s security 
administration with a lack of exercise investor rights consciousness, makes it  easy to 
"offside";327 Secondly, the SASAC takes sponsor’s duties,  the limitations are existing 
personnel and institutions, so the security administration management radius tends to 
be  too large, personnel management is difficult to reach the designated position, with 
defects such as insufficient incentive; lastly, SASAC positioning as regulators helps the 
                                                                                                                                            
Enterprises Tentative Regulations making the legal status of the SASAC fuzzy, led to SASAC’s functional 
dislocation. On October 28, 2008, the law of the People's Republic of China State owned assets of enterprises 
adopted by vote of the standing committee of the 11th National People's Congress fifth meeting, SASAC was 
positioned to sponsor responsibilities on behalf of the state institutions. Zhang thinks SASAC shall become as a 
government agency or institution and return to the state-owned assets supervision, spin off its" businessman "identity, 
and strengthen its administrative duties.  
325 Jiang Xiangyu, 2006. “Luelun Guoziwei de Gongneng Dingwei”, East China University of Policy and Law. 2006 
For further discussion about the legal relationship between SASAC and the main object of the operation for 
state-owned assetssee Wang Quanxing, Fu Lei and Xu Chengyun, 2003. “Guoziwei yu Guozi Yunying Zhuti Falv 
Guanxi de Dingxing Tantao”, Studies in Law and Business, 05 2003. 
326 Ibid Jiang Xiangyu, 2006. “Luelun Guoziwei de Gongneng Dingwei”, East China University of Policy and Law. 
2006. 
327 Ibid. and for the same opinion see Zhu Hongbo, 2007. “Guoziwei de Juese Chongtu”, China Reform, 05 2007 
According to Zhu, After the establishment of SASAC, although SASAC is positioned in the investor,  in the 
operation, the investors, operators and regulators, these three roles are taken by SASAC at the same time. 
Dislocation of roles will reduce the effective CG of SOEs, and will lead to interest conflict, impede fair competition, 
and damage the interests of society as a whole. 
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unification of the state-owned assets supervision. After the SASAC chooses the 
positioning of regulators, it needs to be clear about the functions, the nature and powers 
of SASAC, spin-off its role on some functions of the investor and the function of public 
service.328  
 
                                                 
328 Jiang Xiangyu, 2006. “Luelun Guoziwei de Gongneng Dingwei”, East China University of Policy and Law. 2006. 
and see Wu Jinglian, 2003. “Dui Guoziwei Chengli Hou Guoyou Jingji Gaige de Ruogan Jianyi”, Economy and 
Management Digest, 15 2003. 
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Chapter 4:  Internal Governance of Chinese State-owned 
Listed Companies (I) 
 
It becomes very important to perfect the corporate governance mechanism for 
safeguarding the market, as the reform of corporate governance has become a global 
problem.329 Over the past twenty years, the global focus of research on the main issue 
of corporate governance has gradually extended from the United States to the main 
developed countries such as Britain, Germany, and Japan.330 In recent years it has been 
extended to the developing countries.331 Research content has developed from the 
study of the theory of the governance structure and mechanism, to the governance 
mode and principle of pragmatic research.332 At present, the quality of governance and 
the governance environment gas attracted more attention, and research on corporate 
governance has moved to corporate governance evaluation.333 The current research can 
be divided into two generations. The first generation of research is about the corporate 
governance mechanism, generally focusing attention on two questions about the 
                                                 
329 With the deepening of globalization, economic and cultural exchanges between countries are increasingly 
frequent, the company system of different countries mutually interact. The evolution of corporate governance modes 
has shown new trends: the United States is seeking to evaluate other corporate governance models, especially 
corporate governance modes of Japan and Germany. Japan and other countries’ corporate governance have started to 
move towards the American model in different degrees. Grasping the new trend of the evolution of corporate 
governance modes will helpful to perfect the system of corporate governance in China. More discussion about this 
issue can be seen in Wan Junyi, and Ou Xiaoming, 2004. “Quanqiuhua yu Gongsi Zhili Muoshi Yanjin de Xin 
Qushi”, Contemporary Finance & Economics. 05 2004  and see Li Jiming, 2005. “Quanqiuhua Xia Gongsi Zhili 
Qushi Fenxi: Moshi Qutong huo Gongneng Qutong”, Zhejiang Academic Journal, 06 2005. and see Zhou Xinjun, 
and Xi Shuping, 2007. “Jingji Quanqiuhua Xiade Kuaguo Gongsi Zhili: Wenti yu Tiaozhan”, East China Economic 
Management, 10 2007. 
330 Li Weian, 2012. China Corporate Governance and Development Report 2012, Beijing: Peking University Press 
P.135. 
331 Zhang Ni, 2007. “Development Convergent Inclination Phenomenon of the Two Typical Corporate Governance 
Modes and the Enlighten Meaning to China”, Journal of Liaoning University (Philosophy and Social Sciences 
Edition). 35 (1) 2007. 
332 Guo Yinhua, 2005. “Guowai Gongsi Zhili Fazhan Bianhua de Qushi ji Qishi”, Xiangtan University Xuebao: 
Zhexue Shehui Kexueban. 04 2005 
333 Li, supra note 339, at 135. 
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specific mechanism; first, whether the company governance mechanism affects firm 
performance; Second, whether the company governance mechanism influences a 
company's specific decisions?334 For example, management change, investment policy, 
and external quotation reflect problems for control.335 Generally, legal and regulatory 
issues in the study of the first generation research of international corporate governance 
have played a small role.336 The character of the second generation of research is that 
legal structure, especially the protection for investors’ rights, became a hot topic.337  
 
For Chinese companies, CG reform is the core of enterprise reform. China's enterprise 
reform has developed over 30 years as the main development pattern of CG. If the 
establishment of the stock exchange in early 1990s was really a starting point for 
China's listed company to pay attention to governance practices, it is from then on that 
China's listed companies experienced the introduction of the concept of CG and its 
structure and mechanism, followed by a focus on governance mode and governance 
quality. Some achievements have been made after these years’ experiences: relevant 
laws and regulations have been promulgated,338 a multi-level governance regulatory 
                                                 
334 Keasey, K. (2005) Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons. John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. P.252.  
335 Ibid. 
336 Li, supra note 339, at 224. 
337 Ibid.  
338 Such as The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, has been amended and adopted at the 18th session 
of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on October 27, 
2005. The amended Company Law of the People's Republic of China is promulgated hereby and shall go into effect 
as of January 1, 2006; and The Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, which was revised and adopted at 
the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of 
China on October 27, 2005 are hereby promulgated and shall be implemented as of January 1, 2006. 
The Opinions of China Securities Regulatory Commission on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies, approved 
by the State Council in 2004.  
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system has been established, 339  and the CG of listed companies has gradually 
improved.  
 
Although the CG of Chinese listed companies started later than the West developed 
countries, the first two steps have been completed: an establishment of governance 
structure, 340  and an improvement of the governance mechanism. 341  At present, 
Chinese listed CG has developed to a new and important stage – to pursue the quality of 
CG That is because it is not enough to establish the governance structure and 
mechanism, but it is more important now to achieve the effectiveness of governance. 
For example, the nominating committee has been set up, but it is important to see 
whether the committee can truly make nominations.342 This is the third step of the 
development of corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. Among all the 
issues of CG which need to be improved, the evaluation of CG is a very important link; 
through a timely evaluation, problems of governance can be identified and 
improvements can be made on the effectiveness of governance. 
 
In this Chapter, the scope and elements of CG of Chinese state-owned listed company 
will be discussed. How can the elements of CG of Chinese state-owned listed company 
be defined? Here CG evaluation is a helpful standard.343 The reason for choosing CG 
                                                 
339 SASAC in the central level and local level had been established in 2003, and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) had been established in October 1992. 
340 MES had been basically established in China now, therefore, the Chinese SOEs, especially Chinese state-owned 
listed companies, completed the transfer into modern enterprise. The shareholder meeting, board of directors and 
board of supervision, managers and the stakeholders are the main factors in the CG of Chinese SOEs. 
341 Governance mechanism contains different elements, such as Supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism.  
342 Zhu Fangzhou, 2014. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Timing Weiyuanhui Zhidu Tanjiu”, Legality Vision. 06 2014. 
343 Corporate governance evaluation is the evaluation for corporate governance structure and mechanism. See Li 
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evaluation as a standard to check the CG is that Chinese SOEs and the CG of SOEs are 
still at a in the process of transition. The form of CG of Chinese state-owned listed 
company had been established and prescribed in the laws and regulations. In the 
process of operation, the targets for every state-owned listed company in the 
development process are different. From the academic point of view, as stated in 
Chapter one, different scholars hold different opinions. In addition, industry association 
and industry autonomous institutions are lacking unified standards of governance.344 
Therefore, it is hard to compare different state-owned listed companies’ level, result, 
and efficiency; and how to improve CG is a puzzle. However, CG evaluation of a listed 
                                                                                                                                            
Weian. 2005. Corporate Governance Evaluation Index and Research, Beijing: Higher Education Press.  
344 China Association for Public Companies is based on the "securities law of the People's Republic of China" and 
"social organization registers regulation" and other relevant provisions, by the listed Companies and related 
institutions, etc., in the capital market as a link to a unified, standardized form, maintaining the legitimate rights and 
interests and forming a nationwide self-disciplined, non-profit social organization with the status of a legal person. 
The CSRC is the business supervisor departments for it. It was established in 2012. More information can see 
http://www.capco.org.cn/content/6.shtml (assessed 10 September 2015) The business scope:  
(1) widely contact listed company and its branch of industry, reflect the company group calls to government 
authorities, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the listed company, to create a good environment for the 
healthy development of listed companies. 
(2) with regulators, government agencies, local association of listed companies and investors, the media, such as 
establish communication mechanism, constructing of dialogue and exchange platform, open channel. 
(3) the enterprise using the successful experience of the development of capital market, the exchange of information 
disclosure, law-abiding good self-discipline, standardize the development of typical example, inductive extract 
establish good corporate governance, enhance the use of capital market development potential and the elements of 
law, builds the platform for communication between the listed company for discussion. 
(4) in view of the enterprise and the problems in the development of capital market, or commissioned by the 
government department, to carry out the investigation and study, actively participate in relevant policy 
argumentation and formulate, puts forward Suggestions for the relevant policies and legislation, to assist the 
implementation of relevant state policies and measures. 
(5) Advocate the healthy, active shareholder culture and the culture of integrity, emphasis on the rights of 
stakeholders and role, and promote to perfect the corporate governance system of listed companies and improve the 
level of governance. 
(6) in corporate social responsibility, integrity, and the relationship between investors and stakeholders, etc., 
organization of the listed company to formulate self-discipline or demonstration "guidance", "principles" and 
"convention" corporate citizen ethics, as well as the directors, supervisors and senior managers of professional ethics 
and the directors, supervisors and senior management personnel behavior guide, advocate and promote the company 
autonomy and self-discipline, build good corporate culture. 
(7) To the listed company chairman, general manager and chief financial officer training, strengthening the legal 
consciousness, responsibility consciousness and good faith consciousness, raise the level of business. 
(8) Organization to conduct international exchanges and cooperation, to promote mutual recognition of 
qualifications; For the member internationalization development and implementation of the strategy of "going out" 
service. 
(9) to organize the formulation of the advocacy of listed corporate governance standards, promote the establishment 
of scientific governance of listed companies and related evaluation system, promote the listed company governance 
structure and mechanism of perfecting. 
(10) Statistical information of listed companies, to provide basis for decision-making for the related departments. 
(11) to the China securities regulatory commission and other relevant government departments entrusted by the other 
work. 
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company can offer a unified standard. In this Chapter, the evaluation system of CG of 
listed company in different countries will be listed and compared. Through a 
comparison and analysis, the similarity and difference of the focus of different 
countries’ CG of listed company can be summarized.  Then by contrast with China’s 
CG evaluation system, Chinese characteristics of CG of listed company can be 
identified, and the problem of CG of Chinese listed company can be checked.  
 
In this Chapter, some data comes from China Listed Company Governance Index.345 
Through an analysis of this data, the CG structure of listed company and the risk 
sources of CG can be found, and the existing problems and measures for improvement 
can be further analysed. Moreover, the China Listed Company Governance Index 
includes the data of Chinese wholly state-owned listed companies and Chinese 
state-holding listed companies, and therefore it is relevant to the subject of this thesis.   
 
The study of corporate governance evaluation has developed research on the theoretical 
framework, on principles and their application, and on the evaluation system. The 
evaluation of corporate governance has developed from the evaluation of commercial 
organization to non-commercial organizations. Chinese and foreign scholars focus on 
corporate governance evaluation to meet the demand of the development of corporate 
                                                 
345 It is the first CG evaluation system of listed company in China. It was established and introduced by the 
Corporate Governance of Nankai University Research Center and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, financial institutions and listed companies’ management department. For 
more information see http://www.cg.org.cn/ (accessed 10 September 10, 2015). Thesample of Chinese listed 
corporate governance index data has been taken from two aspects: on the one hand, with the help of the CSRC and 
other departments concerned, in June 2002, the cororategovernance status of 1307 Chinese listed corporate was 
surveyed (the data had been upgraded every year, here we use the data 2002 because it the earliest data); on the other 
hand, the source is the annual report of listed companies. 
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governance practices, especially the demand of institutional investors.346 
 
Corporate governance evaluations sprang up in 1950, when Jackson proposed board 
performance analysis, which was followed by some commercial organizations that also 
launched corporate governance evaluation systems. 347  Firstly, the American 
Association of Institutional Investors in 1952 standardized corporate governance 
evaluation by introducing a formal evaluation procedure of the board of directors, 
followed by a series of diagnoses and evaluation of the corporate governance research, 
such as the diagnosis of the board of directors using the 22 questions asked by the 
Walter J. Salmon in 1993; in 1998, the S&P launched its management service system; 
CLSA introduced the corporate governance evaluation system in 2000;348 in 2003, the 
Nankai University Research Centre on Corporate Governance proposed the first 
corporate governance evaluation system in China for Chinese listed companies349. All 
the details about specific compositions can be seen the Table 4-1 the main CG 
evaluation system in Appendix.350  
 
The Institutional Shareholder Service in the United States has also established a global 
database system of corporate governance and offered corporate governance services to 
its members.351 Other corporate governance evaluation systems are providing similar 
                                                 
346 Li, Supra note 339. at 137. 
347 Ibid. And the main elements of Jackson’ work for CG evaluation system can be summarized into: Contribution 
to the society, service for shareholders, the board performance analysis and the company's financial policy. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. P. 136. 
350 Table 4-1, Table 4-2, and Table 4-3 are all conducted from the Corporate Governance of Nankai University 
Research Central, 2012 Chinese listed corporate governance evaluation report.  
351 Ibid. 
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services, such as Brunswick Warburg, ICLCG (Institute of Corporate Law and 
Corporate Governance), ICRA (Information and Credit Rating Agency), the corporate 
governance evaluation systems from the World Bank, the corporate governance 
evaluation systems from Thailand, South Korea, and the corporate governance 
evaluation systems from Japan (CGS, JCG Index). For more details, see Table 4-1. 
 
In general, the common characteristics of the evaluation system of corporate 
governance are: firstly, all the evaluation systems are composed of a series of detailed 
indicators, and each evaluation system includes three factors 352 , namely the 
shareholders' rights, the board structure, and information disclosure.353 Secondly, the 
methods of collecting information about evaluation systems are consistent, mainly 
from publicly available information, and other information through interviews with the 
company's key employees.354  
 
There are two main differences among various evaluation systems. On the one hand, 
some evaluation systems are used to evaluate a certain individual country’s corporate 
governance (such as DVFA, and Brunswick Warburg),355 and some other evaluation 
systems ae designed for corporate governance evaluations for a number of countries, 
such as S&P, Deminor, and CLSA.356 On the other hand, the main issues, and the 
standards and evaluation indices of the different evaluation systems are not the same. 
                                                 
352 See Table 4-1. Table 4-2 Table 4-3. 
353 Ibid P139. In general, the higher of marks for the evaluation , the better of the CG.  
354 Ibid.  
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid. 
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For example, the S&P which is based on some well-known principles of corporate 
governance, the guidelines or regulations, such as the OECD guideline of corporate 
governance and CalPERS, has gained international recognition as a high level of 
standard. The S&P system proposed that corporate governance should be divided into 
two parts, namely: national factors and company factors. 357  The national factors 
include legal basis, supervision, and information disclosure system and market 
infrastructure. The company factors comprise the ownership structure and its influence, 
stakeholders, financial transparency and disclosure, and the structure and operation of 
the board of directors.358  
 
As discussed above, different evaluation systems have different applicable conditions. 
Governance environment, governance structure and mechanisms of China's listed 
companies differ markedly from foreign companies. Modern corporate governance 
mechanisms are from Europe and the United States. And European and American 
countries can gradually establish and improve the modern corporate governance 
mechanism, not only because of the developed product market and capital market, and 
not only just because of perfect constitutional and judicial regulatory system, but also 
because of the beliefs which are rooted in the national culture, religion and social 
system. The core of corporate governance is the checks and balances of the contract on 
the basis of good faith, trust and mutual benefit. This spirit originated from western 
countries’ contract and the spirit of the rule of law, also came from the capital market’s 
                                                 
357 Ibid. 
358 See Table 4-1. 
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turbulent history, and then gradually formed sound management philosophy. If the 
foreign standards had been transplanted to China, the result is likely to have been a 
culture dislocation with standards unable to develop properly. The development of 
China's corporate governance was first advocated by the academic circles. It is totally 
different with the development of CG in European and American countries. The only 
way to improve the corporate governance of listed companies in China is to learn 
lessons from international experiences combined with the legal environment, political 
system, market conditions and the development of Chinese companies themselves, then 
trying to establish a corporate governance standard and system with Chinese 
characteristics. The task of China's corporate governance research is how to build its 
own corporate governance evaluation standards and system. Such a system and 
standards would, on the one hand, provide investors with investment information, and 
on the other hand help companies and investors to pay more attention to the problem of 
corporate governance structure, and to promote corporate governance quality and the 
value of the company.   
 
The corporate governance of listed companies in China includes internal governance 
and external governance. The internal governance is the core of corporate governance, 
and it is related to the joint governance of all internal stakeholders.359 The internal 
governance mechanisms of listed companies mainly include investment 
decision-making mechanism, risk control mechanism and management incentive 
                                                 
359 All the stakeholders include shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervision, and the managers.  
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mechanism. The external governance, such as market (product marketing, and so on), 
government (government regulation and judicial intervention), and news media, 
includes the legal mechanism, regulatory mechanism, marketing mechanism and social 
mechanism.360  
 
4.1 The Shareholder Meetings and the Rights of Shareholders 
 
The shareholders’ Meeting was defined as the ‘organ of power’ of a company in 
China.361 The Company Law defines the function and the position of the shareholders’ 
meeting and ‘the other governance organs in the company derive their powers from the 
general meeting’362 The powers that are conferred upon the shareholders’ meeting are 
divided into three groups by some scholars as follows: the first group involves the 
powers to make decisions on such important matters as the business policies and 
investment plans of the company, the increase or reduction of the registered capital, the 
amendment of the articles of association, the issuance of debentures, merger, division, 
liquidation and so on. The second group relates to the appointment, dismissal and 
remuneration of members of both the board of directors and the supervisory board. The 
last group of powers allows the general meeting to oversee the performance of the 
board of directors and the supervisory board, by examining and approving their 
                                                 
360 Li Weian. 2005. Corporate Governance Evaluation Index and Research, Beijing: Higher Education Press. Pp. 
39-42. 
361 1993 Company Law, Art 37,102; 2005 Company Law, Art 37,99.  
362 Xi Chao. 2009. Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China, London: Wildy, Simmonds& Hill Publishing, 
p.37 and see more details about the position of shareholders’ meeting of Chinese Company in Bian Yaowu & Li Fei, 
1994: 208. 
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reports.363 
 
The sheer complexity of China’s economy in the time of transition determines the 
complexity of the behaviour of shareholders of listed companies in China.364 In the 
analysis of the characteristics of the shareholder’s behaviour, the scope should include 
controlling shareholders of listed companies, the subsidiaries of listed companies, other 
affiliated companies, and the whole Group (analysis of the degree of control of 
controlling shareholders for the Group, which shows in some cases, that the behaviour 
of controlling shareholders for listed companies always oversteps the boundary as a 
legal person).  
 
From the perspective of protecting minority shareholders, there are three elements that 
manifest the behaviour of shareholders and the shareholders’ governance. The 
equitable treatment of shareholders is the main element. Under the majority principle, 
the controlling shareholders always control the general meeting of shareholders. The 
controlling of shareholders through some means to improve the cost of minority 
shareholders’ participation, means that the minority shareholders will reduce their 
participation in the general meeting of stockholders. Then the controlling shareholders 
can enhance their control, for example, by formulating the procedure of the general 
meeting of stockholders and improving the conditions for shareholders to participate 
                                                 
363 Ibid 37-38  the original provisions see 1993 Company Law, Art 38. 
364 Bai Haiquan, 2008. “Guoyou Konggu Shangshi Gongsi Touzi Xingwei Yingxiang Yinsu de Shizheng Fenxi”. 
West south Finance University.  
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in.365 The result is that the participation of minority shareholders has been restricted.366 
It is difficult to ensure all shareholders receive enough information of the company on 
time. Therefore, it is important how to test the relationship between controlling 
shareholders and general meeting of shareholders. 
Secondly, in the process of shareholding reform in China, the distorted concept and 
nature of property rights inevitable leads to confusion about the legal personality of the 
corporation and shareholders. A complete separation between the corporation and 
shareholder is the premise for corporations to qualify as independent legal persons, and 
it is also the foundation of the shareholders’ limited liability principle. The separation is 
not only reflected in the separation of the property of corporation and shareholders, but 
also showed in the way in which the shareholders are kept away from the corporation’s 
operation and management. The modern corporation is characterized by the separation 
of the property rights of shareholders and the management of the corporation. But in 
practice, the confusion of the property of company and shareholders is serious in 
China.367 Although the company is the independent legal personality in the law, the 
company’s personality is symbolic, and it is actually the shareholders who control the 
company.368  
                                                 
365 Chen Xi, 2011. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhong de Xiao Gudong Liyi Baohu Yanjiu”, Shanghai Academy 
of Social Sciences, 2011.  
366 Ibid. And the same argument can see Ren Jingping, 2002. “Shangshi Gongsi Xiaogudong Quanyi Baohu Jizhi 
Yanjiu”, Shanghai Maritime University.  
367 Wang Lei, 2012. “Kongzhiquan Xingshi de Falv Yueshu Jizhi Yanjiu”, Northeast University of Finance.  
368 Qi Jiali, 2006. “Guanyu Guoyou Dagudong Zhanyou Shangshi Gongsi Zijin de Fenxi”, The Science Education 
Article Collects. 07 2006. According to Qi, The problem of major shareholders of state-owned listed company of 
huge funds of listed companies is peculiar to the Chinese securities market phenomenon. This situation is quite 
striking; and it seriously weakens the independence of listed companies and asset quality. This kind of phenomenon 
is a type of major shareholders abuse of controlling power. Since 2006, under Chinese Company Law, the behaviour 
of major shareholders has been regulated more seriously than before, but due to the imperfection of legislation and 
unsound responsibility system, the major shareholders of listed companies abuse of controlling power is still 
outstanding. For more discussion about the major shareholders of listed companies abuse control power can see 
Zhang Ludong, 2012. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Kongzhi Gudong Lanyong Kongzhiquan de Falv Guizhi Yanjiu”, 
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According to a report,369 the main problems appear to be in that the operation of 
business or residence of shareholders should be completely consistent; the company’s 
book of accounts s not unified with shareholders’ book of account; the company’s 
ownership or company’s other property is mixed with shareholders’ capital, such as if 
the company’s property is illegally transferred or easily stolen by shareholders.370 
From a business point of view, the main problem is that the shareholders and company 
are performing the same business activities, and the company’s business is in the name 
of the shareholders, so the dealing party cannot distinguish whether they are dealing 
with the company itself or with the shareholders.371 As the confusions about property 
between company and shareholders and the confusion about business activities  occur, 
the conditions are created for controlling shareholders to abuse the listed company’s 
resources, damaging the interest of minority shareholders and other stakeholders.372  
 
The Personality Confusion Phenomena mainly include the following elements: 
 The personality confusion between the parent and subsidiary. Article 77of the 
Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability Companies prescribed that ‘when a 
company’s investment reaches holding of shares for another company (enterprise) 
which has been invested (hereafter refers to the latter one), the former shall be the 
parent company, and the latter shall be the subsidiary company (enterprises) of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Fudan University. 2012. 
369 
Ye, Y. 2011:80. 
370 Ibid.  
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid. 
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former and still have the independent legal person qualification.’373  Because the 
parent has  control over the subsidiary entities, although the subsidiary is an 
independent legal entity, it does not have its own independent property, so it is 
difficult to guarantee the independence of its own will.374 To maintain the fairness 
principle, according to the Article 14 of the 2005 Company Law, corporate 
personality of subsidiary, the parent company may set up a subsidiary company, 
and the subsidiary company has its own personality, and can independently take 
civil liabilities according to law.375  
 
 The personality confusion caused by enterprises of mutual investment, namely, 
cross-shareholding. 376  Cross-shareholdings can realize coordinated strategic 
objectives between enterprises, and defend against hostile takeover. 377  But, 
                                                 
373 
1992 the Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability Companies, Article 77. 
374 Yang Yuqing, 2007. “Mu Gongsi Zhong de Renge Fouren”, Southwest University of Political Science and Law. 
According to Yang, the corporate personality is not only abused by the natural person shareholders, in the modern 
society, it is more often abused by institutional shareholders (namely the parent company). Because with severe 
economic and social changes, parent-subsidiary relationship as an effective mean can achieve business control and 
form the enterprise group management, and has become an important part of management strategy for large 
enterprises. Parent-subsidiary are respectively an independent legal person, manage with individual effort, and be 
responsible for their own profit and loss; but the parent company is controlling shareholders for the subsidiary 
company. Especially in a wholly owned subsidiary, the parent company as the sole shareholder is firmly in control of 
the subsidiary. The feature of parent-subsidiary determines the parent company can easily abuse corporate 
personality of the subsidiary company, and engage in the operation of the high risk but with limited liability principle 
to escape legal liability, so as to harm the interests of the subsidiary company’s creditors. The parent company enjoys 
the greatest benefit with the smallest risk, and ultimately hurts the interests of creditors and social public interests. It 
violates the law principle of fairness and justice, and deviates from the purpose of designers of the company legal 
person system and the limited liability system. 
375 See the Article 14 of the 2005 Chinese Company Law. And see the Article 20, which is the first time to define the 
disregard of corporation personality in Chinese Company Law, it is helpful to regulate the major shareholders’ abuse 
of the corporation personality, although this Article is not specific enough.  
376 Taking a stake in each other’s companies, is in fact cross shareholding. 1998, since Guangfa Securities Company 
limited and the Liaoning Cheng Da securities company limited holding each other; the cross-shareholding 
phenomenon is increasingly appearing among the listed companies in China. In August 2003, Cheng Siwei, 
vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress put forward that the problem of SOEs’ 
sole majority shareholder can be addressed by taking a stake in each other between Chinese listed companies. For 
More discussion  see Wang Yanling, 2007. “Gongsi Jian Jiaocha Chigu Xiangguan Wenti Tanjiu”, Economic 
Tribiune, (3) 2007. 
377 Du Jingliang, 2011. “Lun Gongsi de Jiaocha Chigu Ji Falv Guizhi,” CUPL (China University of Political Science 
and Law). According to Du, the advantages of cross shareholding can be summarized into achieving the strategic 
alliance between the enterprises, to prevent a hostile takeover.Cross-shareholdings can save business capital 
spending and also provides  very convenient conditions for enterprises to raise funds, and cross-holdings is a good 
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cross-shareholding brings some problems such as inflated capital, sudden and 
sharp price rises in the securities market, serious internal control problems,378 and 
illegal profits.379 In China, the legal system, laws and regulations are lacking 
specific provisions for cross-shareholding, which led to the defects caused by the 
cross-shareholdings in Chinese capital market which cannot be corrected. 380 
Therefore, in the Chinese capital market is not possible to maintain normal order 
nor to protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors effectively.  
 
Before the current Company Law was promulgated, some Chinese normative 
documents involved rules of cross-shareholdings. In February 1992, the Provisional 
Regulations of Shenzhen Municipality Concerning Joint Stock Limited Companies 
stated that where a company had more than 10 percent of the shares of another 
enterprise, the latter cannot buy a stake in the former; where a company had more than 
50 percent of the shares of another enterprise, it became the former’s parent company, 
and the latter a subsidiary who could not buy a stake in the former; where an enterprises 
obtained a more than 10 percent of shares of the total shares, the former must inform the 
                                                                                                                                            
means to achieve industry layout. 
378 Ibid. According to Du, in recent years, the cases in China's capital market caused by the cross shareholding 
appeared frequently, therefore, the company cross-ownership as a law system issue has become hot topic for 
academia and investors. (The cases include Delong Case, Zhong Guang Case, Yong Jing Case and Tianbao Case, the 
case about De Long can see Miu Pengchong, 2007. “Jiyu De Long Xi de Binggou Rongzi Wenti Yanjiu”, 
http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/Thesis/Y1343309 (assessed on 13 September 2015)) The significantly negative effects 
of cross-shareholdings are: fourfold.The first problem is inflated  company capital;the second one is disruption of 
the capital market trading system, inducing insider trading and related party transactions; the third problem is that a 
mutual shareholding company easily be formed between the internal control and cause the absence of supervision 
mechanism; the fourth problem is that  shareholders are built on stilts, even causing the company's governance 
structure to be can notunable to play the role  investors expect, and in extreme cases will promote the economic 
bubble.  
379 Ibid.  
380 Yang Zhenyu, 2013. “Lun Jiaocha Chigu de Falv Guize”, East China University of Political Science and Law, 
2013. According to Yang, There is no clear rule in Chinese Company Law for cross shareholding; it will affect 
effective utilization of the cross shareholding system. 
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latter within ten days.381 In addition, Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability 
Companies promulgated by the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic 
System (SCRES) on May 15, 1992, stated that ‘where a company had another 
enterprise’s more than 10 percent of the shares, the latter could not buy a stake in the 
former’. 382  Furthermore, in 1992, Provisions on Hainan Special Economic Zone 
Concerning Joint Stock Limited Companies provided that where A company had more 
than 10 percent of the shares in another enterprise ( B ), A company must notify B. If  
A did not notify B, its excess shares in B Company would have their voting rights 
suspended ; companies holding more than 10 percent, in each other the company which 
notified the other party later, as did not notify. The excess shares in another company 
must have their voting rights suspended, and must be dealt with in six months.383  
 
But after Company Law was promulgated in 1993, the administrative rules and local 
rules lost efficacy. In the Company Law, relevant provisions just regulated for the  
company’s total investment.384 Although the relevant provisions in the Company Law 
were not specific, the Company Law played an indirect limitation regarding cross 
shareholdings. However, the provision on cross-shareholdings which had been 
removed in 2005 Company Law led to the current blank state for cross-shareholding. 
For the same topic, the CSRC formulated the Provisions for Trial Implementation on 
Establishing Subsidiary Companies in 2008 which touched upon this issue. Article 10 
                                                 
381 See the Article 30 and 31, 1992, the Provisional Regulations of Shenzhen Municipality Concerning Joint Stock 
Limited Companies. 
382 See 1992，Opinions on Standards for Limited Liability Companies promulgated by the State Commission for 
Restructuring the Economic System (SCRES). 
383 See Article 40, 1992 Provisions on Hainan Special Economic Zone Concerning Joint Stock Limited Companies. 
384 See the Article 80.  
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stated that a subsidiary company may not directly or indirectly hold the equity or stock 
of its controlling shareholders or other subsidiary company under the control of the 
same securities company, or invest in its controlling shareholder or other subsidiary 
company under the control of the same securities company in other forms.’385 The 
limitations imposed by the above provisions of CSRC just focused on securities 
companies, not involving other investment companies and listed companies.  
 
 The personality confusion between sister companies. When one contributes to a 
number of companies, each company is independent ostensibly, but in fact, they are 
a whole in different aspects, such as property, interest, and distribution. In this kind 
of company, the directors and supervision are the same and each company’s 
decision-making powers are held by investors - sometimes the investor is one 
person.  
 
Finally，a sound and complete system protects the interests of minority shareholders. 
It is a common method to protect the minority shareholders by means of strengthening 
minority shareholders’ influence on the general meeting of shareholders and the 
meeting’s proposal, and limiting the rights of the controlling shareholders. In 2002, the 
Guidelines for Corporate Governance of Listed Companies made several rectifications 
in the principles, and it was a good supplement to the Company Law.386 Therefore, in 
                                                 
385 see 2008, the Provisions for Trial Implementation on Establishing Subsidiary Companies formulated by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
386 See 2002, Chinese Listing Corporation Governance Guidelines made several rectifications in the principles. And 
after the Company Law of the People's Republic of China had been in effect for two months, the CSRC issued the 
Guidelines for Listing the Company's Articles of Association.In 1997 the old Guidelines underwent a substantial 
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China, the standard to measure whether a listed company can effectively restrict the 
controlling shareholders’ behaviour is whether the system is perfect and whether the 
system can be implemented effectively.   
 
Through analysing the behaviour of shareholders and the shareholders governance 
above, we could identify three standards to measure the shareholders’ governance for 
Chinese listed companies. First of all, concerning the independence of Chinese listed 
companies, due to the promulgation of the laws and regulations, the strengthening of 
the supervision, the improvement of independent governance of Chinese listed 
companies, and the independence of listed companies has been developed; for example, 
employee, business, financial, assets and institutions had reached the basic standards of 
independence of listed company.  But the most aspects of independence just stay on 
the superficial level; for example, the independence of shareholders should be 
strengthened. There are three aspects that can be addressed and improved in future. The 
first point is that in a company, whether the directors of listed companies are the 
controlling shareholders. The second point is whether the main business of listed 
company and the main business of controlling shareholders’ company are the same or 
parts of the same. The third point is the longer the controlling chain, the more difficult it 
becomes for the ultimate controllers to manage risks, especially financial risks.387 The 
                                                                                                                                            
revision=, andagain in 2006 released and implemented on March 16,. 
387 In China, many listed companies are products of the SOEs reform.The ultimate controller of this part of listed 
companies is still governments in different levels and the SASAC. They are affected by government intervention 
more than non-state-owned holding companies, enjoy some industrial policy support, and take some multiple targets 
at the same time. All the advantages and disadvantages will also finally affect the enterprise financial risk. See Gu 
Jiyu, 2012. “Xinxi Pilu Zhiliang, Zhongji Kongzhiren yu Qiye Caiwu Fengxian de Shizheng Yanjiu”, Xinjiang 
University of Finance and Economics. And for the same opinion see Tang Nan, 2012. “Minying Shangshi Gongsi 
Zhongji Kongzhiren dui Caiwu Fengxian de Yingxiang Yanjiu”, Northeast Agricultural University.  
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interest of minority shareholders is reduced by a pyramid-style ownership structure.388 
Then last but not the least, the supervision department should observe whether the 
controlling shareholder makes the company to overall listing. Because compared with 
split listing, overall listing is more able to avoid horizontal competition, congener 
competition or inter-industry competition, and it also helps the supervision department 
to straighten out relationship between upstream and downstream industries of listed 
companies. Furthermore, it tends to reduce the connected transaction.389  
 
Furthermore, protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders is another 
standard by which to measure the shareholders’ governance of listed companies.390 
Minority shareholders don't like majority shareholder holding a dominant position in 
the listed company. Their interests often exposed under the power of majority 
shareholders, may suffer seriously harm by the majority shareholder making decisions 
from its own economic interests and other unfair trading. With the continuous 
development of modern social economy, the social legal system is constantly 
improving to protect the interests of vulnerable groups. The minority in a company is 
attracting more and more attention from society. It is necessary to take various 
measures to protect and remedy the legal rights and interests of minority shareholders 
                                                 
388 Xu Xiangyi, and Xu Ning, 2010. “Jin Zita Jiegou Xia Guquan Jili de Shuangchong Xiaoying Yanjiu—Laizi 
Woguo Shangshi Gongsi de Jingyan Zhengju”, Economic Management. 09 2010 and see Dubian Zhenlizi, 2011. 
“Guoyou Konggu Shangshi Gongse de Kongzhiquan, Jinzita Jiegou he Qinzhan Xingwei—Laizi Zhonguo Guquan 
Fenzhi Gaige de Zhengju”, Journal of Financial Research. 06 2011. 
389 Overall listing can effectively improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources, promote the agglomeration of 
market capital, promote the further expansion of the enterprise, enhance the competitive power of enterprise, and it is 
conducive to the healthy and long-term development of industries in China. Spin-off listing for the listed company, 
can help the company continuously optimize asset quality, develop the advantage internal projects, and looking for 
more development space for the company. See Li Ganlin, 2014. “Yangqi Zhengti Shangshi he Fenchai Shangshi 
Bijiao Fenxi”, Manager Journal. 01 2014. 
390 Du Xiaodong, 2012. “Tansuo Guoyou Konggu Gudong dui Shangshi Gongsi de Guanli Jizhi”, Modern SOEs 
Research. 10 2012. pp 52-59. 
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and to restrain majority shareholders’ various irregularities, and to make the rights and 
interests of minority shareholders become more fully guaranteed.391 This part will 
focus on the situation of the implementation of the principle, legal regulations, and laws 
on protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders of listed company: for 
example, whether to establish detailed rules for implementation according to the 
relevant laws and regulations, and whether to protect the rights of minority 
shareholders through practical action. 392  Firstly, we should measure whether the 
minority shareholders’ advice will show up in the decision-making of a listed company 
and the specific measures includes the listed company that establishes the system of 
cumulative voting, and adopts online vote in the general meeting of shareholders in the 
listed company. Moreover, we need to measure the enthusiasm of shareholders to 
participate in the general meeting of shareholders through analysing the participation of 
the shareholders.393 In addition, the supervision organization examines whether the 
listed company abuses rights and rules to raise money, and observes whether a listed 
company makes changes to raise funds, whether the change procedure is approved by 
the shareholders meeting, and whether to show the reasons. Finally, the listed company 
in return for shareholders is another standard; such as cash dividend payments scale 
and continuity.394  
                                                 
391 The same issue has been discussed by Chinese scholars:  Wang Changrui, Tanxin, 2013. “Zhongxiao Gudong 
Gongsi Zhili Canyudu Jiqi Quanyi Baohu Jizhi Yanjiu”, The Chinese Certified Public Accountant. 11 2013.pp. 53-56.  
Li Yong, 2014. “ST Changyou Jiang Chengwei Yangqi Tuishi Diyigu Zhong Xiaogudong Weiquan Zhize qi Eyi”, 
China Economic Weekly. 14 2014. pp. 63-64 and Zou Xiyu, 2013. “Yangqi Shehui Zeren yu Zhongxiao Gudong 
Liyi”, Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. 06 2013. pp. 75-80. 
392  Xue Hui, 2011. “Lun Xiaogudong Quanyi de Falv Baohu”, Guofang Zhinan. (10) 2011 and Liu Zheng, 
“Zhongxiao Gudong Quanyi Baohu de Xiangguan Falv Wenti Yanjiu”,Industrial & Science Tribune.  08 2007. Pp’ 
67-69. 
393 Liu Qian, 2013. “Qiantan Gaizhi Qiye Xiaogudong Quanyi Baohu”, Chi Zi.  21 2013. P. 283. 
394 Chen Xi, 2011. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhong de Xiaogudong Quanyi Baohu”, Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences. 05 2011. Pp. 1-58. 
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The final standard for measuring the shareholders governance of listed company is the 
connected transaction.395 The connected transaction could be reflected through three 
indicators, namely, whether controlling shareholders use the funds of a listed company 
for free, whether the listed company provides loan guarantees for controlling 
shareholders and other related parties, and whether the listed company and controlling 
shareholders, through the connected transaction, get profits and benefits.  
 
4.2 The Board of Directors 
 
The board of directors is the core of corporate governance. As a link between 
shareholders and managers, the board of directors is the agent for shareholders, and is 
the client and supervisor for managers as well. The board of directors plays an 
important role for company’s strategic development and major decisions. Therefore, on 
the one hand, with the aim developing the company, from the point of the investors’ 
view, the board of directors should lead the company to create more profit for investors; 
on the other hand, the directors have to focus on the interests and demand of consumers, 
so as to gain their support and trust. Under the dual principal-agent relationship, the 
questions are whether the board of directors can inhibit the opportunistic behaviour of 
the managers for the interests of shareholders, and whether the board of directors can 
avoid the controlling shareholders grabbing the interest for free, and whether the 
                                                 
395  Liu Chunmei, 2011. “Qianxi Shangshi Gongsi Konggu Gudong Guanlian Jiaoyi de Guizhi”, East China 
University of Political Science and Law.  11 2011. 
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directors can realize the maximization of shareholders’ wealth.  All these questions 
depend on making some basic problems clear, such as the functions of the board of 
directors and distribution of the power.  The construction of the board of directors is 
the key for improvement of corporate governance, but if a company only has a better 
board of directors’ governance structure, it cannot make the company’s operation 
efficient. 396  Scientific and reasonable decision-making is the target for good 
governance of the board of directors, because it will guarantee investment and 
financing decisions, the production and business operation decisions, and the 
company’s financial quality. As a core of corporate governance, the main duty of the 
board of directors is to guard against all possible kinds of risky governance. A better 
method is that the board of directors should establish a risk control structure and 
mechanism, and identify, control and prevent the accumulation of risks and their 
outbreak. 397 
 
There are two different approaches to the duties of the board of directors worldwide. 
The duties of the board of directors were not defined by laws in most European 
countries. The maximization of shareholders’ profit was not the only target for the 
board of directors in those countries. In contrast, in the UK, Switzerland and Belgium, 
shareholders’ profit is the priory for the board of directors of companies. .398  
 
                                                 
396 Because the board of directors’ governance structure is an aspect of corporate governance for SOEs, efficiently 
company operation needs a sound CG, not just a perfect aspect.  
397 
Li, Supra note 339, at146. 
398 Li-jiuan Chen, 2007. “The Study of the German Corporate Governance Code”, Tunghai University Law Review. 
No. 26. (2007/06/01) p 45-84. 
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The history of the legal framework of the board of directors of Chinese companies can 
be traced back to 1993. In 1993 Company Law, the power of board of directors and the 
election procedures of the board of directors were prescribed in Articles 112 and 113. 
According to the nature and managerial functions of board of directors, the categories 
fall into four groups: ‘the first category relates to the implementation of the general 
meeting’s resolutions. The second concerns the formulation of plans for the general 
meeting to deliberate and approve. The third includes decision-making powers in 
relation to business and investment plans and to the establishment of the company’s 
internal management organs and system. The last category of powers entitles the board 
of directors to appoint, dismiss and remunerate managers.’399 In the process of the 
development of corporate governance of listed company and at a practical level, the 
functions of directors acquired an undeserved reputation. For example, in many cases, 
the right to make salary related decisions, the right to nominate, and the right to object a 
motion for the Board of directors had been gradually weakened.400  In addressing the 
question of how to improve the governance’s quality of the board of directors, there are 
five aspects that can be summarized as follows: 
 
First of all, the status of the rights and obligations of directors is the important standard 
                                                 
399 see 1993 Chinese Company Law, Arts 112 and 113. 
400 Guo Tao, 2010. “Guoyou QIye Dongshihui Yanjiu”, Business China, 04 2012. P. 129 According to Guo, in the 
State-owned listed company, the employment of the members of the board of directors and general manager are 
designated by the competent department of the government. If the the general manager is not appointed by the board 
it distorts the employment relationship between the board and general manager. The general manager will no longer 
be responsible to board but directly responsible to the government departments, over the head of the rights of board 
of directors and the board of shareholders. On behalf of the government agencies of the state's shares, on the other 
hand, because the agent, the power and responsibility, information asymmetry, they and the manager can conspire or 
be bribed more easily, it decided they couldn't try their best to supervise the board of directors. Therefore, the 
functions weaken as a trustee of the board of directors’ pressure decreases, and the sense of responsibility is not 
strong. 
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that can show the quality of the board of director governance. On the one hand, the 
relationship between the directors and company means that the legal status of the board 
of director is determined by the rights, obligations and liabilities of directors.401 The 
law must balance the rights and obligations of the directors, and reasonably transfer and 
assign the risks as well.402 On the other hand, a better understanding of the status of the 
rights and obligations of the directors can help improve the quality of board of director 
governance. Such understanding would focus on the sources, training, and performance 
of their duties in good faith and diligently including: 1) the total number of per year for 
training, the rules of investigating the director’s responsibility, D&O liability insurance, 
the age composition of directors; 2) the proportion of directors of A serving on the 
shareholder for another company B (the company B belongs to the shareholders of A 
company); 3) official performance of listed company and positions of directors outside 
of the listed company.  
 
Secondly, an efficient board of directors directly determines a degree of completion of 
the duties for directors as well as the degree of realization of corporate targets. A good 
and efficient board of directors will take the responsibility better, establish more 
scientific development planning, and even supervise the managers more effective, so as 
to increase the company’s continuing value. There are six points that can  determine 
                                                 
401 Chen Xiangyi, 2005. “Dongshi Quanli Xianzhi Zhidu Yanjiu—Yi Gongsi Zhili Wei Shijiao”, Xiamen University 
Institutional Repository. According to Chen, “The expansion of the authority inevitably leads to the abuse of the 
authority. While strengthening director’s authority, the corporation legislation sets up the regulation of restricting of 
director’s authority. However, the regulation of restricting of director’s authority in China is weak, and 
corresponding legislation is far from enough. In order to consummate the corporation governance and enhance the 
compatibility of corporation, it is necessary to improve the legal system of restricting director’s authority in our law.”  
402 Ibid. 
 152 
the efficiency of directors, namely: composition and size of the board of directors; 
whether the chairman and manager are separate; the overlap positions between 
directors and executive;403  gender composition of the members of the board; the 
procedures for board of directors meeting; and the status of board of directors meeting. 
 
Thirdly, the board of directors’ structure defines the means of board internal division of 
labour and cooperation. There are a number of elements that could affect the operation 
of the directors, such as the establishment of the professional committees of the board 
and the part-time situation of directors. So, how is it possible to determine whether a 
board of directors for Chinese listed companies is good? The following factors need to 
be considered: the establishment status of the strategy committee, audit committee, 
remuneration and appraisal committee, the nomination committee, and other 
professional committees.404  
 
Fourthly, the directors of listed company take the responsibility for formulating the 
company strategy and supervising the managers at the same time; they need to fulfil the 
diligence and honesty obligations. As such, as an important factor for a listed company, 
the enthusiasm of the directors cannot be ignored. Appropriate compensation is one of 
the incentives which includes both the short-term incentive and long-term incentive. 
Specific factors of short-term incentive and long-term incentive need to be considered 
                                                 
403 The executives are from the members of the board, and the chairman of the board majority is the general manager 
or the CEO concurrently. As the board of directors and senior managers overlap, it is easy to form insider control 
phenomenon. 
404 See Article 52, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China issued by CSRC and State 
Economic and Trade Commission on January 7, 2002. 
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for appropriate compensation: paid status of directors in the listed company, cash 
compensation, directors’ shareholdings and equity incentive.  
 
Finally, the independent director system is introduced in the board of directors of the 
listed company. There is no interest relationship between the listed company and the 
independent directors. Therefore, to some extent, the independent directors can give 
their advice and opinions with a more objective view, so as to protect the interests of 
investors. In China, most listed companies have to face up to an industry dilemma: the 
state-owned shares of listed company account for more than half.405 Therefore, in 
China, the independent director system is so important because it can ensure the 
independence of the board of directors and the scientific nature of decision. The main 
aspects should be noted as follows: the proportion of independent directors; the 
professional background of independent directors the working situation of independent 
directors in other companies or work places – part time or full time; the participation 
status in company meetings, and the allowance for independent director. 
 
4.3 The Supervisory Board  
 
The supervisory board is a key for improving the quality of corporate governance and 
reduces the governance risk of a listed company. Although in different countries the 
                                                 
405 Hu Shijun, Tang Liang, 2004. “Gufen Huigou Lilun zai Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Guoyougu Jianchi Zhong de 
Zuoyong”, Contemporary Economics, 02 2004 pp. 58-59.The same issue had been discussed by Xu Limin in 2000,  
see Xu Limin, 2000. “Shangshi Gongsi Jingxing Guoyougu Jianchi de Fangan Tantao”, State Assets Management. 
12 2000. 
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name of the supervisory board is not unified, some are named “supervisors” while some 
called Jian Cha Yiかんさやく406, but the nature and the function are the same. In 
Chinese Company Law, the board of supervisors shall be composed of at least three 
people.407 The board of supervisors has a range of powers to monitor the board of 
directors, which can be summarized as follows:408  
“1. Check the financial affairs of the company, 
2. Supervise the duty-related actions and put forward proposals on the removal of any 
directors and senior managers who violate any law,  
3. Order any director or senior managers to make corrections if his act has injured the 
interests of the company, 
4. Propose the convening of an extraordinary meeting and put forward proposals to the 
shareholders’ meeting.” 
 
The board of supervisors is a main component of the internal corporate governance for 
listed company.  Setting up a reasonable and effective board of supervisors could 
control or prevent directors and managers from doing something arbitrary, and protect 
the rights and interests of the investment from shareholders and corporate creditors. 
However, in the current situation in China, the functions and effectiveness of the board 
of supervisors of listed company cannot be guaranteed. The supervisor cannot play a 
main role in a company, because supervisors are not independent.409 Therefore, it is 
                                                 
406 Li, Supra note 339, at 148. 
407 See Article 51, The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China revised in 2005.  
408 Ibid. See Article 53, 54, 55, 56. 
409  Li Weian, Hao Chen, 2006. “An Empirical Research of Supervisory Board Governance in China Listed 
Companies.” Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economic, 8 (3) 2006. According to Li and Hao, from 
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necessary to analyse the governance of the board of supervisors.  
 
The problem for the governance of the board of supervisors is a worldwide problem, 
not just one for China.410 There are some complicated reasons, but before analysing 
these reasons, the supervisory structure should be first introduced. The patterns of 
supervisory structure are divided into two kinds of patterns in general, namely the 
one-tier board model and the two-tier board model.411 The difference between them is 
that in the one-tier model company the managing function and the supervisory function 
are in one single body - the board of director; but the two-tier model exercises the 
functions in two different bodies - the board of directors and the supervisory board. For 
the two-tier model, the lower tier seems to make an executive strategy, takes the 
‘management’ responsibility, while the upper tier plays a role with a supervisory 
function and monitors the management board. The UK and US, Ireland and some 
southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece use the one-tier board 
model.412 Germany, Switzerland, Austria and some Scandinavian countries choose the 
                                                                                                                                            
the running status of the board of supervisors, the structure and size of the board of supervisors and supervisors’ 
competencies, these three aspects illustrate and evaluate the status of Chinese listed company governance of the 
board of supervisors. The evaluation result showed that the board of supervisors of listed companies in China is ata 
low level, and the board of supervisors is unpractical. The reason is not the board of supervisor’s governance system 
itself, but because there are many deficiencies in the running process, such as structure and size of the board of 
supervisors it should be further optimized, and the supervisors of low competence need to be improved.  
410 Guo Xiangdong, 2001. “Dui Wanshan he Chuangxin Gongsi Zhili Jiegou de Jidian Sikao”, The Planning and 
Market. 01 2001.p 30 Since the 1990 s，corporate governance has attracted worldwide attention and caused the 
globalization of corporate governance reform. Corporate governance has become a key factor of the modern 
company to improve its core competitiveness. Corporate governance structure includes internal governance and 
external governance, the internal governance including the board of directors and board of supervisors, management 
remuneration and majority shareholder control. The board of supervisors, as the main part of the internal governance, 
is important to construction of corporate governance structure, especially for the improvement of the regulatory 
functions. Therefore, the board of supervisors has also been discussed widely. The same opinion can be seen in Sun 
Xiaohui, 2010. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Jianshihui yu Dongshihui Jianguan Zhineng Hubuxing Tantao”, 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.  
411 Xi, Supra note 371, at 39. 
412 Ibid. 
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two-tier board model.413 There are some countries where these two kinds of model are 
mixed together in the practice, such as Belgium, France and Italy.414 China follows 
German model establishing a legal framework of two-tier system - the board of 
directors and the supervisory board. 
 
Following the discussion above, the first reason can be summarized clearly: the one-tier 
board model of corporate governance, represented by UK and US, has mainstream 
status for international level.415 Missing out the board of supervisors does not mean 
missing a supervision mechanism, because the implementation of main monitoring for 
the board of directors in their countries can be done through relevant committees of the 
board of directors, external independent directors and external market. Because the 
number of national public ownership companies in UK and US is large, equity highly 
fragmented, the large shareholders made the price of the agent too high, so it is 
impossible for the individual shareholder to supervise or jointly supervise the 
company.416 In addition, because of the free-rider problem, individual shareholder 
supervisors lose motivation and commitment. Furthermore, the national agent markets 
of the UK and the US are developed; there are enough conditions and chances to 
support strong external supervision for the operator.  
 
The second reason is the reality of listed companies in China. From the perspective of 
                                                 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Wan Wei, 2008. “Gongsi Zhili Shijiao Xia Shangshi Gongsi Jianshihui Zhidu Yanjiu”, Communication of 
Finance and Accounting (Academy Version), 02 2008. pp 13-15. 
416 Sun Manli, Wang Zhujun, and Jiang Yanxia, 2012. “Daili Wenti, Gongsi Zhili Moshi yu Yeji Zilixing Guiyin 
Qingxiang—Jiyu Mei Zhong Ri Sanguo de Shuju Bijiao”, Accounting Research. (1) 2012. 
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corporate governance structure, China’s corporate governance mode is more close to 
the continental system - the two-tier board model – of Germany and Japan. Compared 
with America, these two countries’ securities markets are undeveloped, and the basic 
characteristic of their corporate governance is that the manager occupies dominant 
position in the listed company. Therefore, the board of supervisions in these two 
countries is the requisite for their countries’ development. However, the boards of 
supervisors in Germany and Japan are different. According to German Law, the 
company must have a system of two-tier structure of the board of directors: 
management committee and the board of supervisors.417 The former is responsible for 
the daily affairs of the company, and is composed of the managers with a title. who are 
working in the company The latter as the main body for company, controls the 
company, and is responsible for the appointment of the management committee 
members, approving major decisions and supervising their behaviour, but not to 
perform the specific management functions. The supervisors’ system in Japan is 
different from the countries with one-tier board model - the US and the UK - but 
Germany’s two-tier board model is not the same as Japan’s.  In Japan, the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors are at equal level in a company, both of them are 
elected by the shareholder meeting, and the board of supervisors supervises the board 
of directors. As stated in Chinese Company Law, the functions and power of the board 
of supervisors in Chinese listed company418 are different from other countries which 
discussed above; therefore, it is hard to collect relevant experience from the countries 
                                                 
417 Li, Supra note 339, at 149. 
418 The functions and power of the board of supervisors of Chinese listed company can see the Article 117, 118, and 
199 of the Company Law.  
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with the two-tier board model.  
 
Latterly, the evaluation system and standards for the board of supervisors has not 
received enough attention in China. Some well-known securities companies did not pay 
more attention to the board of supervisors, but just focused on other factors, such as the 
evaluation systems of shareholders, directors, and information disclosure. 419  The 
researches of these well-known securities companies hardly involved the evaluation 
system and standards for the board of supervisors.420 The lack of evaluation for the 
board of supervisors means the corporate governance cannot be examined exactly, and 
it is important to improve for the board of supervisors.421 Because of the special 
position of the board of supervisors in Chinese listed companies, the conditions of 
                                                 
419 Some “famous securities companies” refer to Haitong Securities Company Limited. and other famous securities 
companies in the history of development of securities companies and listed companies, for example, Dapeng 
Securities Company. Both are key Securities Companies in China, therefore the data and conclusions from them has 
attracted more attention. Because Dapeng Securities was bankrupt in 2005, here we just introduce Haitong Securities 
Company. Haitong securities co., LTD. (hereinafter referred to as the "company") whose predecessor is the Shanghai 
haitong securities company, was founded in 1988 and is the earliest generation securities company in China.  In 
1994, it restructured into limited liability Company, and developed into the national securities firm. At the end of 
2001, company's overall restructuring for co. LTD. In 2002, approved by the China securities regulatory commission 
(CSRC), the company registered capital of 8.734 billion yuan, to become the domestic securities industry in the 
capital's largest integrated securities company. In May 2005, approved by the China securities industry association 
review, Haitong securities became an innovative pilot brokerage, and corporate development entered the new period, 
but the business continued to maintain the market. In 2006, as the reform of non-tradable shares and brokers 
comprehensive control, capital markets are the real point. During the year, the company seized the opportunity, 
deepen the reform, speed up the development of the company in business, management, wind systems and process 
control, construction on a new step, initiated the process of listing the substantial progress that has been achieved. On 
July 31, 2007, the company successfully listed. In October 2007, the China securities regulatory commission 
approved the company non-public offerings are not more than 1 billion shares, and has set up a complete 
introduction of the CITIC group, peace, Pacific and other strategic investors, optimize the structure of the 
shareholders of a company, the company capital of 8.22782 billion yuan. In domestic securities industry it is one of 
the capital's largest integrated securities company. At the end of 2009 the company's total assets of 2009 (?) yuan, net 
assets of 43.4 billion yuan, net capital of 34.4 billion yuan. For the first time in 2009, the company borrows the 
professional organization; formulate the development strategy of company in the next five years. 
420 Wang Shoujun, 2013, “Zhongyang Qiye Gongsi Zhili Yanjiu”, Harbin Institute of Technology. According to 
Wang, because there is no a clear evaluation system and standards for the board of supervisors, some tensions are 
hardly, solved for example, the procedures for the meeting of the board of supervisors is not clear, human resources 
management system is not scientific, internal supervisors’ independence is too low, and the communication 
mechanism between the board of supervisors and the external directors had not been established. According to the 
research of Wang, the articles of association of most of the state-owned listed enterprises are not mentioned the 
supervisory board’s rules of procedure, and the vast majority of respondents believe that incentives to the board of 
supervisors is not operable. Most of the respondents-full-time supervisors feel confused about their future. 
421 Ibid. 
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listed company, market environment and the reform process, the most urgent problem 
is to establish an evaluation system for the board of supervisors.422 The nature of the 
supervisory determines that the board of supervisors cannot perform any business 
activities in the name of the company both internally and externally. For example, in 
Germany, the supervisory cannot simultaneously be the board of director. 423  In 
Chinese Company Law, there is a similar provision: the directors, managers and 
financial officer cannot serve as the board of supervisors at the same time in a 
company.424  The aim of Chinese Company Law is to ensure a good exercise of 
supervision specifically to target the board of supervisors. The basic work of the board 
of supervisors is to oversee the company’s business and financial position, and the main 
targets are the directors and the general manager. During the monitoring process, the 
directors and the general manager could be requested to correct their ultra vires (beyond 
his own power) activities which violate the articles of the association of the company. 
Therefore, the goals and standards of the evaluation system of the board of supervisors 
are the effectiveness of the supervision. The structure and size, operational conditions 
and the competency of the supervisors will be discussed below.425 
 
First of all, the operational conditions of the board of supervisors refers to whether the 
                                                 
422 The term of “special position” refers to the board of supervisors which has been set up in listed company, but 
because of the insider control or government intervention, the function of the board of supervisors has been restricted. 
The Chinese listed companies which just completed the establishment MES, have already established the basic 
framework of modern enterprise, but in those developed at the transition time in China, all the relevant legal system 
are not sound.  
423 Peng Zhenming, Jiang Hua, 2003. “Meiguo Duli Dongshi Zhidu yu Deguo Jianshihui Zhidu zhi Bijiao- Yelun 
Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili Jiegou Moshi de Xuanze”, Law Review, 01 2003. p 37-43. 
424 See the Article 117 of Chinese Company Law.  
425 These three factors of the standards of evaluation of the board of supervisors are from China's listed company 
governance evaluation index system of the board of supervisors. The data collection and analysis have been done by 
the Corporate Governance of Nankai University Research Central. Also can see Table 4-5. 
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board of supervisors held meeting, , how many times the meetings of the board of 
supervisors took place, whether the meeting’s times are higher than, equal to or lower 
than the times specified  by Chinese Company Law.426 Secondly, a good structure and 
size of the board of supervisors are the precondition of the effective operation of the 
board of supervisors, and include that the number of the supervisors and the situation of 
employee supervisors.427 Lastly, the competency of the supervisors is an important 
element.428 for a good board of supervisors of a listed company., This is because the 
listed company is a complex group with  huge economic resources and interests, so 
working for it as supervisors requires professional knowledge on legal, financial, 
accounting and relevant working experience. In addition, the ability to communicate 
with shareholders, employees and other stakeholders is required. Furthermore, the 
education background and age of the supervisors also have an important influence on 
the company. Moreover, when the member of the board of supervisors holds the listed 
company’s shares this will help to arouse their enthusiasm their responsibility.429 
According to the discussion above, the evaluation system of the board of supervisors 
involves two parts: on the one hand, the professional background, education 
background, age and shareholding allocation of the chairman of the board of 
supervisors will be shown in the system.  On the other hand, for other supervisors, 
professional background, education background, age and shareholding allocation are 
the main factors which should be examined. 
                                                 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Ibid. 
429 The result comes from the Corporate Governance of Nankai University Research Central. 
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4.4 The Manager 
 
All around the world, most listed companies take manager governance as an important 
element to examine in relation the corporate governance. But the difference is that they 
focus on different aspects of the manager. According to S&P, there are some key parts 
of the Directors’ governance which should be addressed in corporate governance, such 
as nomination of managers, salary system of manager and dismissal or resignation 
status.430  According to the reports from ICLCG, ICRA and ISS, senior manager 
structure, salary of manager, stock equity of manager were the professional and key 
factors to define the corporate governance.431 Deminor focused on another standard: 
stock opinion and the relationship between the chairman and managers.432  For CLSA, 
the top important elements are manager stock incentive and distribution of cash flow 
for shareholders.433 Although different listed companies used different standards and 
factors to analysis manager governance, the importance of manager cannot be ignored.  
 
This part will address three aspects of manager governance for Chinese listed 
companies. The first one is appointment and removal of manager system. This system 
includes the hiring of the managers and other senior managers; the part time working 
status for Chairman and general manager, and stability or any changes therein of the 
                                                 
430 Li, Supra note 339, at 151. 
431 Ibid 
432 Ibid 
433 Ibid 
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senior manager. The second point is on the implementation of a manager governance 
plan. The education background of the manager and whether the manager is working 
full time (or working part-time in some other company) for the shareholder’s company 
are both included. And the final criterion is incentive and restrains mechanisms, 
including salary, total equity, and the relationship between salary, equity and company 
performance.  
 
4.5 Information Disclosure 
 
The higher information transparency a capital market has, the more effective it is and 
the easier it is for the investors to make effective decisions. If the market information is 
transparent, the investors can make a reasonable judgment in advance before carrying 
out any business activities or decisions and can enhance better supervision after 
transaction.  Investors have more chances to choose the appropriate investment or 
financing projects, and managers can get the money they need. By contrast, any 
information asymmetry between investors and mangers will prevent the idle funds of 
investors and investment opportunities from being matched quickly. If there is 
incomplete information, the investors can only rely on the average profit of market to 
estimate the profitability of a project. For the high quality projects, it will cause 
financing constrains for the company. Myers and Malouf considered that when 
investors underestimate an enterprise’s financing securities, and the manager cannot 
pass a good investment chance on to external investors, the result is the stalling of the 
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investment project.434 In addition, in some extreme cases, the bond market will also 
appear to be credit rationing. Although the borrower is willing to pay average interest 
rates, they are unable to raise all the money they need.435 
 
Through information disclosure to alleviate the information asymmetry, investors can 
more accurately estimate the value of securities and the risk of the project. For good 
investment opportunities, if investors want to buy securities, they will require in a lower 
risk premium to reduce the cost of financing of the company. For the high risk project 
companies, the investors buying securities would require a higher risk premium to 
compensate for the losses it may suffer and thus reduce the company’s financing costs. 
This information disclosure is conducive to investors supervising the manager after 
trading. It is hard for investors to collect the internal information about enterprise. Or 
the investors may be unable to afford all the necessary cost for gathering information. 
Under this situation, it is difficult to implement effective supervision of agency 
problems. Thus, when investors cannot supervise their own investment in real time 
with complete access, and they realize that managers will have the problem of agency, 
they will be wary of investing.436  
 
Based on the research mentioned previously, on the reference to the OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles, and on the Chinese Company Law, Securities Law, the Chinese 
Listed Company Governance Guidelines, The Code of Public Offering of Securities 
                                                 
434 Li, Supra note 339, at 153. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid. 
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Companies to Disclose Information Content and Format No.2, Chinese Enterprises 
Accounting Standards, the Rules for the Implementation of Information Disclosure of 
the Listed Company, and other laws and regulations relating to the listed company, the 
evaluation system of information disclosure can be discussed from three aspects, 
namely reliability, relevance and timeliness.437  
 
First, the reliability of the information disclosure requires the company’s public 
information to accurately reflect the objective facts or the development trend of 
economic activity, and whether the information disclosure can meet the certain 
standards. The reliability of the information is relative and dynamic. In general, 
external people cannot judge the reliability of the data of listed company through public 
information. 438  But whether the listed company and its related personnel violate 
company records and other assessment information could help us to judge.439 From the 
perspective of information transmission, the way regulators and intermediary 
organization collect and analyse information, and verify the reliability, the test results 
for evaluating information disclosure is feasible and reasonable.440 The evaluation 
                                                 
437 These three factors of the standards of evaluation of the information disclosure are from China's listed company 
governance evaluation index system of the board of supervisors, the data collection and analysis have been done by 
the Corporate Governance of Nankai University Research Central. Also can see Table 4-7. 
438 Listed company information disclosure violations occurred frequently, seriously impacted on the securities 
market, and harmed the interests of investors. Delay of disclosure or major omissions (not timely and not 
comprehensive) are the main problems of the listed company information disclosure violations. See Wu Guoping, 
2009. “Type of Rule Breaking by Publicly Listed Companies during Information Disclosure and Their Main 
Characteristics”, Contemporary Economic Research, (7) 2009. Also see Zhu Weihua, 2003. “Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi 
Pilu Weigui Gongkai Qianze Xiaoguo de Shizheng Yanjiu”, Economic Management, (16) 2003.p 92-96 there is  
some data about cases which can support this argument, 188 A-share listed companies were punished because of 
information disclosure violations during 2001-2005. See Qu Wenzhou, Cai Zhiyue, 2007. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi 
Xinxi Pilu Weigui de Dongyin Shizheng Yanjiu”, China Idustrial Economics, 04, 2007. p 98-105. 
439 Wang Delu, Liu Mingyuan, 2009. “Information Disclosure System of Listed Companies in China: Proposals for 
Solving Problems”, Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce. 29 (2) 2009. 
440 Zhang Zongxin, Zhu Weihua, 2007. “the Empirical Study on Disclosure Quality of Listed Companies in China”, 
Nankai Economic Studies, (1) 2007. 
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standards of reliability of the information disclosure are: whether the annual financial 
report is issued by the standard unqualified audit opinion; any irregularities of company 
in nearly three years; and negative reports about company.441  
 
Secondly, the timeliness of information disclosure refers to how the information should 
be provided to the decision maker before the information loses its ability to influence 
decisions. Reality, integrity and timeliness are the characteristics for the information. 
Because investors, regulators, the public and the internal managers of company gain the 
information at the different times, in order to solve the problems resulting from 
asymmetry of the time, the system information disclosure requires management 
departments to show the information according to the laws within the prescribed period. 
This measure will help to reduce the chances for relevant personnel to use internal 
information to do insider trading Therefore, enhancing corporate transparency and 
decreasing the difficulty of regulation will push the management to more 
standardization, and protect the interests of the investors. From the point of view of 
public investors, disclosure of information can help the investors to make a rational 
judgment about the value of project and make a good investment decision. From the 
point of view of the listed company, disclosure of information will adjust the price of 
share on time, and ensure continuous and effective disclosure. The standards of 
evaluation system of the timeliness of information disclosure are mainly drawn from 
the annual reports of listed companies.  
                                                 
441 These three factors of the standards of evaluation of information disclosure are from China's listed company 
governance evaluation index system of the board of information disclosure, the data collection and analysis have 
been done by the Corporate Governance of Nankai University Research Central.  
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Finally, the correlation of information disclosure requires that listed companies must 
disclose all information as the laws require, the information shall not be ignored. 
Through this method, the information users will understand the corporate governance, 
financial status, operating result, cash flow management risk and the degree of risk, so 
that they can understand the business results. The correlation of information disclosure 
includes complete contents and form. The information disclosure relevance evaluation 
index mainly concerns  whether to fully disclose the following aspects: corporate 
strategy, governance structure, the competitive environment, product and service 
market, the profit forecast information, empirical risk and financial risk, social 
responsibilities, employee training plans and costs, foreign investment projects, the 
distribution of business, the business status of the holding company and taking a stake 
in the company, related party transactions and events occurring after the date of the 
balance sheet. 
 
 
4.6 The stakeholders 
 
Until the 1980s, the enterprise's management objective was considered to be to 
maximize shareholder interests, and the core of corporate governance research was 
mainly about how to establish a reasonable incentive and constraint mechanism and 
minimize the agent's moral hazard risk, eventually to maximize the value of the 
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company.442 In 1963, SRI proposed a group named ‘stakeholders’; 443 Freeman and 
Reed believed that the stakeholders were very important for the development of the 
company, without whose the support companies or organizations could not survive.444 
However, in the area of management science this view did not attract enough attention 
at that time. Since the 80s, the business environment has changed from planned 
economy to market economy. The rights and interests of the shareholders, creditors, 
employees, customers, suppliers, government, community residents and other 
stakeholders became noticed by the business operators, and the company in the 
management process of business transaction and the operation process needed to pay 
more attention to stakeholders.445 In addition, the consumer rights movement, the 
environmental protection lobby and other social activities created a great influence.446 
Consequently recognition of the importance of employees had greatly improved.447 
The mode of corporate governance also developed from the traditional --unilateral 
governance pattern of shareholders to the co-governance mode involving stakeholders. 
According to Blair, a company should be an organization with a huge social 
                                                 
442 Xie Huobao, Yang Mingze, 2007. “Shehui Zerenguan Xia Qiye Jingying Mubiao de Goujian”, Construction 
Machinery Today, 01 2007. pp. 80-83 According to Xie and Yang, there are two views of an enterprise 
management’s goal in academic research: one is the traditional theory of "shareholder first"which argues that 
shareholders enjoy the right of control and ownership of the enterprise, and  to maximize shareholder interestis  its 
basic goal; the other one is gradually formed in the 1970s and 1980s-- "stakeholder theory",which argues that 
shareholders, creditors, suppliers, employees, customers, government and community, social public and other 
stakeholders tshare the control and ownership of the enterprise, and argues that the enterprise”s management goal is 
to serve the stakeholders. 
443
 
Li, Supra note 339, at 155. 
444 Ibid. 
445 Jie Min, Jin Wei, and Cui Jing, 2001. “Guoyou Qiye Caiwu Guanli Mubiao Wenti Tanxi”, Coal Economic 
Research, 07 2001. pp. 56-58. 
446 The corporate social responsibility movement was born in European and American countries, against the 
background of the development of teconomic globalization the civil society movement, the consumer movement, the 
labour movement and environmental movement. Consumers, investors, government and other stakeholders required 
enterprises to meet their responsibility about economic, legal, ethical, and charity aspects. Complete economic 
responsibility is the material basis for the completing their social responsibility. While, the implementation of the 
responsibility on charity, legal and ethical aspects for enterprise is the guarantee of promoting of economic 
responsibility of the enterprise. See Guo Jinlin, 2002. “On the principle of interest correlation and the mechanism of 
consumer involvement for corporate control”, Consumer Economics, (1) 2002.  
447 Ibid.  
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responsibility, and the company exists to create wealth for the society.448 The main 
point of the corporate governance reform is (also is the biggest difference between the 
unilateral governance pattern (shareholders) and the co-governance mode (stakeholders) 
is that shareholders should not be given more power and control, managers should be 
separated from the shareholder pressure, and more power should be passed to other 
stakeholders.449 Li Weian considered that corporate governance is a set of system 
arrangements, and it includes formal or informal, internal or external systems to 
coordinate the relationship between company and all stakeholders, to ensure that the 
company's decision-making will be scientific, and to safeguard the interests of the 
company in all aspects.450 Corporate governance is not confined to the shareholders, 
and includes shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, government, the 
community and other stakeholders. Currently, it has become a widely accepted point of 
view to give full consideration to the rights and interests of stakeholders in corporate 
governance and encourage appropriate stakeholders to participate in corporate 
governance.451 Although the issue stakeholders is  very important in the study of 
corporate governance, most of research both at home and abroad does not involve and 
emphasise stakeholders in connection with  corporate governance evaluation 
systems. 452  According to SP, the evaluation system of corporate governance just 
involves financial interests. Although it refers to the shareholders, other stakeholders 
                                                 
448 Ibid. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Li Weian, Hao Chen, 2009. “Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili Zhuanxing: Cong Xingzhengxing Dao Jingjixing”, The 
Capital Market, (9) 2009. Pp.112-114.  
452 According to the research on China's listed company governance evaluation index system, done by the Corporate 
Governance of Nankai University Research Central.  See Li, supra note 339, at 155. 
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are not covered. 453  The corporate governance evaluation system of CLSA which 
focused on corporate transparency, management constraints, the independence and 
accountability of the board of directors, the protection of minority shareholders, the 
reasonable control of the debt and corporate social responsibility evaluation, so to some 
extent it covers the stakeholders.454 The corporate governance evaluation systems of 
Deminor and Haitong did not involve stakeholders.455 This thesis agrees with the 
opinion of Li Weian, and considers that Chinese listed company must establish a system 
to involve and balance the relationship among shareholders, creditors, employees, 
customers, suppliers, government, community and other stakeholders. In addition, the 
issue of stakeholders should be discussed in corporate governance as one of the main 
issues.  
 
The standards to evaluate stakeholders can be divided into two parts. 456  The 
participation of stakeholders is the first part, and includes four elements: namely, 
employees’ participation, protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders, 
and management of investor relations. First of all, amongst the participating 
stakeholders the employee is the important stakeholder for company. The condition of 
the human capital becomes more and more important. Providing effective ways to 
participate in the company's major decisions and daily operation and management for 
the employees is conducive to enhancing employees' sense of belonging, improving 
                                                 
453 See Table 4-1 the Main Corporate Governance Evaluation System in Appendix. 
454 Ibid. 
455 Ibid. 
456 According to the research on China's listed company governance evaluation index system, done by the Corporate 
Governance of Nankai University Research Central.  See Li, supra note 1, at 156 and See Table 4-8.  
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loyalty and motivating employees continually to achieve higher personal and corporate 
goals.457 Employee shareholding can show the status of employee participation in 
corporate governance of monetary capital and property rights. An employee stock 
holding plan is also the important measure for employees on the property right 
incentive.458 Second in importance is protection of the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders. Sometimes controlling shareholders in the company absolutely dominate 
low, minority shareholders. They are a vulnerable group, due to various reasons, such 
as: the participation in corporate governance costs too much; they can't participate in 
company’s decisions of corporate governance practice, so that their own interests often 
have been harmed.459 Accordingly, there are three indicators to measure whether the 
rights and interests of minority shareholders get effective protection: the system of 
cumulative voting, online voting system, and the proxy voting system, namely whether 
to adopt a solicitation voting method. Finally, management of investor relations means 
that the Company through the timely disclosure of information, can strengthen 
communication with the investors, and try to form a good relationship between the 
company and investors with the aim of maximizing the value of the company.460 In 
China, listed company investor relations management is at the development stage. This 
thesis considers that Chinese listed companies should build investor relations 
management system from the following angles: the establishment of the company's 
                                                 
457 Li Weian, Tang Yuejun, 2005. “Shangshi Gongsi Liyi Xiangguanzhe Zhili Jizhi, Zhishu Jizhi yu Qiye Yeji”, 
Management World. (9) 2005. Pp. 127-136. 
458 Ibid.  
459 Liang Mengyao, Peng Shiyu, 2011. “Qianxi Shangshi Gongsi Zhongxiao Gudong Quanyi Shou Qinhai Yuanyin 
Ji Duice”, Journal of Gansu Lianhe University (Natural Science Edition), S2 2011. Pp. 32-34. 
460 Li Weian, Tang Yuejun, 2005. “Shangshi Gongsi Liyi Xiangguanzhe Zhili Pingjia Ji Shizheng Yanjiu”, Securities 
Market Herald. (03) 2005. Pp. 37-43. 
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website and updating it; the review of the company's investor relations management 
information disclosure and the establishment of communication channels; and 
establishment of an investor relations management system and its execution, inspecting 
whether there is a specific department in charge of investor relations management. This 
measure is helpful to promote the effective development of investor relations 
management. 
 
On the other hand, coordination of stakeholders is the other factor must be considered. 
It mainly include three elements, namely, corporate social responsibility, the 
relationship between company and supervisory and administration departments, 
litigation and arbitration. 461  Firstly, knowing the importance of corporate social 
responsibility, paying more attention to the protection of the natural environment and 
correctly handling the relationship with society and the community are the three 
prerequisites for enterprises to pursue long-term development.462 The following two 
points should be established as key issues for the listed company: the company 
spending on public welfare donations can demonstrate the listed company's 
contribution to the society; and the company’s environmental protection measures, 
reflects listed company’s protection of the natural environment.463 Secondly, in the 
relationship between company and administration department Enterprises engaged in 
legitimate business must fulfil the corresponding legal responsibility, therefore, to 
                                                 
461 According to the research on China's listed company governance evaluation index system, conducted by the 
Corporate Governance of Nankai University Research Central.  See Li, supra note 1, at 157. 
462 Xiao Zuoping, Yang Jiao, 2011. “Gongsi Zhili dui Gongsi Shehui Zeren de Yingxiang Fenxi—Laizi Zhongguo 
Shangshi Gongsi de Jingyan Zhengju”, Securities Market Herald. 06 2011. Pp. 36-42. 
463 Ibid.  
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coordinate and correctly handle the relationship between company and its regulators is 
essential. Through quantitative analysis of fine spending and income, the harmonious 
degree of the listed company and its regulators can be judged. Finally, through 
investigating the amount of company’s litigation, arbitration and their nature and 
characters, the relationship between the listed companies and shareholders, suppliers, 
customers, consumers, creditors, employees, communities, government and other 
stakeholders can be measured. 
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Chapter 5: Internal Governance of Chinese State-Owned 
Listed Companies (II): the Tension Issues for Internal 
Governance 
 
In overseas mature markets, there is a set of good governance structures for the listed 
companies.464 However, the situation of listed companies in China is more special. 
This is because most of the domestic listed companies have been changed from the 
original465 or local companies (most of original or local companies had been operated 
without any standard of corporate governance at that time). In the process of reform of 
Chinese SOEs, many problems appeared in some aspects linked to corporate 
governance, the main issues of which are fivefold. The first issue is that the ownership 
of SOEs’ asset is not clear. The second one is that the controlling shareholders take the 
funds of company. The third problem is that related party transaction is serious. The 
fourth problem relates to San Hui (the board of directors, the board of supervisors and 
the shareholder meeting) and is one of formalisation.466 Finally, insider control and 
                                                 
464 As discussed in Chapter 4, a good governance structure can be dividied into different types, such as the U.S. 
mode, Japanese mode and German mode. But in general, the main factors can relate to company's equity structure, 
the company's independent legal status, the allocation of power between the shareholders of a company’s directors 
and managers and the interests of the checks and balances. Aslso to be considered are; Tthe supervision and 
incentives of the company management, and the corresponding social responsibility, and a series of legal and 
economic problems. For more relevant articles see Liu Qi, 1996. “Jiejian Guowai Gongsi Zhili Jiegou, Tuijin Woguo 
Guoyou Qiye Gaige”. China Business & Trade. 11 1996.  And see Liang Neng, 2000. “Gongsi Zhili Jiegou: 
Zhongguo de Shijian yu Meiguo de Jingyan”,Journal of Renming University of China. 04 2000. and see Song Zengji, 
Li Chunhong, and Fan Pengtao, 2004. “Guowai Gongsi Zhili Moshi dui Woguo de Qishi”, Reform of Economic 
System. 06 2004. 
465 The companies system in the West ishas directly developed from the private enterprise system while in China, the 
corporate governance system is evolving from a planned economy, as China's listed companies have more directly 
developed from public ownership of the state-owned enterprises. 
466 The framework of Sanhui is complete in form, butthe function of Sanhui is not fully playing a role. In the current 
style of company, shareholders, especially minority shareholders', rights and interests cannot get effective guarantees, 
and as a result the corporate governance is not as effective as expected. For example, major shareholders have 
absolute control over business investment decisions. See Huang Qiang, Chen Lan, 2001. “Ruhe Baohu Ruoshi 
Gudong Chanquan”, Tian Fu New Idea Bimonthly. (1) 2001. 
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untimely information disclosure are the core tension issues for listed companies. In this 
chapter, the following issues will be discussed: first, the problems about the ownership 
structure the controlling shareholder behaviour,  followed by the problems on the 
related party transactions and information disclosure, and then the problems for San 
Hui will be analysed,. Finally, the problem about stakeholders will be illustrated.  
 
5.1 The Problems about the Ownership Structure and the Controlling 
Shareholder Behaviour 
 
5.1.1 The Problems about the Ownership Structure: Equity Concentration have 
not been Fundamentally Solved  
 Compared with the largest shareholder, other shareholder and their shares are 
superficies 
In China, the listed company had been perceived as being the listed SOE, because an 
overwhelming majority of the listed companies were SOEs.467 The high ownership 
concentration as a main feature of the shareholding structure of Chinese listed SOEs, 
was described as excessive by a study of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE).468 
According to the SSE, at the end of 2002, in 40.9% of all the companies (a total of 300 
companies, according to data from the annual reports of 734 companies listed on the 
SSE), the largest shareholders owned more than half the shares.On average, in all 734 
                                                 
467 Wang, 2004: 40-42. 
468 Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili Baogao, 2003; 46. 
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companies, each largest shareholder possessed 44.3% of its company’s shares.469 After 
almost seven years’ development of corporate governance in China, the listed 
companies were not all synonymous with listed SOEs. However, the situation of equity 
concentration has not been solved fundamentally. According to Lu’s annual reports of 
the central SOEs 2010, the largest shareholder played an absolute role for corporate 
governance, the board of directors and the board of supervisors finding it hard to work 
for a company. 470   The high ownership concentration may lead to the largest 
shareholder attaining the majority rule to control the shareholder meeting, the board of 
directs and the board of supervisors. Moreover, the largest shareholder may harm the 
benefit of minority shareholders and the company through means including capital 
occupied, an illegal guarantee, related party transactions, insider trading, manipulation 
of the stock price and other irregularities. Here, the largest shareholder refers to the 
Chinese State, which means the state dominance of shareholding in the listed SOEs. 
Therefore, the first problem which has not been solved fundamentally is that in 
comparison with the largest shareholder, other shareholders and their shares are 
superficies, as they do not play a substantial role for corporate governance of Chinese 
listed companies.  
 
As stated, the establishment of the SASAC in 2003 demonstrated the state’s renewed 
efforts to tackle long-standing problems concerning SOEs ownership. The SASACs 
can be seen as the government agencies and with some functions including representing 
                                                 
469 Ibid. 
470 Lu, supra note 339, at p. 111. 
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the State ownership, regulating and supervising SOEs. The SASAC at the central level 
supervises central SOEs which are those owned and controlled by the Central 
Government, and the SASAC at the local level supervises local SOEs which are owned 
and controlled by the provincial government.471 The following discussion will focus on 
the central SASAC and the central SOEs which are controlled by it.  
 
The number of the central SOEs has reduced from 196 in 2003 to 113 in 2014 as a result 
of continuous restructuring472 and of the state’s plan to foster larger and global Chinese 
companies.473 These 113 companies which the central SASAC supervises and controls 
are the 113 companies which are considered as core to national security and 
strategically important enough to warrant the maintenance of State control.474 The 
SASAC drafts laws, administrative regulations and rules on the management of 
State-owned assets, and the central SASAC exercises ownership rights on behalf of the 
Central Government to accelerate the process of SOEs reform, but in fact, the State 
retains significant ownership control over key SOEs, and the State is the leader in the 
restructuring of SOEs. Therefore, for the most listed central SOEs in China, the actual 
controller is the SASAC.  
 
 Insider control 
                                                 
471 See the Interim Regulations on the Management of Enterprises State-owned Assets 2003. 
472 See, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html. at 27 June 2014. 
473 See Wen Jiabao, Government Work Report 2007, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
474 The part about the SASAC was discussed in Chapter 1, and the reason, strategic for State controls vital industries 
and companies also was discussed in former chapter. And some more detail see Edward Tse, Context and Complexity 
2007, Stratrgy + Business. 
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The first situation involving insider control is about the largest shareholder of the 
central SOEs being the Group Company of SOEs,475 and the actual controller is the 
SASAC, the central SASAC on behalf of the Central Government. Therefore, as the 
SASAC’s decisions always reflect the Central Government’s will, it amounts to insider 
control for a SOE. There are many links, steps or procedures in the process of a SOE 
reform, such as evaluation, acquisition and mergers. The SASAC plays a key role in 
those links involving SOEs. The insider control is serious, and the SOEs are controlled 
by SASAC- the spokesperson of the State. If so, corporate governance is just a 
decoration for SOEs, and the rights of the shareholders, even the largest shareholder are 
weakened. 
 
The second situation of insider control is that the legal person of state-owned equity 
position cannot be personified, and so the rights of the company operator or managers 
also are at the risk of being undermined.476 State holding listed companies in China are 
divided into three types: the government holding company, state-owned asset 
management holding company and state-owned legal person holding company. 477 
Firstly, the largest shareholders of the government holding company include 
                                                 
475 The state holding listed companies are mostly established by relatively high quality assets which had been split 
out as  part of SOEs. A large number of non-operating assets and debt burden had been left in the Croup. The Croup 
Company with diversified goals and controlling status of the listed company formed a strong control of state holding 
listed companies. Fort he same opinion see Lu, supra note 4, at 112.   
476 Guan Xinchun, 2008. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Neiburen Kongzhi de Fajingji Fenxi”, Legal System and Society. 
28 2008 and the same issue had been discussed in He Yabin, 2005. “the Greatest Risk in China Property Market 
Development Originating from the Control of Relevant People on Assignor’s Side”, Property Rights Guide. (10) 
2005. 
477 Yang, Y, 2011. Reconstruction: New Path for Corporate Governance, Beijing: China CITIC Press P. 82 The same 
opinion with Yang can see Li Zengquan, 2002. “Guojia Konggu yu Gongsi Zhili de Youxiao Xing”, Shanghai 
University of Finance Economic. According to Li, In order to maintain the dominant position of public ownership, 
state-owned enterprises have adopted listed state-owned equity mode in the process of restructuring.  
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state-owned assets supervision and administration commission, the Ministry of Finance 
and the competent administrative department for enterprises.478 Secondly, the largest 
shareholders of a state-owned asset management institution holding company include 
state assets management company and Industry Corporation.479 Lastly, the largest 
shareholders of a state-owned legal person holding company include the state-owned 
Group or Corporation. For state holding listed companies, the SASAC as the 
representative of state-owned equity, is also the agent of the state-owned investors at 
the same time; the SASAC is responsible for the largest shareholder, in fact, is 
responsible for the higher administrative departments of original enterprises or Group 
Co. In addition, because these holdings are virtual subjects, it is difficult to monitor the 
agent. Therefore, the managers can get rid of the control of the board of directors, either 
as a representative of state shareholders then ignore the opinions of the minority 
shareholders, and can as insiders then ignore the opinion from the state-owned 
controlling shareholders.  
 
The third situation of insider control takes place where the SASAC has replaced the 
operators and the board of directors, and also limits the SOEs’ international 
                                                 
478 Such as the 110 Central-owned enterprises which investment by SASAC, the list can see 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/c1725422/content.html (accessed 12 July 2015) the largest shareholder of 
them is SASAC.  
479 The state assets management companies mean state-owned non-banking financial institutions whose functions 
are acquisition of state-owned Banks non-performing loans, management and disposal of assets formed by the 
acquisition of state-owned Banks non-performing loans. In 1999, approved by the State Council and the People's 
Bank of China, p four state-owned financial asset management companies  (AMC) were set up: Orient asset, 
CINAD Asset, Huarong Asset Management, the China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation, respectively 
responsible for the acquisition, management and disposal of the corresponding Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank and China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China by the 
stripping of non-performing assets. After 2009, as policy tasks had been completed, the four AMCs since then had to 
strengthen the commercialization process. For more about the classification of the state holding listed companies see 
Wen Zongyu, Tan jing, 2008. “Guoyou Konggu Shangshi Gongsi Fenlei Fenxi”. Review of Economic Reseatch. (6) 
2008. 
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competitiveness, and decides the direction of development of SOEs. It is hard to 
separate the functions of Chinese government and the SASAC for SOEs, so when the 
SASAC controls SOEs, such control inevitably caused the government’s intervention 
in the State holding listed company. The function of the government’s public 
management is to maintain overall social, political and economic stability, and ensure 
the value of state-owned assets, but the goal of listed company is profit maximization. 
These two goals are inconsistent. Therefore, in many cases, government intervention, 
and even excessive intervention, is inappropriate for SOEs, especially the state-owned 
listed companies. (Government intervention through the SASAC can be seen as a kind 
of insider control, and at the same time, government intervention is one of the 
characteristics of Chinese SOEs. More details about government intervention as a 
characteristic will be discussed in the next chapter). For example, the aim of mergers of 
SOEs is to improve their international competitiveness through increasing scale and 
consolidating operations. There were 818 acquisitions of Chinese companies by foreign 
companies in 2006.480 Although only a small proportion of foreign acquisitions were 
blocked by the Chinese Government, no single foreign company acquired a controlling 
stake in the Chinese SOEs. 481 From the point of view of competition, under the 
control of the SASAC, the central SOEs did not liberally develop to accord with the 
market, especially the international market. For Chinese central SOEs, it seems that 
SOEs were protected by the State through restricting foreign enterprises and aimed to 
guarantee that the SASAC can maintain control of SOEs absolutely. Why must the 
                                                 
480 Yan and Torchia, 2007. 
481 See Ministry of Commerce, the CSRC et al, and Administrative Measures on Strategic Investment of Foreign 
Investors in Listed Companies, issued on 31 December on 2005, effective 30 January 2006. 
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SASAC or Chinese State control the central SOEs, although they also want to 
strengthen central SOEs’ global competitiveness through mergers? The reason lies in 
the method of injecting State resources into central SOEs and taking an absolute control, 
which was explained by a manager of the SASAC.482 He said that this was not just a 
strategic method for Chinese central SOEs. But there were some objections, some of 
which thought that foreign enterprises could reduce more costs than Chinese central 
SOEs in the same project, and if so, people could enjoy the result of the project at a 
lower price. Therefore, they insist that it is not necessary to obtain a controlling stake 
for the State in central SOEs, if the foreign enterprises can create more profit for 
Chinese people with lower costs. However, he did not agree with that. His opinion can 
be summarized as follows. First of all, who obtains controlling stake of Chinese central 
SOEs is a legal, economic and management topic for a country, therefore, we could not 
research and evaluate it just from an individual field or just from costs and profits. 
Moreover, political factors or diplomatic strategy will affect the economic transitions 
between countries. If the controlling stake is held by a foreign company, political 
rupture and tensions of international relations will lead to the unstable development of 
Chinese SOEs. Ultimately, most of central SOEs are, in terms of national security, 
strategically important enough to warrant the maintenance of State control. If the 
controlling stake was held by a foreign enterprise, the SOE’s development instability 
would lead to national security concerns. This method is weakening the corporate 
governance and market effectiveness for Chinese SOEs.  It cannot be relied as a long- 
                                                 
482 Data from the interview with a manager of the SASAC on 27th, June 2012, it was a part of fieldwork in my second 
year of PhD, in this thesis, the view of this manager cannot represent the SASAC; it was a personal view just from a 
senior manager who worked for the SASAC.  
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term solution, if Chinese SOEs try to gain strong international competitiveness. But it 
should be the only route which can juggle both stability and development before 
finding a better way.  
 
 Tradable shares and non-tradable shares (non-circulation shares) of SOEs exist in 
China’s capital markets 
 
Apart from the factors of the SASAC’s controls over the central SOEs and limitation on 
foreign enterprises, another factor (also the third problem) which is weakening the 
corporate governance and market effectiveness for Chinese SOEs, is caused by equity 
concentration of Chinese SOEs.483 Because tradable shares and non-tradable shares 
(non-circulation shares) of SOEs484 exist in China’s capital markets at the same time, it 
is hard to realize control over the company through market practice for external 
potential investors, which may lead to internal operators’ slackness, and may also 
strengthen the monopoly position of the controlling shareholder of the SOE. Moreover, 
it can cause State assets to be misappropriated and siphoned off by the managers.  
                                                 
483 The status of state-owned major shareholders of SOEs is Absolute control, SOEs formed a highly centralized 
equity, and namely the equity structure of state-owned shares a dominant. See Yin Bocheng, Xue Feng, 2001. 
“Woguo Shangshi Gongsi de Guquan Jiegou yu Neiburen Kongzhi”, Collected Essays on Finance and Economics. 
06 2001. 
484 Prior to 2005, the proportion of non-tradable shares was too high in a lot of state-owned listed companies, but 
between 2005 and 2008, through the reform of non-tradable shares, the proportion state-owned shares are far greater 
than the number of state-owned shares. The so-called equity division reform restricted the circulation of state-owned 
shares and legal person shares all lifted a ban, and became tradable shares. What is the proportion of tradable shares 
and non-tradable shares? There is no answer for this question.  The proportion of tradable shares and non-tradable 
shares of listed companies is not strictly limited, should be completely according to particular case about different 
companies. The State did not have any laws and regulations about their proportion. The conditions of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics determines that the non-tradable share holding is greater than tradable shares for the SOEs 
which controlled by the SASAC. For example, 600028 China Petrochemical, with a total of 116.5 billion shares, has 
91 billion A shares in circulation, but China Petroleum & Chemical Croup Co., Ltd. has controll over and holds 85.6 
billion shares, the actual current A-share only (910-856 = 856), less than 10% of the tradable shares. Many tradable 
shares of the listed SOEs which are controlled by SASAC, had been controlled by relevant group company. In fact, 
they are not really in circulation. 
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5.1.2 The Problems about the Controlling Shareholder’s Behaviour 
 It is difficult to guarantee independence of the listed company under the controlling 
shareholder 
 
To ensure the legal person status of the controlling shareholders is a core issue in order 
for controlling shareholders to play a better role, and improve corporate governance. 
However, for Chinese State holding listed companies, the controlling shareholder plays 
a dual role. On the one hand, it acts as an agent of the SASAC; on the other hand, it is 
the company’s principal. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee the independence of 
operators or managers due to the dual role for the listed company. In practice, 
controlling shareholders always influence the operation of listed companies through 
three main ways: intervene in personnel matters, intervene in the management and 
operation, and in selecting auditors. For example, the directors and managers of 
Chinese central enterprises listed companies are largely political appointees (appointed 
by the SASAC or organization department) whose job is to safeguard State assets.  
 
 Intervention in personnel matters 
 
According to the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, the 
nomination committee is responsible for the directors and managers’ election, review 
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and nomination.485 But in fact, the board of directors and senior management of some 
of the state holding listed companies, which came from the reorganization or 
restructuring of central enterprises or came from the overall listing, are mainly from the 
controlling shareholders, who belong to the Organisation Department of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China 486 and the SASAC. Therefore, the 
recommended candidate nomination needs to collect the support of the controlling 
shareholders or others directly recommended by them. The major persons-in-charge of 
the large central enterprises mainly be appointed by the Organization Department of the 
Central Committee,487 while in the other listed companies which are held by the central 
and local enterprises, the main principals are appointed by the SASAC (the central and 
local) respectively.488 The other executive personnel need to obtain the state-owned 
shareholders' approval. The board of directors and the review of the shareholders' 
general meeting are a formality.489     
 
There is a high degree of dependence on Chinese government departments or the 
SASAC for executives when the executives engaged in the business activities, in that 
they must consider the opinion of government department, the controlling shareholders, 
                                                 
485 See Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, Article 55: the main duties of the nomination 
committee are 1. to formulate standards and procedures for the election of directors and make recommendations, 2. 
to extensively seek qualified candidates for directorship and management, and 3. to review the candidates for 
directorship and management and make recommendations.  
486 The Organisation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is one of the important 
functional departments for the Central Committee and is mainly responsible for the Party's organization structure 
and the cadres’ team structure and the talent team structure, etc. In May 1924, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China formally decided to set up departments about publicity, organization and workers and 
peasants. See http://news.12371.cn/dzybmbdj/zzb/ (accessed 15 July 2015). 
487 Cheng Xin, 2010. “Woguo Guoyou Qiye Fuzeren Xuanpin Jizhi Gaijin Yanjiu”, Shandong Jingji Xuyuan. 
488 Ibid.  
489 Ibid. and the same opinion also can see Shen Zenghong, 2007. “Pinren erfei Renming Zhuzhi shi Gaohao Guoqi 
de Guanjian”, Jingji Guanli. 01 2007. 
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promotion being their priority, rather than the interests of listed companies and 
investors.  
 
 Intervention in operations 
 
The controlling shareholder with the background of the government not only carries out  
the examination and approval in advance for the major issues of the state holding listed 
companies, but also reviews the business plan, budget and some other daily business 
matters, even some issues which do not need to report to the board meetings, such as 
purchase of vehicles and office equipment. In some large SOEs groups, especially the 
SOEs with more subordinate members, the managers think it is necessary to copy the 
whole enterprise group's internal management system including financial accounting 
and money management of their holdings of listed companies.490 This thesis does not 
agree with this position, but argues that the administrative intervention from the 
SASAC or SOEs Groups is harmful and a challenge for the standardised operation of 
listed companies and the regulation of the capital market. 
 
The modes of controlling shareholder or actual controller gaining the profit can be 
summarized into three types. The first mode is based on the inherent stakes obtained 
from the operating results of listed companies, such as the investment interest or return. 
The second one is based on its intrinsic value or premium transfer profit. The final one 
                                                 
490 Yang, supra note 486, at 85. 
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is the controlling shareholder or actual controller transfer, taking up corporate resources, 
and receiving beyond the proportion of equity returns. 491 On the one hand, the 
controlling shareholder or actual controller control and effectively manage the listed 
company, which is the foundation for profitability and development of the company, 
and is the source of profit for the minority shareholders. On the other hand, the 
controlling status of controlling shareholder of listed companies provides a lot of 
possibilities and opportunities to harm minority shareholders through irregularities. For 
Chinese state-owned listed companies, corporate governance does not play a beneficial 
role, because it is easy for the group company, as the major shareholders of listed 
companies, to misappropriate funds of the listed company, for example, through related 
party transactions, and cash dividend.492 
 
5.2 The Problem about the Related Party Transactions and 
Information Disclosure 
 
Related party transactions between the controlling shareholder and State holding listed 
companies is a common phenomenon, the main reason being that when the SOE was 
originally listed, part of the auxiliary business had been left in the controlling 
shareholder’s name. The listed company signed a comprehensive service agreement 
with the controlling shareholder, and then controlling shareholders provided supporting 
                                                 
491 Ibid. 
492 See Shen Youlun, Yu Bangqing, 2004. “Lun Dagudong Nuoyong Shangshi Gongsi Zijing Xingwei zhi Youxiao 
Guize---You Zhongguo Zhengjianhui, Guoziwei Linhe Qianfa Tongzhi Suo Yinfa de Sikao”, Chinese Criminology 
Review. 04 2004. Since the latter half of 2003, 57.53% of the listed company (676 listed companies) had  
misappropriated huge amounts of money by the major shareholders.Among the 1175 listed companies with the 
occupied capital totalling 96.669 billion Yuan, the average embezzlement was 143 million Yuan. 
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services for listed companies. In addition, part of the industry chain of listed companies 
is not complete; they have to purchase a large quantity of raw materials or components, 
or they need to sell finished product via the controlling shareholder. All the links above 
have resulting in a large number of related party transactions going on for a long time. 
 
The main problems of related transactions of Chinese central SOEs are: related 
transactions are more subtle and complex; how to determine whether the related 
transactions’ price is reasonable; and inadequate disclosure of information about related 
transactions. After the shareholding reform, an important trend of related party 
transactions of listed companies is that controlling shareholders and actual controllers 
go through more hidden, indirect connection transaction to avoid regulation, and 
achieve the goal of transfer of interests of listed companies. In such ways, the 
controlling shareholder through seemingly independent third party affiliates or other 
affiliated parties can encroach on the interests of the listed company. The harm caused 
by related transaction to listed companies is very serious. 
 
5.2.1 The Main Methods of Related Transactions  
First of all, it is difficult to define the “related party”; some parties do not work for 
affiliated enterprise, and there is no equity relationship between the parties and SOEs. 
But the parties often emerge as customers or partners;493 therefore, it is a big challenge 
to make an accurate judgment about the related party. There are provisions about 
                                                 
493 Yang, supra note 486, at 80. 
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related party and disclose in the Company Law,494 Securities Law,495 Accounting 
Standards496 and other relevant documents. In addition, the rules about related party 
transactions of stated in Stock Market Listing Rules497 are stricter. Therefore, some 
companies tend to adopt some related transactions - non-related methods to circumvent 
the rules. These methods can be divided into two levels:498  One is the company 
indirectly controls the listed companies through looking for a non-related party as a 
trading intermediary or multiple participation of listed companies., 499  Another 
method, under the condition of certain definite related party transactions, uses various 
means to conceal the essence of the transaction or the transaction itself..500 If the 
transaction is non-monetary, there are certain rules or codes which restrict them, so it is 
hard to achieve the purpose of manipulating profits. Therefore, some listed companies 
try to make the non-monetary transactions change to monetary transaction. One of the 
main methods is splitting a non-monetary transaction into two deals, namely selling 
assets and buying assets. The other one is that the listed companies get high valuation 
of assets from a related party for low value assets, and then sell the low value assets at 
                                                 
494 See Article 21 of Company Law of the PRC. 2007  And for more discussion and analysis for Article 21  see Shi 
Wenting, 2008. “Jianli Guanlian Jiaoyi de Sifa Shencha Biaozhu---dui Gongsi Fa Guanyu Guanlian Jiaoyi Guifan de 
Yidian Jianyi”, Legal System and Society. 25 2008. Also  see Luo Huanping, Wang Yanli. 2005. “On the Regulation 
of Associated Deal in the Newly- amended Corporation Law”, Journal of Political Science and Law. 23 (2) 2006 the 
same issue is referenced in Shi Tiantao, Du Jing, 2007. “Woguo Gongsifa Shang Guanlian Jiaoyi de Guiyi Jiqi Falv 
Guize—Yige Liyi Chongtu Jiaoyi Faze de Zhongguo Banben”, China Legal Science, 06 2007. 
495 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities, adopted at the 6 th Meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the Nine National People’s Congress on December 29, 1998; amended in accordance with the Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on Amending the Securities Law of the People’s 
Republic of China adopted at its 11 th Meeting on August 28, 2004; and revised by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress at its 18 th Meeting on October 27, 2005. The disclosure principle, subject, way and 
responsibility of information disclosure had been regulated in Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities. 
496 Accounting System for Business Enterprises (applicable to Joint Stock Limited Enterprises effective 1 January 
2001 and applicable to Foreign Investment Enterprises effective 1 January 2002). In the Chapter 12 between pages 
72-74, related party relationship and transactions had been regulated.  
497 Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange, amendment in 2008. The Chapter IX and 
Chapter X are Discloseable transactions and related party transactions (pp. 39-48). 
498 Lu, supra note 339, at 115. 
499 Ibid.  
500 Ibid. 
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normal market price. The assets with the high value are swapped out, and the assets 
with low value are sold at a higher price than its worth, and the listed companies 
achieve their goal.  
5.2.2 Difficulties of Determining the Reasonable Price of the Related 
Transactions 
The second problem is how to determine the standard price of related transactions. In 
daily management, the listed companies buy or sell assets to the related party; the object 
of transaction is often based on the consideration of assessed value.501 However, the 
industry of assets appraisal in China is undeveloped. Moreover, the different evaluation 
methods and parameters of assessment value lead to different results.502 Therefore it is 
difficult to ensure the objectivity of evaluation results.    
5.2.3 Inadequate Disclosure of Information on Related Transactions 
The final issue is inadequate disclosure of information on related transactions. 
Disclosure of information on related transactions involves multiple aspects, including 
the trading main body, time, quantity, price, and accounting for the company’s assets, as 
well as the company’s convening of general meeting of shareholders and other items.503 
Accounting standards for business enterprises require disclosure of related party 
transactions information including: the amount of trading or equivalent ratio, the 
                                                 
501 Ibid. at 114, and the same opinion see Yang, supra note 10, at 80. 
502 Yang, supra note 486, at 80. 
503 Lin Meileng, 2009. “Shangshi Gongsi Guanlian Jiaoyi Xinxi Pilu Zhidu Yanjiu”, Southwest University of 
Political Science and Law.  
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amount of outstanding project or corresponding proportion, and pricing strategy.504 
However, the listed companies often only vaguely disclose the above content, 
especially when facing up to some kind of information which could have adverse 
effects to the company's business. The listed companies always show the ‘cop out’ 
answer, or hide the truth. Therefore, the real information and message is very limited. In 
addition, in terms of the disclosure of related transaction prices, there is chaos such as 
lack of disclosure of transfer price, and lack of comparability and understandability. 
According to a research from Lu,505 in  practice, almost all the listed companies said 
they would follow the principles of equity and reciprocity concerning the related 
transactions, but a proportion  of them showed a different approach when the related 
transactions were exposed. For example, there are many kinds of ways to name related 
party transactions, such as market price, contract price and cost price, preferential price 
and evaluating price and so on. There is a big difference between different disclosures 
of information by listed companies who do not have a unified standard. The standards 
of the interest of fund income and expenses are different, mainly involving agreement 
interest rates and bank interest rates during the same period. Some listed companies just 
reveal the interest calculated amount, but do not provide the information about money 
and interest at a pre-determined standard. Moreover, there is no specific provision 
about the fees for providing or accepting guarantees. Finally, there are only a handful of 
companies who disclose the fees, but all the listed companies need a standard of charge 
to avoid the irregular charge. The disclosure of information of related transactions of 
                                                 
504 Accounting System for Business Enterprises (applicable to Joint Stock Limited Enterprises effective 1 January 
2001 and applicable to Foreign Investment Enterprises effective 1 January 2002). 
505 Lu, supra note 339, at 114. 
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Chinese listed companies is inadequate, because the listed companies pay more 
attention to form, and the useful content of the disclosure of information is not enough. 
In general, the listed companies just disclose the relationship between listed company 
and related enterprises, business properties, the main business, the registered address, 
legal representative and so on.506 However, the related transaction elements have not 
been shown to the public by listed companies, such as transaction amount or the 
corresponding proportion, the amount of outstanding project or the corresponding 
proportion, transaction price, and pricing policy. Even if the listed companies show 
above information to the public, they do not state whether the price of assets is after the 
audit and assessment, or whether the price was in accordance with the principle of 
independent business accounting of the listed company. Therefore, it is hard to fully 
understand the nature of the relationship between listed company and related 
enterprises, the type of transaction, and other transaction elements, and it is easy to 
cause a deviation in understanding and even lead investors to make wrong judgments. 
Some of listed companies are trying to escape or avoid disclosing related party 
transactions.507 
 
                                                 
506 Wang Jun, 2007. “Woguo Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi Pilu Neirong Fenxi”, Financial Supervision, 04 2007.  Also 
can see He Lin, 2001. “Qianxi Shangshi Gongsi Xinxi Pilu”, Modern Management Science. 04 2001. 
507 The case named ‘Kai En Listed Croup’. More detail about related party transactions. And the case about Kai En 
will be attached later.  
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5.3 The Problems for San Hui (General Meeting of Shareholders, 
Board of Directors, and Board of Supervisors)  
5.3.1 A formalized San Hui 
In the operation of state holding listed company, and their shareholder meeting, board 
of directors, board of supervisors， two factors lead to a strong control over San Hui by 
the state-owned shareholder of listed companies, namely the fact that the legal status of 
state-owned shares is dominant and the principle of capital majority decision of general 
meeting of shareholders. The state-owned shareholder exerts control over San Hui 
through three ways including: nominating directors (including independent directors), 
supervising candidates, taking advantage of the right to vote for the election of directors 
and supervisors, directly appointing the chairman, general manager and the 
impeachment motion for directors and supervisors. So, state-owned controlling 
shareholders have the right to vote, and have the decision-making power and executive 
power at the same time. It is too easy to formalise San Hui. 
5.3.2 Problems of the Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the core of the governance structure of listed companies, and 
plays an important role. Chinese Company law stipulated the duties and functions of 
the board of directors. 508  The SASAC introduced the Interim Measures for the 
Standard Operation of the Board of Directors of a Central Enterprise in the Pilot 
                                                 
508 See the company Law of the Peopole’s Republic of China (2013 Amendment), the Article 108, 109,110, 111, 112, 
113,114.  
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Program on Board of Directors since 2009,509 which was a good development and 
enabled the board of directors of the central enterprises to establish a normative 
governance mechanism. But in the actual operation, there are still many problems. For 
example, the major decisions of listed companies are always made the corresponding 
decision-making procedures by the board of directors after prior approval by the 
department of state-owned assets or state-owned shareholder, and some issues 
involving major development strategy or decisions of merger, acquisition and 
reorganization of listed companies. Decisions are also driven by management 
department of state-owned assets or state-owned shareholders, even though listed 
companies sometimes do not know the details. Therefore, listed companies just go 
through the motions of being the decision of the board of directors. In the state holding 
listed companies, the role of the board of directors is greatly weakened, and the board of 
directors fails to play its due role. This part will analyse the main problems.  
 
 The composition of the Board of Directors  
 
1. Members of the board of directors and managers are overlap in the same listed 
company. The proportion of part-time members of the board of directors of Central 
enterprises is as high as 78.53%.510 The board members of some enterprises are all 
from management, except of a staff worker can be a director. Or the chairman might 
                                                 
509 See the Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council on 
Issuing the Interim Measures for the Standard Operation of the Board of Directors of a Central Enterprises in the 
Pilot Program on Board of Directors, which issued on 03-20-2009 by SASAC.  
510 The financial report 2010 of Chinese central enterprise conducted by Lu.  
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also be the general manager of the same company. This kind of circumstance causes 
an imbalance for the structure of corporate governance. The imbalanced proportion 
of Board composition is not conducive to the division of rights and responsibilities, 
and it is harmful to the scientific decision making of the board of directors. 
2. There is a low proportion of external directors. The term of full-time external 
directors refers to a person who is specifically appointed or employed as an external 
director of a pilot enterprise for working on the board of directors by the SASAC. A 
full-time external director shall not assume any other positon in the enterprise in 
which he works, nor assume any position in any other entity during his term of 
office.511 According to the report in 2010, the proportion of external directors was 
37.8% 512of all the members of directors, less than the numbers prescribed by the 
Interim Measures;513  members of the board of directors need to absorb more 
external independent directors.  
3. The component of the external directors is not reasonable. ‘As a general rule, the 
chairman of the board of directors shall not be the general manager of a company… 
where a non- external director serves as the chairman of the board of directors, an 
external director may serve as the vice-chairman to assist the chairman in organizing 
the operation of the board of directors. Where neither the chairman nor the 
vice-chairman of the board of directors of a company is an external directors, the 
external directors may, in turn, serve as the convener of external directors for a term of 
                                                 
511  See the Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission on Issuing the 
Administrative Measures for the Full-time External Directors of Pilot Central Enterprises for the Work on the Board 
of Directors (for Trial Implementation), issued on 10-13-2009 by SASAC, Article 3.  
512 Supra 519. 
513 Supra 518, Article 22: The board of directors shall have 7 to 13 members. As a general rule, more than half of all 
members of the board of directors of a company shall be external directors.  
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one year; or all external directors may jointly recommend the convener of external 
directors, but the convener of external directors shall be recommended again after three 
years at most.’514 This provision explains the methods and the basic principles of 
elections for external directors. The details on the selection and employment of external 
directors are set out in the Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission on Issuing the Administrative Measures for the Full-time 
External Directors of Pilot Central Enterprises for the Work on the Board of Directors 
(for Trial Implementation)515. The selection and employment of external directors 
showed that the aim of external directors was to solve the problem of insider control.516 
Another evidence to support this argument is that administration of external directors 
has been influenced by political elements. The administration, political attitude have to 
close with the incumbent persons in charge of Central enterprise, in such aspects as a 
reading document, attending relevant conferences and taking part in relevant 
activities.517 In addition, the selection and employment, evaluation, incentives and 
training, and the routine administration are authorized by the SASAC.518 However, the 
function of external directors is not effective. The main problems relate to the 
component of the external directors. It can be summarized into three points.  
 
First of all, the business ability of external directors cannot achieve the standard of 
                                                 
514 Supra 518, Article 27. 
515 Supra 520, Article 11-14. 
516 Kong Fantai, 2010. “Waibu Dongshi Zhidu Shi Yaoshi”, Directors & Board. 09 2010. and see Li Qiulei, 2010. 
“Duli Dongshi yu Waibu Dongshi Zhidu Bijiao Yanjiu—Jiyu Woguo Shangshi Gongsi he Zhongyang Qiye”, Yunnan 
Finance & Economics University Journal of Economics & Management. 03 2010. The relevant document can see 
Dongshihui Shidian Zhongyang Qiye Zhuanzhi Waibu Dongshi Guanli Banfa, released on 06.11.2009 by SASAC. 
See http://gzw.bjdch.gov.cn/n5687274/n5723562/n5745439/n5745634/8854405.html ( accessed 9 September 2015) 
517 Supra 520, summarized from Article 5, 6. 
518 Ibid. Full articles see Article 7, 8, 9. 
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development required for listed companies. The basic requirements for a full-time 
external director were stated clearly: 
‘1   having a good political quality, abiding by disciplines and laws, being faithful 
 And diligent and having a good occupational reputation. 
2 having the professional knowledge required for the performance of the relevant 
duties and being familiar with the macroeconomic policies and relevant laws and 
regulations of the state, being familiar with the information about the domestic and 
overseas markets and about the relevant industry, 
3 having strong capabilities of decision-making, risk management, discovering and 
using talents, and making innovations, 
4 having 10 years or longer enterprises management or relevant work experience, or 
being a professional in strategic management, capital operation, law or other 
aspect and having made good performances, 
5 not having attained the age of 55 at the time of initial taking of the position, 
6 having a bachelor’s degree or above or having a senior professional title, 
7 having good psychological quality, and being in good health, 
8 Other requirements as prescribed by the Company law and the articles of 
association.’519 
Because of the sources of external directors are limited, it is hard to select a qualified 
external director. For example, ‘at least one external director shall have a work 
background as chief financial officer or be an expert in financial accounting of 
                                                 
519 Supra 520, Article 10. 
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enterprises…’520. However, in practice some external directors are without such a 
financial background. 521  in addition, senior managers of companies, can find 
themselves in the same situation  as most senior managers of listed companies are not 
professional experts, and without relevant experiences.522 Due to the strict limitations 
of employment conditions, most central SOEs cannot reasonably select the external 
directors.  
 
Secondly, it is not easy to find the external directors with good qualifications for the 
central enterprises, nevertheless, the central enterprise need qualified external directors, 
so the qualified candidates often act as part-time external directors for several central 
enterprises. Some part-time external directors have been known  to work for seven 
central enterprises at the same time.523 This part-time status  means the part-time 
external directors cannot participate in the decision-making and management of central 
enterprises very well, because the huge workload  absorbs the part-time external 
directors’ energy and research time. However, how to deal with the issue of the 
part-time external directors and the numbers of part-time jobs of enterprises was not 
explicitly stipulated in the relevant laws and regulations.  
 
Finally, civil servants and administrators serve as part-time external directors and the 
percentage is too high. The external directors of more than half of the listed central 
                                                 
520 Supra 518, Article 26. 
521 From the interview with the officer who works for SASAC, the interview time was 2012.  
522 Supra 518, Article 26, ‘…at least one external directors shall have experience in the selection, appointment, 
performance evaluation and remuneration management of senior managers of enterprise…’ 
523 Supra 530. 
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companies (the total number is 109) were civil servants and administrators.524 The 
disadvantage of this situation is that civil servants and administrators don’t have 
enough time and energy to understand and research the enterprises; moreover, because 
they lack management experience, they cannot play the director’s role well.  
 
 The rights and responsibilities of the Board of Directors are not clear 
 
In accordance with the provisions of the Company Law, there are four rights for the 
board of directs, namely, the rights of making important decisions in the operation and 
management,525 investment management rights,526 the right for performance appraisal 
and compensation decisions for managers,527 and the election rights for managers528. 
Most senior managers of the listed central companies have government background. 
For example, the chairman of the board of directors or general manager often have 
achieved administration headship level in the government, as the discussed above, and 
they may think more about their own promotion than the development of companies. If 
so, the basic obligation and responsibility of the board of directors can be evaded.  
5.3.3 Problems of the Board of Supervisors 
The board of supervisors is significant and irreplaceable for SOEs in supervision and 
inspection. The supervisors make a huge contribution to ensure the value of 
                                                 
524 Supra 519. 
525 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2013 Amendment), see Article 110, and 111. 
526 Ibid, see Article 112. 
527 Ibid, Article 113. 
528 Ibid. Article 113. 
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state-owned assets and maintain the rights and interests of state-owned assets. But in 
the operation, there are some problems which need improvement.  
 
 Organization and management and positioning of the board of supervisors are not 
reasonable 
The chairman of boards of supervisors shall be selected in accordance with the 
prescribed procedures and appointed by the State Council.529 And full time supervisors 
shall be held by the administrative organ for boards of supervisors.530 The boards of 
supervisors in the key large SOEs shall be dispatched by the State Council, accountable 
to the State Council.531 So how is it possible to understand the relationship between 
boards of supervisors and the State Council? They are neither parent-child relationships, 
nor  cooperative relationships between the various departments of the State Council. 
This organizational form and position setting has introduced barriers to supervision. 
There is no clear answer to some questions, such as: “Who is in charge of the 
chairman?” and “Who could constrain the chairman?” The unfortunate consequences 
caused by the fuzzy rules are very clear: on the one hand, it affects the supervision’s 
work of SOEs, on the other hand, it leads to a misunderstanding about the functions of 
the chairman of the supervisions, including an understanding of whether the position of 
chairman is used to solve some issues about leading cadres retirement and job 
promotions.532  Therefore, improving the authority relationship between the SASAC 
                                                 
529  Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors in State-owned Enterprises issued by State Counci on 
03-15-2000  See Article 15. 
530 Ibid. 
531 Supra 538, Article 2.  
532 Lu, supra note 339, at120. 
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and the supervisions of SOEs is helpful and necessary to eliminate the doubts 
concerning the supervisors system of SOEs.  
 
 The human resource management system of the board of supervisors is not 
scientific and reasonable 
 
First of all, the membership of supervisors is not enough, and when they are under a 
burden of heavy workload, they cannot offer everything, and this affects the 
effectiveness of supervision. According to the report from Lu, the number of 
supervisors of central listed companies on average is four, the least is two, and the most 
is nine.533 The scale of the supervisors is small. Therefore, when the supervision must 
be before or in the process of the event instead of after the event, the supervisors will 
feel understaffed.    
 
Secondly, the board of supervisors did not establish a scientific mechanism of choosing 
and employing members. Although the supervisors’ duty requires every supervisor to 
carefully monitor the directors and managers’ behaviour, and avoid the insider control 
to violate shareholders or other stakeholder’s interests, most supervisors of listed SOEs 
are insiders. So they cannot play their oversight role, except the worker supervisors 
who are stipulated by the Company Law as ‘the representatives of the employees’ of the 
company at an appropriate ratio (not less than one third)to be specifically prescribed in 
                                                 
533 Ibid.  
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the bylaw’.534  The other supervisors of listed companies are generally the trade union 
chairman of the company, discipline inspection commission secretary, and secretary of 
the party committee concurrently. From an administrative level perspective, the 
supervisors are the subordinates of the chairman of the board of directors or general 
manager; their salary, positions are determined by the chairman or general manager. It 
is difficult to effectively fulfil their duties of supervision because the supervision are in 
a position of being led and commanded. Moreover, the full-time supervisors lack a 
career development plan, and this situation impacts on the professionalism and stability 
of the supervisors. Finally, the chairman of the supervisors does not receive any 
punishment when they make serious mistakes concerning SOEs.535  
 
Finally, the board of supervisors has not established a reasonable performance 
management system and incentive mechanism. ‘Those members of the boards of 
supervisors who have made outstanding achievements in carrying out supervision and 
inspection and important contributions to safeguarding the State interests shall be 
rewarded’.536 However, in the process of supervision and inspection, this incentive 
mechanism’s operability is poor and the result is not good.537   
                                                 
534 Company Law 2013, Article 51. 
535  Since 2013, represented by the case of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), scandals about 
executives frequently occurred. It meant the board of supervision did not play its role well in SOEs. Between August 
and September 2013, five former executives and current executive of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
had been Shuanggui because of serious disciplinary violations.  Shuanggui is a special survey of the Chinese 
Communist Party Discipline Inspection Organs and Government Administrative Supervisory Organs. The term of 
“Shuang Gui” appeared in paragraph 1 of article 28 of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Authority 
Case Inspection Regulations, "asked relevant personnel within the prescribed time, place, to explain the case 
involved in the problem". The details of CNPC’s case can see http://www.ccstock.cn/subject/zhongshiyouwoan/ 
(assessed 9 th September 9, 2015). For the research on punishment for the chairman of supervision see Yan Xuefeng, 
2013. “Wenze Yangqi Jianshihui Zhuxi”, Directors & Boards, 10 2013. 
536 Interim Regulations on the Board of Supervisors in State-owned Enterprises issued by the State Council on 
03-15-2000 Article 23. 
537 Yan Ran, 2014. “Qianxi Jianshi zhi Jili Zhidu”, Chinese Time,l (2) 2014. 
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 The lack of formal communication mechanism between the board of supervisors 
and external directors 
 
The communication between the board of supervisors and external directors is arbitrary. 
The listed central companies did not establish a formal communication mechanism.538 
The external directors and supervisors are appointed by the SASAC, and they share the 
aim of ensuring the value of state-owned assets and maintaining the target and interest 
of state shareholder. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a formal communication 
mechanism to promote an expansion of communication.  
 
5.4 Problems about Stakeholders  
 
 Employee participation 
 
Firstly, in China, a good corporate governance of listed SOEs’ employee participation 
lacks effective laws and policy to support the legal status of the Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP).539 Chinese law confirmed three methods to improve the 
                                                 
538 Wang Shoujun, 2013. “Zhongyang Qiye Gongsi Zhili Yanjiu”, Harbin Institute of Technology.  
539 Employee stock ownership plan, an effective enterprise system arrangement, is widely popular in developed 
market economy countries such as in Europe and America.  It is helpful in motivating employees to supervise 
operators’ behavior consciously, and participate in business management so as to improve the operational efficiency 
of enterprises. For more details about ESOP, see Xie Gang, Zhong Weizhou, Wandifang, 2003. “The Nature, 
Function, and Application of Employee Stock Ownership Plan”, Forecasting. 22(3) 2003. And according to Wu 
Chunbo and Zhao Yaping, the first ESOP was from America, and proposed by a lawyer. See Wu Chunbo and Zhao 
Yaping, 2001. “Zhengque Lijie Yuangong Chigu Jihua”, Human Resource Development of China. (9) 2001. 
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workers’ participation in the corporate governance involving the congress of workers 
and staff,540 worker participation in management, and equal consultations between 
worker and companies. However, there was no corresponding legislation to provide 
further details and steps more clearly. Therefore, the legal status of the ESOP is not 
guaranteed, which is a legal obstacle for the implementation of the ESOP. Moreover, 
because Company Law laid down a strict limit to the purchase the company’s own 
shares,541 the source of shares of ESOP had been fixed on the original shareholders’ 
transfer. The result is that the source of shares of ESOP is narrow, and cannot reserve 
shares in the company for later.  
 
Secondly, the management of the ESOP is confusing. On the one hand, because of the 
lack of support from national legislative, there is no unified standard for management. 
The listed SOEs in different cities manage the ESOP differently. Some companies 
entrusted management to securities business institutions to manage; some entrusted the 
local authority card custody centre to manage, and others entrusted the accounting 
department of companies to manage.542 The employee group should be an unofficial, 
not-for-profit organization and be voluntarily composed of internal employees, 
whereas existing employee groups are mostly held in the name of the workers union. 
The ESOP needs a reasonable legal status to function. On the other hand, the proportion 
                                                 
540 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment) issued by National People’s Congress on 
03-14-2004 Article 16; Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 Amendment) issued by 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 12-28-2012 Article 4; Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2013 Amendment) issued by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
12-28/-2012 Article 18, 44,51, 67. 
541 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2013 Amendment) issued by Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on 12-28-2012 Article 138,139,140,141,142,143. 
542 Lu, supra note 339, at124 
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of ESOP for every employee is the same. To some extent, this situation weakens the 
result of the incentive and reduces the enthusiasm of the employees. The ESOP should 
have some variation between different individual position and different responsibilities.     
 
Finally, some listed SOEs issued employees with shares which are for employee’s 
welfare, not in order to realize a long-term cooperation between the staff and listed 
companies. A successful ESOP needs to establish a long-term cooperation system and 
an effective incentive mechanism for managers and employees, with the aim of forming 
a community of risks and benefits to employees and companies, and to improve 
efficiency. There is obviously a price difference between worker shares and ordinary 
shares; in addition, the policy did not strictly limit the circulation of worker shares. In 
general, many shareholders will sell all the shares to get the cash in the secondary 
market. The incentive effect of ESOP had been weakened by this practice of seeking 
short-term interests.  
  
 Management of relationship between listed companies and Stakeholders 
 
The first problem is that interaction in the process of communication between investors 
of listed companies and companies is not enough. Looking at the official website of 113 
listed central companies,543 reveals that because of the requirements of listed company 
information disclosure, all central enterprises set up their own website. However, the 
                                                 
543 http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html access on 12-10-2014. 
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interactivity of the website is poor, in that the investors can only receive the information 
passively to understand the enterprise, but they cannot interact with the enterprise’s 
personnel responsible for information disclosure.  
 
The next problem which should be discussed is that the special relationship between 
regulators and central enterprises reduces the likelihood of the central enterprises being 
punished. When a central enterprise is wandering at the edge of the legal norms, and 
even if regulators can follow the rules and laws, the degree of punishment is still 
difficult to define. Most central enterprises are injected with funds by the SASAC, and 
the supervision by local regulatory bodies of central enterprises has declined because of 
the lower permissions and effectiveness of local regulatory body. Central enterprises 
also underestimate the local regulatory because of central enterprises’ own special 
identity.  
 
Last but not least, the attention the central enterprises pay to crisis management is 
limited in China. The 113 central enterprises have not established the evaluation 
standard for crisis management and risk events. The methods and results concerning 
risk events solved by managers are not included in the performance appraisal of central 
enterprise. As a result, the possibility of damaging the economic interests of the central 
enterprises caused by risk events will increase, and then the social concern and market 
value of central enterprises will reduce.  
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 Social Responsibility 
 
First of all, there is no standard definition of central enterprises’ social responsibility.544 
In the operation of the central enterprises, there is no clear guidance for dealing with 
violation of regulations in a central enterprise, and in general, solving any problems 
relies on the senior managers’ personal understanding. The main problems concerning 
the content of the social responsibility are vague, the targets of responsibility are 
uncertain, responsibility and tasks are not quantitative. According to the specific 
content of corporate social responsibility of central enterprise in 2010, 2011 and 
2012,545 there is a big difference between different central enterprises, most of which 
lack a detailed description of the social responsibility. Therefore, when the social 
responsibility report is completed in form, it has violated the original intention of the 
SASAC to promote the central enterprise to discharge social responsibility. The reports 
just stated the goals of the enterprises, but did not list specific measures and industry 
standards in order to achieve pre-defined goals. Thus the fulfilment of social 
responsibility obligations by enterprises cannot be measured. Some reports of social 
responsibility are a simple textual description, which just use the words ‘significant’, ‘a 
lot’, ‘very’ to describe the report, but there are no charts, and digital quantitative 
analysis, so the reports lack credibility and persuasion.546  
                                                 
544 So far there is no a set social responsibility evaluation system of central enterprises.According to the Guidance on 
the Performance of Social Responsibility of Central Enterprises, the central enterprise’s social responsibility is 
divided into eight aspects.However, secondary and tertiary segment index did not  constitute the index system. See 
Wang Bing, 2013. “Woguo Zhongyang Qiye Shehui Zeren Pingjia Zhibiao Tixi Gaijin Tantao”, Jiangxi University of 
Finance.  
545  Heng Jianxin, and Li Zhijian, 2012. “Yangqi Shehui Zeren Xinxi Pilu Xianshi Kunjing Ji Duice”, 
Communication of Finance and Accounting. 09 2012. 
546 The argument comes from Xu Jialin and Liu Haiying, according to them, social responsibility reports of 125 
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Secondly, as discussed in the former section, in China the leaders of central enterprises 
hold administrative positions at the same time; therefore, the leaders tend to hide bad 
news about central enterprises in the report which is published for the public, because 
the bad news may affect their own achievements. Because of incomplete information 
disclosure, the information users realise the information is incomplete. Most central 
enterprises just disclose information about public welfare, donations, and energy 
conservation, but the negative information is less.547  
 
Thirdly, as a result of indistinct definition of the standards and evaluation system of 
social responsibility, some central enterprises tend to pursue campaigns for short-term 
commercial benefit, but call it fulfilling social responsibility. The Chinese government 
did not establish a complete system and set of standards to guide and promote central 
enterprises to take social responsibility. The government pays more attention to taxes 
and social security.  The public did not realize the importance of supervision on 
implementation of social responsibility by themselves; therefore, the effective 
supervision by public had not been realized.548 
 
                                                                                                                                            
central enterprises between 2006 and 2010 had been analyzed, the reports lacked credibility and persuasion was the 
common problem. See Xu Jialin and Liu Haiying, 2010. “Woguo Yangqi Shehui Zeren Xinxi Pilu Xianzhuang 
Yanjiu—Jiyu 2006-2010 Nian Jian 100 Fen Shenhui Qiye Zeren Baogao de Fenxi”, Journal of Zhongnan University 
of Economics and Law. 06 2010. 
547 Ibid.  And also can see Heng Jianxin, and Li Zhijian, 2012. “Yangqi Shehui Zeren Xinxi Pilu Xianshi Kunjing Ji 
Duice”, Communication of Finance and Accounting. 09 2012. 
548 Wang Kelei, 2011. “Shilun Woguo Gongsi Shehui Zeren”, China University of Political Science and Law. And 
the same opinion can see Wang Yixu, 2014. “Yangqi Shehui Zeren Pingjia Zhibiao Tixi Chutan—Shehui Gongzhong 
Shijiao”, Chinese & Foreign Corporate Culture. 10 2014.  More discussion of this issue are contained in Jiang 
Zhiyu, 2014. “Tanxi Yangqi Lvxing Shehui Zeren de Weilai Zouxiang”, Guide to Business. 05 2014. 
 207 
Finally, most central enterprises’ social responsibility refers to the Guidelines for 
Central Enterprises to Fulfil Social Responsibilities issued by the SASAC, or social 
responsibility instructions to listed companies issued by the stock exchange. The 
reports on social responsibility are supposed to achieve the goal that the board of 
directors and all the directors should guarantee their reports’ content has no falsehoods, 
misleading statements or major omissions, and they can take individual or joint liability 
for the authenticity, accuracy and completeness of content. Since the central enterprises 
did not hire a third party to inspect the report, the credibility of the report was not 
confirmed. The aim of releasing the social responsibility report is to help the central 
enterprises fulfil social responsibility better, but if the authenticity and reliability of the 
report has not been required, it may lead to consumers and investors feeling deceived.  
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Chapter 6: The Characteristics and the Suggestions of the 
Corporate Governance of Chinese State-Owned Listed 
Companies 
6.1 Characteristics 
6.1.1 Strong Government Intervention and the Government-led Driving Force 
 
The formation and development of China's corporate governance mechanism of SOEs 
has experienced continuous trial and error, and constantly improved the process in the 
Chinese capital market.549  The reform and opening-up policy and construction of the 
capital market are the social environment for the early development of Chinese CG. 
The planned economy and strong government administrative control are the features of 
Chinese SOEs in 1980s. The reform and opening-up policy was dominated by the 
government's top-down process which meant that reforms in the fields of corporate 
governance were also driving force employed by the government-led top-down 
process.550 The reform lack driving force for the construction of corporate governance. 
 
At the beginning of development of China's capital market, the Chinese government 
tried to decentralize administrative, but due to the lack of unified national legal rules, 
the result was that the local government could not control the SOEs very well. The 
construction of the capital market system was not mature against the background of the 
                                                 
549 Guo Shuqing, 1999. “Zhongguo Shichang Jingji Zhong de Zhengfu Zuoyong”, Reform. 03 1999. Pp. 48-57. 
550 Zhou Tianyong, 2010. “Lun Gaige Kaifang Yilai Zhengfu Zhudao dui Zhongguo Jingji de Tuidong Zuoyong”, 
Studies on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. S1 2010. Pp. 57-70. 
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capital market emerging in the transition time, because the domestic market 
management was weak, the market adjustment ability was not good, intermediary 
agencies and other social organizations were unable to play a strong role, and capital 
market was in a state of having no regulation and supervision.551 In this case, the 
central government asserted its authority through repatriating powers from the local 
governments into their own hands. That included beginning to practice administrative 
control, and developing and implementing a wide variety of multifarious, detailed 
administrative regulations and administrative discipline.552 The central government, 
once a bystander in the early period of development of capital market, became a strong 
leader and a controller.553 
 
The formulation and implementation of the laws and regulations on Chinese corporate 
governance of SOEs, are often oriented by problem and task, namely with the 
appearance of specific issues and experience related to repeated trial and error about 
corporate governance, the regulations and laws targeted at the those problems and 
lessons, then formulated and adopted. The formulation and implementation of the laws 
and regulations on Chinese corporate governance of SOEs is step by step, developing 
from less to more, and from the very general to specific and professional. 
 
In the process of establishing rules and regulations on CG, the government departments 
                                                 
551 Huang Fanzhang, 2012. “Zhengfu Zhudao yu Zhengfu Shoushen—Jianlun Chongsuo Guoziwei he Chengli 
Guojia Ziyuan Guanli Weiyuanhui”,Tribune of Study. 12 2012. Pp. 33-38. 
552 Ibid.  
553 Chi Fulin, 2013. “Gaige Zhongdian: Lishun Zhengfu yu Shichang Guanxi”, Zi Guang Ge. 11 2013. Pp. 31-33. 
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and related organization operating in the forefront of Chinese SOEs’ CG, acquired more 
relevant information, professional knowledge and practical experience. In addition, 
those departments and organizations have the stronger professional ability for drafting 
law than the legislature, and therefore they dominated the corporate governance of the 
legislative process. Under the situation of lacking of laws, regulations and a code of 
corporate governance and lacking of independent enforcement mechanism, the 
government-led model, becomes a strong power, which can be used to quickly fill the 
gap of the law and the market mechanism. 
 
6.1.2 Transplantation of Chinese Corporate Governance 
The development of corporate governance is in line with the development of modern 
enterprises with the basic characteristics of the separation of ownership and managerial 
authority. Solving the problem of operator's incentive and supervision mechanism is the 
core of CG. Different solutions were born from different countries with their own 
politics, economy and culture. This led to different corporate governance models in the 
world. At the beginning of establishing the modern enterprise system, China adopted a 
system transplant strategy. The introduction of corporate governance model, 
established XinSanHui as the basic framework of corporate governance system, and 
then learned lessons from other countries and regions on a good governance system.554 
Because there are so many differences between our country's current situation and the 
                                                 
554 Shi Xiaohong, 2009. “Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili de Chansheng he Yanbian Lujing: Cong Falv Yizhi dao Bentuhua 
Tansuo”, China Economic& Trade Herald. (20) 2009. 
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introduced corporate governance’s cultural background and economic basis, many 
problems are arising, such as that of employee participation system becoming 
formality.555 
  
Compared with capitalism, if socialism in the pursuit of superiority wants to win 
greater development, it must boldly absorb and draw lessons from all achievements of 
other countries including the production modes of operation and advanced 
management methods of developed capitalist countries which reflect modern social 
regulations.556 According to Montesquieu, law made for the people of a country, 
should be very applicable to its people. So if the law of one country can apply to another 
country, it is just a coincidence.557 If from these two perspectives, the CG of SOEs has 
been copied from other countries, but with Chinese characteristics caused by the legal 
transplantation, it ,merits  the corresponding explanation. 
  
Corporate governance is a kind of culture. The United States, Europe and Japan's 
corporate governance models have their own culture. Liberalism is deep-rooted in 
America; it is generally supposed that the concentration of private economic rights will 
make the public extremely nervous. So the political power of the United States 
repeatedly blocked the development of the financial institutions to acquire enough 
                                                 
555 Zhang Wenting, Shi Guanglong. 2012. “Fansi Falv Yizhi Moshi xia de Ziben Shichang Chuangxin Jizhi—Yi 
Zhonggaigu Chouwen Beihou de Gongsi Zhili Wenti Weili”, Zheng Quan Fa Yuan, 7(2) 2012.  
556 Deng Xiaoping, 1994. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III. (1982-1992), Beijing: Foreign Language 
Press. P373.  
557 Charles de Montesquieu, 1961. translated by Zhang Yanshen, “the Spirit of Law”. The Commercial Press. P6. 
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stock to exert influence in most large companies. 558  Furthermore, the company's 
shareholding structure is also highly dispersive. Under this background, corporate 
governance in America emphatically limits the infringement of board of directors of the 
interests of the shareholders.559 In German companies, the board of directors, board of 
supervisors, and the union used to cooperate. 560  In addition, in Germany the 
Government  created large Banks as a driving force to develop German industry, 
which  would like to supervise the projects which use their bank loans for investment, 
and to participate in the enterprises’ corporate governance.561 Therefore, for the CG in 
Germany, the board of supervisors provides effective supervision mechanism for the 
staff and the external supervisor.562 Japanese companies’ equity structure was mainly 
controlled by Zaibatsu families after the Second World War, so the stock quickly 
became concentrated by the Banks and insurance companies, with cross-shareholdings 
as the main method tying the industry and finance sector together.563 Zaibatsu families 
often through Banks and insurance company over the company crisis’ period; moreover, 
their workers with heartfelt mental and cultural traditions, will stay and over the hard 
time with company. Furthermore, companies also tried to take various measures to 
improve the cohesion.564 Japan's corporate governance reflects consistency between 
                                                 
558 Zhao Yuan, 2009. “Dongshihui Zhongxin Shuo yu Gudong Zhongxinshuo: Xiandai Meiguo Gongsi Zhili 
Xueshuo Zhibian”, Journal of Comparative Law, 04 2009. Pp. 93-99.  
559 Song Yongxin, Yang Rong, 2003. “Research American Corporate Governance from Enron Crisis”, Wuhan 
University Journal (social sciences) 56 (1) 2003. 
560 Cui Xuedong, Sheng Feng, 2006. “Deguo Gongsi Zhili Moshi Cunzai de Wenti yu Gaige”, Contemporary 
Economic Management, 04 2006. Pp. 108-111.   
561 Ibid. 
562 Li Chuanjun, 2005. “Liyi Xiangguanzhe de Gongtong Zhili—Deguo Gongsi Zhili de Jingyan”, Infornation for 
Enterpreneurs. 09 2005. Pp. 60-61. 
563 Cui Xuedong, 2007. “Jiaocha Chigu de Bianhua yu Riben Gongsi Zhili Gaige”, Contemporary Economy of 
Japan. 02 2007. Pp. 43-47. and more information about the cross-shareholding of CG for Japanese companies can be 
seen in Sun Shichun, 2001. “Cong Dangqian Riben Gongsi Zhili Jiegou Kan Farenjian Huxiang Chigu de Zhengfu 
Xiaoying”, Japan Studies. 03 2001. Pp. 6-11. 
564 Sun Li, 2001. “Jiandu, Jili yu Gongsi Zhili- Qianxi Riben Gongsi Zhili Jiegou de Youxiaoxing”, Japan Studies. 
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the actual control and staff under the common goal.565 
 
Compared with the countries mentioned above, the highly centralized management 
mode is the main method of management in China - both family management habits in 
the past and the governance mode of the contemporary economy.566 Related ethics and 
social acquaintances constitute the internal and external environment of corporate 
governance - shareholders, senior management and staff.  In a company, internal 
governance lacks the habit of democratic decision-making, and excludes external 
supervision mechanism.567 However, the core of the modern corporate governance - 
the separation of powers - is totally different with the Chinese enterprises’ cultural 
background. So, when the CG system had been transplanted and applied in Chinese 
companies, some new problems appeared.568 Major cultural differences require that the 
CG of Chinese SOEs must absorb the experience of home and abroad, and explore the 
modern management with Chinese characteristics. Innovation in the process of trial and 
error is the correct method to explore the governance system of listed companies which 
are suitable for China's national conditions. 
 
6.2 Suggestions  
 
                                                                                                                                            
04 2001.  
565 Ping Tian Guang Hong, Li Weian, 1998. “Riben Gongsi Zhili: Biange yu Qishi”, Nan Kai Business Review. 06 
1998. Pp. 6-15.  
566 Yang Hua, 2011.  Reconstruction: New Path for Corporate Governance, Beijing: China CITIC Press.  
567 Ibid.  
568 For Tthe case about Zhonggai Gu see Zhang Wenting, Shi Guanglong, 2012. “Fansi Falv Yizhi Moshi Xiade 
Ziben Shichang Chuangxin Jizhi- Yi Zhonggai Gu Chouwen Beihou de Gongsi Zhili Wenti Weili”, Zheng Quan Fa 
Yuan, 7(2) 2012.  
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The characteristics and problems of corporate governance of Chinese listed companies 
are good evidence to support changes and further development of corporate governance 
in China. Although in accordance with the requirements of the modern enterprises 
system and through a transplantation of western corporate government modes, Chinese 
listed companies so far established the general meeting of shareholders, board of 
directors, board of supervisors and managers in form, the original SOEs management 
system in the state holding listed companies is still dominant, and plays an important 
role. Under the operation of such a mixed mode, the reform of SOEs itself is not the 
only method, and more suggestions for solving the problems will be discussed below. 
6.2.1 Fundamentally Solve the Problem of Related Party Transactions 
The related transactions and horizontal competition, as the main and difficult problems 
restricting long-term development of China’s capital markets, are the key reasons for 
weakening the independence of the state holding listed company. Part of the issues of 
related transactions and horizontal competition are caused by the irregular and halfway 
reform of SOEs.569  
 
For the different types of cases which have problems left over from history, the first step 
is to understand the details and specific situation, then solve them one by one: for 
example, creating a solution for the specific case, and encouraging, guiding and 
                                                 
569 The emergence of China's securities market is the system arrangement which was introduced in the period of 
economic transformation, with the aim of pushing the reform of state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises 
listed on the stock market. In order to achieve the standard for listing, Chinese SOEs mainly adopts the model of 
overall listed and business spin-off listed in the past, so the resulting companies lack the ability to operate, making it 
difficult to avoid horizontal competition and related transactions. See Wang Hao, “Woguo A Gu Shichang Qiye Jieke 
Shangshi Xiangguan Wenti Yanjiu”, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Pp. 19-78. 
 215 
supervising the company to seize  favourable opportunities, through methods such as 
merger, acquisition, reorganization, to make the integrating controlling shareholders, 
related party and their affiliates assets integrate, and after the integration, make all of 
them into the system of listed companies. 570  At the same time, the regulatory 
authorities should focus on the holistic listed companies, to prevent the listed 
companies using the chance of holistic listing to do insider trading, manipulate the 
stock price, obtain illegal interests, or disrupt the capital market with the related 
parties.571  
 
In addition, as the related party transactions in recent years are more subtle and indirect, 
the measures for dealing with this trend should be as follows: firstly, in the operation of 
supervision, strengthen the analysis of cases about specific related transactions,572 and 
find the commonality and breakthroughs, collect more experience for solve the 
problem about how to define the specific related party, and perfect relevant 
legislation.573 Moreover, there should be a strengthening of independent directors for 
                                                 
570 Yang, supra note 486, at 88. 
571 Ibid. 
572 In order to circumvent the law, the form of related party transactions of listed companies renews itself ceaselessly, 
and subsidiaries and joint-stake Company become the main related party. See Huang Na, 2012. “Zouyi Woguo 
Shangshi Gongsi Guanglian Jiaoyi Xinxi Pilu Cunzai de Wenti he Gaijin Jianyi”, Securities & Futures of China, 10 
2012. 
573 The definition of related party is important. First of all, the Chinese Company Law just simply defined the 
affiliated party, and the Chinese Securities Law did not define about related parties. The Shanghai and Shenzhen’s 
Stock Listing Rules, adopt a way of enumeration which specifies the scope of the related parties, but unavoidably 
omissions appear. Secondly, accurately defining the related party transactions is the key to solving the unfair related 
transactions of listed companies. There are some defects the existing laws, embodied in regulations and rules for the 
legal regulating of the unfair related transactions. The existing legal norms’ level is low, the legal framework about 
related transactions lacks overall plan, and the information disclosure system of listed companies and related 
transaction of listed company shareholder voting rights system and responsibility- tracing system still have 
deficiencies. The imperfection of the legal regulation system about related party transactions of listed companies 
could lead to unfair related transactions escaping legal regulation, which would affect the legitimate rights and 
interests of minority shareholders and creditors, and even affect the safety, stability and prosperity of economic 
market in Chins. Therefore, it is necessary to abide by the principle of good faith, fairness and efficiency  and the 
principle of procedural justice, on the basis of these principles, and improve the legal system from these three 
aspects:y, first of all establishing procedural rules in advance and restricting related transactions of listed companies 
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the prior review duty and afterwards to investigate responsibility for related party. The 
independent director should be supervised and urged to really diligently to fulfil the 
obligations to review related party transactions, issue independent opinion and realize 
justice. Furthermore, the supervision for the agency or intermediary institution, such as 
asset appraisal firms, should be strengthened. The assets appraisal industry standards 
and the system of selecting agencies need to be perfected. The objectivity and 
impartiality of evaluating the value of related party transactions should be improved. 
The last suggestion is about the improvement of the judicial relief mechanism and its 
effective use, including whether the litigation mechanism of shareholders meeting 
resolution can be revoked or can be decided to invalid, 574  including shareholder 
derived litigation mechanism, the judicial review system of the fairness of connection 
                                                                                                                                            
before they happen, such as improving the shareholders' voting rights challenge systemand the listed company 
information disclosure system.In addition,  improving the internal governance structure, strengthening the 
controlling shareholders fiduciary duty and the independent director system, is conducive to the protection of the 
interests of minority shareholders and creditors. Afterwards relief measures can-build a good judicial relief way, in 
order to regulate related transactions. 
574 According to Article 22 of Chinese Company Law, specific provision for the resolution of the shareholders' 
general meeting revocable system has been made. The Article 22 created the resolution of the shareholders meeting 
revocable system in China, set up a legal basis for the shareholders. Compared with the Company Law 1993, it is an 
achievement. Shortcomings of the resolution of the shareholders' general meeting revocable system: the resolution 
without distinction between revocable system and non-litigation relief system, and lack of the judicial practice in the 
remedy system. Relief method about the shareholders meeting resolution revocable system was divided into 
non-judicial relief and judicial relief, non-judicial relief to include personnel to attend the shareholders meeting to 
make the revocable defects, as well as to withdraw and ratifythe revocable defective resolution, the judicial relief is 
an important way of relief of revocable resolution. In China, shareholders only have revocable proceeding method, 
without the non-litigation relief way. Even in litigation relief way and only the shareholders as the only main body 
can institute legal proceedings. Chinese Company Law did not regulate to the guarantee system and main body 
qualification, and provision of the discretion to reject system. 
The resolution of the shareholders' general meeting of revocable system in China should be built. First of all, it is 
more appropriate for Chinese’s system of the shareholders meeting resolution revocable system adopts the model-- 
revocable, does not exist, and is invalid. However, the resolution revocable system and the resolution was invalid 
system, these two types having been provided in current legislation, the type of non- existence of resolution should 
be given independence status. Second, the non-litigation relief way can effectively maintain trade order, and the 
company’s operating stability, so the construction of non-litigation relief way for the shareholders meeting resolution 
relief system is urgently needed. Finally, the resolution of the shareholders' general meeting revocable system 
provides only the lawsuit relief way and the guarantee system, with no clear regulations regarding the above system, 
the discretion to set aside system should be introduced in China: “Revocation of the resolution of the shareholders' 
general meeting proceeding, the court may consider the content of the resolution, the company situation and all other 
circumstances, considers discomfort at the time, can be set aside”, in order to achieve the litigation right and prevent 
the abuse of litigation right of exercise of the right balance. 
More discussion about this issue can see Zhang Juan, 2007. “Gudong Dahui Jueyi Ke Chexiao Zhidu Yanjiu”, 
Master degree thesis of Master of China Excellent Full-text Database. 04 2007 Pp. 1-51.  And see Zhang Lei, 2014. 
“Gudong Dahui Jueyi Ke Chexiao Zhidu Yanjiu”, Master degree thesis of Master of China Excellent Full-text 
Database. 
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transaction, and the system of disregard of corporate personality.  
6.2.2 Perfect the Management System of the State-Owned Equity, Standardize the 
Scope and Procedure of Government Intervention 
The typical patterns of representation of the state-owned shareholders of listed 
companies in Chinese capital market can be divided into the followings: the first kind 
of pattern is that the SASAC of local government at all levels is the representative of the 
state-owned shareholders of listed companies. 575  The second kind is that the 
state-owned assets management company established by the government is the 
representative, such as State Development& Investment Corporate (SDIC) 576  and 
China Cheng Tong (CCT)577, and the state-owned assets management company which 
is affiliated to Beijing municipal SASAC. The last kind of representative of the 
state-owned shareholders of listed company is the SOE Group which is authorized by 
government, for example, the China National Chemical Corporation.578 According to 
the modern corporate governance theory, the shareholder representative participation in 
the activities of the listed company is a kind of civil legal action. They need to accept 
restriction by civil laws and commercial laws, without any special status. However, for 
the three modes stated above, the status of the state-owned assets management 
institutions is special. Under the mode of direct holdings of stock, the state-owned 
assets management institution plays the role of the shareholders, under the mode of 
                                                 
575 Such as the two listed companies—Anhui Conch Cement Company Limited (600585) and Wuhu Conch Profiles 
and Science Company Limited (000619) which belongs to Anhui SASAC Conch Group, Yunnan Yunwei Co.Ltd. 
(600725) belongs to Yunnan SASAC. GRG Banking Equipment Co. Ltd. (002152) belongs to Guangzhou SASAC, 
and Chongqing Taiji Industry (Group) Co. Ltd. (600129) Chongqing SASAC. 
576 See http://www.sdic.com.cn/cn/index.htm (accessed on 16 September 17, 2015). 
577 See http://www.cctgroup.com.cn/wwwroot/c_000000010009/ (accessed on 16 September 17, 2015). 
578 See http://www.chemchina.com.cn/portal/index.htm (accessed on 16 September 17, 2015). 
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authorized operation; the state-owned assets management institution plays the role of 
the supervision and administration.   
 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises 
weakens the administrative and supervisory functions of the state-owned assets 
management institutions. 579  Moreover, the Chapter VII of Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, State-owned Assets 
Supervision, did not state the SASAC’s duty of supervision and the state-owned assets 
investors’ duty of supervision, but instead, the supervision of the standing committee of 
the people’s congress at every level,580 supervision of the State Council and the local 
people’s government,581 the supervision of the audit organs582 and supervision of the 
supervision of the general public583 had been emphasized. It is clear that the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises is deprived of the 
regulatory functions with administrative function of the state-owned assets supervision 
and administration institution.  
                                                 
579 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-owned Assets of Enterprises issued by Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress on 10-28-2008, Article 6 ‘ the State Council and the local people’s governments 
shall, according to law, perform the contributor’s functions, based on the principles of separation of government 
bodies and enterprises, separation of the administrative functions of public affairs and the functions of the 
state-owned assets contributor, and non-intervention in the legitimate and independent business operations of 
enterprises.’ the same agreement of state-owned assets investors’ duty can be traced into the Report of the Party’s 
Sixteenth Congress and Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned Assets of the 
Enterprises issued by State Council on 05-27-2003. 
580 Ibid. Article 63, the Standing committee of the people’s congress at every level shall legally exercise the powers 
of supervision, though hearing and deliberating the specialized work reports on the performance of the contributors’ 
functions by the corresponding people’s government and on the supervision and administration of state-owned assets, 
organizing the law enforcement inspection on the implementation of this Law, etc.  
581 Ibid. Article 64, the State Council and the local people’s governments shall conduct supervision over the 
performance of functions by the bodies empowered by them to perform the contributors’ functions. 
582 Ibid. Article 65,’…the audit organs conduct audit supervision over the implementation of the state-owned capital 
operating budgets and the state-invested enterprises falling within the subjects of the audit supervision.’ 
583 Ibid. Article 66, ‘the State Council and the local people’s governments shall make available to the public the 
status of state-owned assets and the information on the state-owned assets supervision and administration, and accept 
the supervision of the general public…’  
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Although there are some distinctions for functions of the state-owned assets 
management institutions, the different functions are still mixed. For example, the 
functions about management of state-owned assets, personnel decisions, and managing 
specific affairs are taken at the same time by SASAC. Managing state-owned assets is 
the civil right and obligation of state shareholders, but the state-owned assets 
management institutions take responsibility about personnel decisions, and managing 
specific affairs at the same time will cause the listed company problems about 
personnel intervention.584 Future legislation shall strictly divide the functions of the 
state-owned assets management institutions, and distinguish the duties of investors and 
supervisor. The SASAC and other government department shall play the roles of 
investors and supervisor. The administration commission’s scope, content, methods, 
procedure, and corresponding liability ascertained system of intervention of 
supervisors to state-owned listed companies shall be defined clearly in the legal system.  
6.2.3 Improve the Efficiency of Corporate Governance of State-owned Holding 
Listed Companies  
The predecessor of the state holding listed company decided the particularity and 
complexity of the internal structure. The Party Committee, staff and workers’ congress, 
trade unions and the board of supervisors of the original SOEs combined together with 
the corporate governance of the modern enterprises system including meeting of 
                                                 
584 See http://www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n101964c800p2.aspxb (accessed on 16 September 17, 2015) Li Yining, 2013. 
“Li Yining : Guoziwei Yao Fangquan Bie Ganshe Guoqi Yunying Taiduo”. 
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shareholders, the board of directors, board of supervisors and managers. These two 
modes combined and formed the internal governance structure of state holding listed 
companies with Chinese characteristics. These institutions and functions overlapped, 
which led to a degree of confusion and division of insider governance. 585  Some 
institutions are just taking a necessary external form, but it is hard for them to play their 
proper role. Therefore, it is necessary for the internal structure of state holding listed 
company to integrate innovation, streamline institutions, cut costs and enhance the 
effectiveness of its legal intelligence performance, and further improve the 
management efficiency of state holding listed companies.  
 
1. To promote a fusion between the Party Committee and the board of directors, and to 
establish an effective board of directors. In the state holding listed companies, the Party 
Committee is not only dealing with the ideological and political work of the members 
of the Communist Party of China, but also participating in the company’s business 
decisions. All the important issues of the reform and development of the state holding 
listed company had to be discussed, collectively researched and decided by the Party 
Committee.586 The working methods and function of the Party Committee are similar 
to the board of directors. At present, a relatively effective measure can solve this 
problem which is to take a mode of mutual part-time, namely, to absorb the main 
                                                 
585 More detail of confusion can see Bai Yue, 2012, “Woguo Guoyou Duzi Gongsi Neibu Ge Jiandu Jigou Xianghu 
Guanxi Yanjiu”, Capital University of Economics. And see Dong Baiyi, 2008. “Lun Woguo Duli Dongshi yu 
Jianshihui de Chongtu yu Xietiao”, Journal of Hebei University (Philosophy and Social Science). 05 2008. Pp. 
83-86. 
586 Yang Hua, 2011. Gongsi Zaizao: Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili de Xinlujing. Beijing: China CITIC Press. P. 
90. 
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members of the Party Committee into the board of directors as internal directors.587 In 
addition, this kind of part-time working would have to meet the qualifications, 
nomination and election procedures of the state holding listed company.  
 
For effective operation, the board of the directors shall be relatively independent from 
the controlling shareholders and managers. Controlling shareholders or any insider 
control over the board of directors will lead to an imbalance of the internal governance 
structure. In order to guarantee the independence, scientific nature and effectiveness of 
the board’s decision, the following aspects should be strengthened. First of all, the 
nomination, election and replacement system of directors should be perfected, and a 
board of director’s team with diversified background and knowledge structure need to 
be established. This system and team should maximize all the parties’ interests, and 
ensure that the board of directors will have independent professional judgment ability. 
Secondly, independent director management institutions, such as the independent 
director association, should be established and responsible for the management of the 
independent directors, and the assessment of salary payment. And the independent 
director database should be established and improved; controlling shareholders 
recommended or nominated independent directors should be randomly selected in the 
database to improve the quality of the independent directors. Thirdly, the relationship 
between the board of directors and managers should be straightened out. The chairman 
should be banned from being the general manger at the same time in the same state 
                                                 
587 Ibid. 
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owned listed company. A regular evaluation mechanism of the managers should be 
established, aiming to realize the separation and checks and balances between the rights 
of management, decision-making and executive authority.  
 
2. It is necessary to promote the fusion between dispatched supervisors and the board of 
supervisors, and improve the effectiveness of the supervision of the board of 
supervisors.588 In practice, the SASAC, in order to enhance the monitoring of state 
holding listed companies, often directly or indirectly through state-owned shareholders, 
dispatches full-time supervisors to exercise right of supervision. Compared with the 
supervisors of state holding listed companies, the dispatched supervisors neither 
receive compensation from state holding listed companies (thus without direct interest 
relationship with the listed companies), nor are controlled by companies, being 
relatively independent of major shareholders. However, these dispatched supervisors 
replicate the functions of listed companies’ own supervisors, yet carry with them the 
staff identity from the SASAC. This situation conflicts with the regulations of the Civil 
Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China that a civil servant shall not undertake 
or participate in any profit-making activity or hold a concurrent post in an enterprise or 
any other profit-making organization.589 One suggestion to improve the supervision 
structure of the state holding listed company and reduce the cost of governance is that 
the SASAC should involve the dispatch of supervisors into the supervision of state 
holding listed company through proposing candidates, not directly or indirectly through 
                                                 
588 Ibid. 
589 Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China issued by Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on 04-27-2005, See Article 42, and Article 53. 
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state-owned shareholders. The other suggestion includes to establishing and improving 
the administration system of the dispatch supervisors, making particular  
specifications on the identity, functions and power, accreditation program and measures 
of dispatch supervisors, in order to avoid conflicting with the Civil Servant Law, 
Company Law, the Listed Company Corporate Governance Standards and other related 
Laws and regulations.  
 
Whether board of supervisors can exercise authority effectively depends on whether the 
members of the board of supervisors have corresponding independence and ability. At 
present, most members of board of supervisors for Chinese state owned listed company 
are supervisors who represent the interests of the major shareholders and employee 
supervisors. The full time supervisors hired from outside are rare. Before serving as a 
supervisor, some have worked for the Party Affairs Committee,590 discipline inspection 
committees,591 and trade unions.592 Even after serving as a supervisor, there are some 
                                                 
590 According to Chinese Constitution Law, the Company Law and relevant regulations of the Constitution of 
Communist Party of China (amended and adopted at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China on October 21, 2007), the Party Affairs Committee has the main body qualification to participate in corporate 
governance of the state holding listed company. This is a feature of CG of the state holding listed company in China. 
For more discussion about the Party Affairs Committee see Guo Yabing, 2014. “Lun Guoyou Qiye Dangwei 
Zhengzhi Hexin Zuoyong de Fahui”, New West, (6) 2014. 
591 Discipline inspection work of state-owned enterprises is an important part of Party Committee of enterprise, 
which shoulders responsibilities including maintenance the party constitution under the leadership of the Party 
Committee, rectifying the style of discipline for the Party and cadres, checking the Party's line policies ar carried out 
in the enterprise, and ensuring the sustainable development of the enterprise and its execution. See Han Zhenyiang, 
2010. “Qiantan Xinshiqi Guoyou Qiye Jijian Jiancha Gongzuo”, Shanxi Development & Reform. 05 2010. Pp. 44-46. 
and See Wang Fuyi, 2011. “Ruhe Qianghua Guoyou Qiye Jijian Jiancha Bumen de Zhineng”, Market 
Modernization.. 4 2011. 
592 According to Article 7, Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on April 3, 1992 at the 5th 
Session of the 7th National People's Congress, and amended according to the Decision on Amending the Trade 
Union Law of the People's Republic of China at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National 
People's Congress on October 27, 2001. ‘Article 7 A trade union shall mobilize and organize the employees to 
participate in the economic development actively, and to complete the production and work assignments 
conscientiously, educate the employees to improve their ideological thoughts and ethics, technological and 
professional, scientific and cultural qualities, and build an employee team with ideals, ethics, education and 
discipline.’ The trade union in the SOEs was appointed by the Party Committee at the higher level. In state-owned 
enterprises, one of the legal responsibilities of the state-owned enterprise’s trade union is to foster the patriotism of 
employees through education. The trade union’s job is to safeguard the rights and interests of workers, and resolve 
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who take the part-time positions in these departments; some even do the part-time job 
of managing and operating the company.593 It is difficult to ensure the independence of 
the supervisors, and it is hard to guarantee that supervisors have enough time and 
energy to carry out supervision. Therefore, the governance structure of supervisors 
should be improved; the proportion of external professional supervisors should be 
increased, especially the proportion of operating personnel who are familiar with the 
industry or who have professional background including accounting, auditing and legal 
background. This part of the supervisor’s nomination and compensation should be 
charged by the independent directors, and the power to appoint and dismiss them 
should be left to the general meeting of shareholders, thus cutting the subordinate 
relationship between this element of supervisors and the board of directors and senior 
managers. In addition, the existing board of supervisors system lacks the guiding rules 
with regard to the specific work of the supervisors,594 and because of this lack the rules 
should be further refined. Manoeuvrability need to be improved, for example, in what 
issues need to be supervised, and the procedures, measures, information channels, 
agencies and spending should be explicit.  
 
3. To the workers’ congress system should be perfected to ensure that employees can 
effectively participate in corporate governance. The employee is one of groups which 
                                                                                                                                            
difficult problems. For more discussion of the trade union see Wang Erfu, 2011. “Gonghui Zai Guoyou Qiye 
Zhongde Weizhi”, China Urban Economy. 12 2011. P. 92. 
593 There is more detailin these articles, which hold the same opinion: Ma Bo, Wang Xiaoming, 2013. “Qiye Jianzhi 
Gonghui Ganbu Ruhe Zuohao Gonghui Gongzuo”, Chinese Workers’ Movement. 01 2013. Pp. 53-54. and see Xu 
Fengyang, 2011. “Xiandai Qiye Fazhan Xuyao Gonghui Zhicheng”, China Co-Operation Economy, 11 2011. 
594 Yang Hua, 2011. Gongsi Zaizao: Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili de Xinlujing. Beijing: China CITIC Press. P. 
91. 
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are closely related to corporate interests. The company’s business situation is directly 
related with the interests of the employee. Compared with public shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders for state owned listed company, employee are familiar 
with the operation of the company, and the relationship between the company and 
employee is more durable. Therefore, the employee can gain a certain degree of 
decision-making participation and supervision. The method and procedures for 
employees to participate in corporate governance should be regulated, in order to 
improve the employee’s interests and the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
According to the provisions of the Company Law about listed company employee 
representatives,595 the key for the employee to effectively participate in corporate 
governance is whether the workers’ congress can play its proper role.  
 
The workers’ congress system is a traditional and effective organisational form for 
SOEs’ workers to participate in a democratic management. According to the 
requirements of the modern enterprises system, ‘Xin Sanhui’, as a new governance 
structure, had been established after the corporate reform of SOEs. The workers’ 
congress basically lost its original important position. Although the Company Law still 
retains the workers’ congress system for strengthening the protection of workers’ 
legitimate rights and interests, the legal status and specific rights and procedures had 
not been defined in the Company Law. It is obvious that although Chinese law gives the 
rights to employees to take part in corporate governance, the right is falsified, and the 
                                                 
595 Article 18, 44, and 70 of the Chinese Company Law. 
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corresponding security conditions which can guarantee the rights are not enough. To 
solve the problem, the workers’ congress needs to be further improved by the specific 
measures including: to make  clear the checks and balances relationship and the 
mutual coordination relationship between workers congress and other parts (general 
meeting of shareholders, board of directors, and board of supervisors), to ensure that 
the workers can truly  elect their own representatives – workers directors and workers 
supervisors -and to participate in the operation and management of the company.  
 
6.2.4 Strengthen the Supervision of Insider Information Sources 
The state holding listed companies may submit non-public information to the 
controlling shareholders and actual controllers, and this will cause insider trading. To 
solve this problem since 2007, the CSRC started in some jurisdictions - area under 
administration - to implement an insider information source registration system that 
requires listed companies to report to the securities regulatory bureau about the lists of 
listed companies, controlling shareholders and actual controllers, and other insiders, 
before they submit the non-public information. To put term “insiders “in context: for 
any major event being planned that may affect the stock price of the company, the listed 
company and its directors, supervisors, senior managers, trading counterparts, related 
parties, and directors, supervisors, senior managers or main principals of its trading 
counterparts, professional institutions and handlers it has hired, relevant institutions 
and persons participating in the formulation, demonstration, examination and approval 
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to other relevant links, as well as the relevant institutions and persons that have the 
access or may have the access to the major event due to business contacts.”596 This 
system will bring more regulatory pressures to listed companies, controlling 
shareholders and actual controllers. Moreover, this system will provide important clues 
and evidence for investigation and punishment of insider trading. It plays a key role for 
providing advance warning, timely monitoring and solidification of evidence, and it is 
helpful to check the leakage of inside information and insider trading. The market 
parties have accepted this system, but have not yet become a mandatory provision. In 
the actual execution, parts of insider cannot be included in the scope of registration, 
such as controlling shareholders and actual controllers, and staff of the relevant 
competent department in charge. The scope of registration and the pilot range of the 
system should be expanded in future, and the insider information source registration 
should be made a legal obligation for listed companies and its insiders.  
6.2.5 Improve the State-owned Equity Transfer System  
The corporate control market is the main part of the corporate governance of listed 
company, 597  and plays a key role to optimise resources allocation and industrial 
distribution. Its functions of management and punishment and shareholder governance 
are the important external mechanisms to constrain managers and control shareholders’ 
                                                 
596  Notice of China Securities Regulatory Commission on Regulating the Information Disclosure of Listed 
Companies and the Acts of All the Related Parties issued by CSRC on 08-15-2007, see III. 
597  The importance of corporate control market had been stated in Notice of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on the Relevant Issues concerning the Regulation of Acts of Transferring Actual Controlling Rights of 
Listed Companies issued by CSRC on 09-01-2006, now expired. The corporate control market for listed companies 
has developed further, and the takeover of listed companies is more transparent and standardizing. All this has 
accelerated the innovation of the merger and acquisition market. The transfer of the actual controlling right of listed 
companies concerns the sound management, sustainable development and the rights and interests of the wide 
minority shareholders, and touches the normal order of the securities market…’ 
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behaviour. With the completion of non-tradable share reform, the state-owned equity 
transfer system, environment and trading partners have gone through great changes. 
The traditional methods - the original pricing method which is on the basis of the net 
assets - and the original transfer method which is negotiating transfer are no longer 
suitable for the development of the capital market.598 Therefore, it is necessary to build 
a mature, effective corporate control market, to realise the transition of state-owned 
equity transfer of listed companies, to make the state-owned capital achieve efficient 
configuration through capital market platform, and to perfect corporate governance of a 
listed company.  
 
First of all, the current laws and regulations on state-owned equity transfer need to be 
improved; a good legal and market environment should be established. The transfer of 
the state-owned equity of listed companies involves many aspects. In order to promote 
state-owned equity transfer, the detailed rules should be formulated, the specific rules 
should be refined, and the approval procedures should be simplified. 599  The 
state-owned equity transfer should be treated differently between industries involved in 
                                                 
598 Yang Hua, 2011. Gongsi Zaizao: Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili de Xinlujing. Beijing: China CITIC Press. P. 
93. 
599 With the development of social economy since the reform and opening up, the traditional SOEs experienced a 
shareholding system reform, and a large number of state-owned property rights transferred into state-owned equity. 
At the beginning of the SOEs restructuring, state-owned equity transfer had been limited strictly by the policy in 
China to effectively prevent the loss of state-owned assets. However, under strict policy control, state-owned equity 
is difficult in realis8ing the value of its diversity. Starting with the 1990s, the government gradually eased restrictions 
on state-owned equity transfer. When we look back through history, many policies and regulations about the transfer 
of state-owned equity have been formulated in different periods. At present, the management of the listed companies 
of state-owned equity transfer is "one case by one case has been handled by one institution for examination and 
approval”. With frequent acquisition restructuring of listed companies, the cumbersome approval process is 
inefficient, such as multidisciplinary departments’ examination and approval for change to the comprehensive 
examination and approval. More discussion about this issue can be seen in Zhang Xiaozhe, 2004. “Shangshi Gongsi 
Guoyou Guquan Zhuanrang Shenpi Guanli de Youguan Wenti”, Contemporary Economics. 02 2004. Pp. 60-61. and 
see Zhao Deming, 2005. “Waizi Shougou Shangshi Gongsi Guoyougu de Chengxu Yinggai Jianhua”, Capital 
Shanghai. 06 2005. P. 73. and see Mei Yi, 2013. “Woguo Guoyou Guquan Zhuanrang de Falv Wenti Yanjiu”, Master 
degree thesis of Master of China Excellent Full-text Database, 07 2013. Pp. 1-35. 
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the national economy and general competitive industries; and the state-owned equity 
transfer of listed company should be classified, managed and monitored.600  
 
Secondly, a more transparent information disclosure mechanism should be established, 
and the transparency of state-owned equity transfer should be increased. Contract 
transfer is the traditional method for transfer of the state-owned equity of a Chinese 
listed company.601 Moreover, the auction after the judicial action is the result of private 
bargaining. 602  Therefore, asymmetric information in the process of transfer is a 
common problem, and establishment of a market-oriented pricing mechanism may 
solve this issue better.  In the state-owned equity transfer of state holding listed 
companies, especially involving state-owned equity transfer into non-state-owned 
equity, buyers should be found through market information disclosure, and public 
bidding in the market, or transfer through property rights trading centre, in order to 
ensure transparency of the state-owned equity transfer and the rationality of pricing.  
 
Moreover, the controlling shareholders’ duty needs to be strengthened, likewise the 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests. Today, the main method of state holding 
listed company equity transfer is still negotiating transfer. Therefore, it is necessary to 
strengthen the duty of care and duty of loyalty of controlling shareholders in the process 
                                                 
600 Since strategic adjustment of state-owned economy had been appointed on the Fifth Plenary Session of 14th 
Central Committee, state-owned economy gradually exited from competitive fields, and focused on matters related 
to the national security, natural monopoly, public services, such as telecommunications, petroleum, aerospace, steel, 
coal gas, war industry. See Bai Jinfu, 2006. “Striking Problems in Current State-Owned Enterprises Reform”, 
Academic Exchange, (9) 2006. and see Gu Shen, 2012. “Xinxing Guoyou Zichan Jingying Gongsi Yanjiu”, Master 
degree thesis of Master of China Excellent Full-text Database. Pp.44-73. 
601 Yang, supra note 486, at 94. 
602 Ibid. 
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of transfer.  And the equity transfer should follow the principles of marketization, 
standardisation and transparency to protect the interests of minority shareholders. The 
money income and purpose of state-owned equity transfer should be announced to the 
public. The supervision measures should be formulated as soon as possible to achieve 
the goal of unified management for the funds of the state-owned equity transfer.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to strengthen the real-time monitoring of secondary market 
trading, increase punishment, crack down on insider trading and market manipulation. 
Securities regulators should focus on abnormal price and volume movements in the 
process of the state-owned equity transfer, and on strengthening supervision 
coordination with the relevant government departments. For insider trading and market 
manipulation, early intervention should take place when necessary. 603  And the 
punishment of the company and the punishment of the responsible person should be 
combined. 
 
                          
                                                 
603 The term “early intervention” refers to a special kind of work method in criminal litigation that mean the 
disciplinary inspection and supervision organs of trial department accepts the cases which form the disciplinary and 
supervisory organs at the same level. When the case of inspection goes to a certain phase, a preliminary trial will be 
conducted, and the case should be transferred to the department after all inspection has been done. See Zhang Wei, 
Xu Fanggu, 1995. “Tantan Anshen Gongzuo de Tiqian Jieru”, Honesty Outlook. 02 1995. Pp. 10-11. In China, early 
intervention was originally produced in a period of taking severe measures against grave illegal and criminal 
activities in 1983, and then gradually carried out by some local People's Procuratorate or the People's Court as an 
important method to deal with major cases or hard cases as soon as possible. See Liu Jiahu, 2012. “Tiqian Jieru shi 
zai Teshu Qingkuang Xia Caiqu de Gongzuo Fangfa”, Jiang Huai Fa Zhi, (03) 2012.”  And see Zhang Zhonglin, Fu 
Kuanzhi, 1991. “Guanyu Tiqian Jieru de Sikao”, Chinese Journal of Law, 03 1991. The term “necessary” refers to 
the cases which found major violations of discipline problems by the audit department, so that the bureau of 
supervision of municipality can master the details on time. See Audit Office of Qingdao City in Shandong Province, 
“Shandong Qingdao Dazao Shenji Jiancha Xiezuo Peihe Pingtai”, Audit Monthly. 11 2012. p. 59.  
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Conclusion 
 
Under the background of the reform and open policy, the SOEs experienced expanded 
autonomy and the period of the responsibility contract system. Then the interests’ 
status of the SOEs had been further established. In addition, the SOEs’ structure had 
been readjusted through the projects about: grasping the large, releasing the small, 
mergers, and standardizing bankruptcy procedures, laid-off employees, and 
re-employment. Large-sized SOEs established MES; small and medium sized SOEs 
completed further development through restructure, partnership, mergers and 
acquisitions, leasing, contract operation, the joint stock cooperation and sale. After 
2003, with the establishment of the SASAC, the central and local state-owned assets 
supervision institutions were established, and regulations gradually implemented. 
According to the government’s administrative rights, Chinese SOEs can be classified 
into the central enterprises and local SOEs. The total number of central enterprise was 
196 at the beginning of the establishment of SASAC in 2003, and then reduced to 110 
by the end of September 2015 through mergers and reorganization.604 
 
Due to the state-owned assets being very active in the stock market, the government 
paid more attention to the securities markets. The problems of CG in Chinese 
state-owned listed companies are representative and universal in China’s securities 
market. Therefore, this situation determines that China's legal framework for corporate 
governance, in fact, is to seek a balance between maintaining and increasing the value 
                                                 
604 See the list of Chinese cerntral enterprises from SASAC, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/c1725422/content.html (accessed on September 30, 2015). 
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of state-owned assets and protecting the interests of the stakeholders. In some cases, the 
public welfare goal of the state-owned equity is more important than the profit-making 
goal. 
 
The system construction and practice of CG for Chinese state-owned listed companies 
have created remarkable achievements. The revision of the current Chinese Company 
Law and Securities Law consolidate the legal basis for the CG. The listed company 
governance principles, the listed company equity incentive measures for the 
administration of the listed company's articles of association, and the listed company 
information disclosure management method have established a basic framework for the 
CG of listed companies. From the point of view of practice, performance appraisal, 
market-oriented employment executives, the overall listing, construction of enterprise 
culture have accumulated rich experience. 
 
Although some achievements in CG had been made, the unique position of state-owned 
stake for the equity structure of listed companies still determines the status of the 
state-owned equity in the market for corporate control, thus leading to a series of issues 
about the Chinese characteristics of the CG of listed company. For example, on the one 
hand, listed company and the controlling shareholders of listed companies are closer to 
dealing with the issues about personnel, assets, finance, and management, whereby the 
listed company listed is the independent legal person nominally, it actually lacks of 
independence. On the other hand, there is a common phenomenon is that the 
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state-owned shares have a dominant status in a state-owned listed company; therefore, 
the CG cannot restrict the behaviours of majority shareholders - state-owned shares. 
The majority shareholders can easily use its advantageous status to seize the minority 
shareholders' interests. To solve these problems, this thesis puts forward suggestions 
and the theory and methods with the features of the localization research concerning the 
CG of Chinese SOEs. 
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Appendix I 
 
Table 4-1 the Main Corporate Governance Evaluation System  
 
Corporate Governance Evaluation 
Organizations or Individuals  
The Content of Evaluation 
Jackson del Martin 1.Social contribution, 
2.Service for Shareholders 
3.The board performance, 
4.The company’s financial policy 
S&P 1.Ownership Structure 
2.The rights of Stakeholders and mutual relations 
3.Financial transparency and disclosure  
4.The board of directors structure and procedure  
Deminor 1.Shareholder’s rights and obligations 
2.To take over the scope of defence  
3.Information,disclosure,transparency 
4.The board of directors structure 
ISS 1.The structure and composition of the board and main 
committee 
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2.The company’s articles of association 
3.The law of the company belongs to state 
4.The salary and compensation of manager and board 
members 
5. Financial performance  
6.Governance practice 
7.Executive shareholders 
8.Director’s education(background) 
DVFA 1.the rights of Shareholders 
2.the governance committee 
3.transparency 
4.the management of company 
5.Audit  
Brunswick Warburg 1.trarsparency 
2.transfer of assets/costs 
3.Equity dispersion degree 
4.Megers and reorganization 
5.bankruptcy 
6.Bid and ownership restrictions 
7.The Attitude for external personnel 
8.The nature of register 
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ICLCG 1.Information disclosure 
2.owerships structure 
3.The board of directors and manager’s structures 
4.the rights of shareholders 
5.the risk of misappropriation 
6.the history of corporate governance 
ICRA 1.ownership structure 
2.management structure 
3.the quality of financial report and other disclosure 
4.The satisfaction of the interests of the shareholders 
CGS 1.the rights of shareholders 
2.the quality of directors 
3.the effectiveness of internal control 
Thailand 1.rights of shareholders 
2.the quality of directors 
3.the effectiveness of internal control 
South Korea 1.rights of shareholders 
2.the structures of the board of directors and committee 
3.procedures of the board of directors and committee 
4.Disclosed to investors and equality ownership 
City University of Hong Kong 1.the board of directors structure 
2.independence and responsibility 
3.minority shareholders’ treatment 
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4.transparency and information disclosure  
5.stakeholders  
6.Rights and human relations  
7.the rights of shareholders 
Taiwan FuJen University 1.the compositions of the board of directions and 
supervision 
2.ownership structure 
3.participation in the management and major shareholders 
4.Ownership structure and concentration 
5.the major shareholders in supermarket  
GMI 1.transparency and disclosure  
2.the accountability of the board of directors 
3.the social responsibility 
4.Ownership structure and concentration 
5.the rights of shareholders 
6.salary of managers 
7.corporate behaviour 
The world Bank 1.The promise of corporate governance 
2.the Result and Functions of the board of directors 
3.Control environment and procedure 
4.transparency and information disclosure 
5.treatment of minority 
Institute of World Economics and 
Politics Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences 
1.the rights of shareholders  
2.Equal treatment to the shareholders 
3.stakeholders 
4.transparecy and information disclosure 
5.Duty of the board of directors 
6.Duty of the board of supervision 
 
Table 4-2 the Evaluation System of Corporate Governance of Chinese Listed Company 
Evaluation Factors 
Shareholder  1. independence of listed company 
2. related party transaction 
3. protection of the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders 
The board of directors 1. rights and obligations  
2. operational efficiency 
3. the structure of the organization 
4. the salary and compensation of directors 
5. the independent director 
The board of supervisors  1. running status 
2. size and structure 
3. competence 
The manager 1. the appointment system  
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2. implementation supporting system 
3. incentive constraint 
Information Disclosure 1. reliability 
2. relevance 
3. timeliness 
The Stakeholders 1. the participation 
2. the coordination  
 
 
Table 4-3 The Evaluation System of shareholders Governance of listed Companies 
Main Factors Elements The Content of Evaluation 
Independence The directors and the 
controlling shareholders 
1. whether the directors of listed 
company are the controlling 
shareholders in the same company 
2. the independence of policy makers 
and controlling shareholders 
3. whether the directors can keep a 
balance when dealing with the 
conflicts of interest between 
shareholders 
Inter-industry competition; 
horizontal competition; 
congener 
Whether the main business of listed 
company and main business shareholders  
Company are the same or the parts of same 
The controlling chain between 
ultimate controllers and listed 
company 
The degree of the divergence between the 
control rights and cash-flow rights of the 
firm’s ultimate controllers to estimate the 
independence of listed companies. The 
controlling chain is longer , the ultimate 
controllers are more likely to  be 
vulnerable to management risks, 
especially financial risks, reduce the 
interest of minority shareholders through a 
pyramid-style ownerships structure  
Overall listing  Avoid horizontal competition, congener 
competition or inter-industry competition, 
reduce the connected transaction  
Protection of the 
rights and 
interests of 
minority 
shareholders 
Shareholders voting system Establish  cumulative voting, adopt 
online vote 
Participation of the 
shareholders 
 
Raise money 1. whether there is abuse to raise money 
2. observes listed company whether to 
charge the raise funds, 
3. Whether the charge procedure is 
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approved by the shareholders meeting. 
Cash dividend payments  Cash dividend payments scale and 
continuity  
 
Table 4-4 The Evaluation System of the Board of Directors Governance of listed company 
Main Factor Elements The content of Evaluation 
The rights and obligations of 
directors 
Rights and obligations The responsibility of directors 
The number of training Liability of directors 
Compensation system Duty of the directors 
D&O liability insurance Obligations of the directors 
Age   
Shareholder directors 
proportion 
The proportion of shareholders 
in the board of directors 
The wording status of directors 
in other company 
The time guarantee to execute 
the directors’ obligation 
Efficiency of the directors Scale of directors  
Whether the chairman and 
manager are separate  
The part-time working status 
for the chairman and general 
manager 
The overlap positions between 
the directors and executive 
The part-time working status 
Gender composition of 
members of the board of 
directors 
Female proportion 
The procedures for the board of 
directors meeting 
The legitimacy of the 
procedures 
The status of the meeting Efficiency 
The structure of the board of 
directors 
Strategy committee  
Audit committee  
Remuneration and appraisal 
committee 
 
Nomination committee   
Other professional committee  
Compensation and salary 
system 
Compensation and salary level  
Compensation structure and 
forms 
 
Performance evaluation 
standards 
 
Independent director system  The professional background 
of the independent director 
 
The part-time working status The working situation of 
independent director in other 
working place 
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Proportion of independent 
directors 
 
Incentive system  Cash/equity 
Duty  Supervision and advisory  
 
 
 
 
Table 4-5 The Evaluation system of the Board of Supervisory of Chinese Listed Company 
Main Factors Elements Inspection Items 
Running Status Or 
Operation 
Conditions 
Whether  a meeting is held and the times 
of the meeting 
Basic Status of Completion of 
work 
Size and Structure 1.Number of Members 
2.employee supervisory 
1.the performance of the 
supervisory 
2.the situation of the board of 
supervisors on behalf of the 
employee supervised the 
company 
Competence 1.professional working background of the 
chairman 
2.the Degree qualification of the chairman 
3.Age of the chairman 
4.shareholding allocation of the chairman 
5.professional working background of 
other supervisors 
6.Degree of other supervisors 
7.Age of other supervisors 
8.shareholding allocation of other 
supervisors 
The relationship between 
elements and competence 
 
 
 
Table 4-6 the Evaluation System of the Managers Governance of Chinese Listed Company 
Main Factors Elements Inspection Items 
The Appointment System Senior Manager The hiring of the managers and 
other managers 
The Chairman and general 
manager 
Part time working status 
Stability of senior manager The charges of manager 
Implementation Supporting 
System 
Executives’ constitute Education background 
The Dual representation Members of managers’ part 
time status 
CEO The CEO’s setting 
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Incentive and restrains 
mechanisms 
Salary level Salary incentive system 
Salary structure The dynamic incentive system 
Equity ratio Long-term incentive status 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-7 The Evaluation System of the Information Disclosure Governance of listed 
Companies 
Main Factor Elements The content of Evaluation 
Reliability of the information 
disclosure 
Whether be issued a modified 
unqualified report 
The legitimacy and fairness of 
financial report 
Irregularities of company Irregularities of company in 
nearly three years. 
The negative reports of 
company 
 
Timeliness of information 
disclosure 
 Whether the information has 
been provided to decision 
maker before the information 
loses its ability to influence on 
decisions  
The correlation of 
information disclosure 
Corporation strategy  
Governance structure   
The competitive environment  
Product and service market   
The profit forecast information  
Empirical risk and financial 
risk  
 
Social responsibilities  
Employee training plans and 
costs 
 
Foreign investment projects   
The distribution of business  
The business status of holding 
company and taking a stake in 
the company 
 
Related party transactions and 
events occurring after the data 
of the balance sheet 
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Table 4-8 The Evaluation System of the Stakeholders’ Governance for Chinese Listed 
Company 
Main Factors Elements Inspection Items 
The participation of 
stakeholders 
Employees participation Employee holding the 
company’s stock 
Participate in and protection of 
the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders 
 
Management of investor 
relations 
Establishment of the web, and 
the management system of 
investor relations’ status 
The coordination of 
stakeholder 
Social responsibility 1.social responsibility 
2.disclosure 
3.the attitude and protection for 
natural environment 
The relationship between 
company and supervisory and 
administration department 
The relationship between listed 
company and the part of stake 
holders 
Litigation and arbitration  
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